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Abstract
Application development today is characterized by ever shorter release cycles
and more frequent change requests. Hence development methods such as service
composition are increasingly arousing interest as viable alternative approaches.
While employing web services as building blocks rapidly reduces development
times, it raises new challenges regarding security and compliance since their im-
plementation remains a black box which usually cannot be controlled. Security
in particular gets even more challenging since some applications require domain-
specific security objectives such as location privacy. Another important aspect
is that security objectives are in general no singletons but subject to interdepen-
dence. Hence this thesis addresses the question of how to consider interdependent
security and compliance in service composition.
Current approaches for service composition do neither consider interdepen-
dent security nor compliance. Selecting suiting services for a composition is a
combinatorial problem which is known to be NP-hard. Often this problem is
solved utilizing genetic algorithms in order to obtain near-optimal solutions in
reasonable time. This is particularly the case if multiple objectives have to be
optimized simultaneously such as price, runtime and data encryption strength.
Security properties of compositions are usually verified using formal methods.
However, none of the available methods supports interdependence effects or
defining arbitrary security objectives. Similarly, no current approach ensures com-
pliance of service compositions during service selection. Instead, compliance is
verified afterwards which might necessitate repeating the selection process in case
of a non-compliant solution.
In this thesis, novel approaches for considering interdependent security and
compliance in service composition are being presented and discussed. Since no
formal methods exist covering interdependence effects for security, this aspect is
covered in terms of a security assessment. An assessment method is developed
which builds upon the notion of structural decomposition in order to assess the
fulfillment of arbitrary security objectives in terms of a utility function. Interde-
pendence effects are being modeled as dependencies between utility functions. In
order to enable compliance-awareness, an approach is presented which checks
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compliance of compositions during service selection and marks non-compliant
parts. This enables to repair the corresponding parts during the selection process
by replacing the current services and hence avoids the necessity to repeat the se-
lection process. It is demonstrated how to embed the presented approaches into a
genetic algorithm in order to ease integration with existing approaches for service
composition. The developed approaches are being compared to state-of-the-art
genetic algorithms using simulations.
Zusammenfassung
Anwendungsentwicklung ist heutzutage gekennzeichnet durch immer kürzere
Release-Zyklen und immer häufigere Änderungswünsche. Daher wecken Entwick-
lungsmethoden wie Service Composition in zunehmendem Maße Interesse als
praktikable Alternativansätze. Obwohl die Nutzung von Web Service-Bausteinen
Entwicklungszeiten rapide senkt, führt dies auch zu neuen Herausforderungen
hinsichtlich Sicherheit und Compliance weil die konkrete Implementierung in
diesem Fall eine Blackbox darstellt, die üblicherweise nicht der eigenen Kontrolle
unterliegt. Was die Sicherheitsherausforderungen noch vergrößert ist der Um-
stand, dass manche Anwendungen domänenspezifische Sicherheitsziele benötigen
wie z. B. Location Privacy. Ein weiterer wichtiger Aspekt in diesem Zusammen-
hang ist, dass Sicherheitsziele i. A. nicht unabhängig voneinander sind, sondern
in interdependenter Wechselwirkung stehen. Daher beschäftigt sich diese Arbeit
mit der Frage, wie interdependente Sicherheit und Compliance im Rahmen der
Service Composition beachtet werden können.
Gegenwärtige Ansätze zur Service Composition betrachten weder interdepen-
dente Sicherheit noch Compliance. Die Auswahl von passenden Services für eine
Komposition ist ein kombinatorisches Problem, welches bekanntlich NP-schwer
ist. Oftmals wird dieses Problem durch den Einsatz genetischer Algorithmen
gelöst um in vertretbarer Zeit nahezu optimale Lösungen zu erhalten. Dies ist
insb. dann der Fall, falls mehrere Ziele simultan optimiert werden sollen wie z. B.
Preis, Laufzeit und Verschlüsselungsstärke. Sicherheitseigenschaften von Kompo-
sitionen werden üblicherweise mittels formaler Methoden nachgewiesen. Keine
der verfügbaren formalen Methoden unterstützt jedoch die Modellierung von
Interdependenzeffekten oder die Definition beliebiger Sicherheitsziele. Analog un-
terstützt kein derzeitiges Verfahren die Einhaltung von Compliance-Eigenschaften
während der Serviceauswahl. Statt dessen wird die Compliance im Nachhinein
überprüft, was es möglicherweise erforderlich macht, den Auswahlprozess zu
wiederholen falls eine Lösung nicht compliant ist.
In dieser Arbeit werden neue Ansätze zur Beachtung von interdependenter
Sicherheit sowie Compliance im Rahmen von Service Composition vorgestellt
und diskutiert. Aufgrund des Umstands, dass es keine formalen Methoden gibt,
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xdie Interdependenzeffekte im Rahmen von Sicherheit abbilden, wird dieser As-
pekt im Sinne einer Bewertung abgebildet. Es wird eine Bewertungsmethode
entwickelt, welche auf der Idee der strukturellen Dekomposition aufbaut um die
Erfüllung von Sicherheitszielen auf Nutzenfunktionen abzubilden. Interdepen-
denzeffekte werden als Abhängigkeiten zwischen Nutzenfunktionen modelliert.
Zur Beachtung von Compliance-Anforderungen wird ein Verfahren präsentiert,
welches die Compliance von Kompositionen während der Serviceauswahl über-
prüft und alle Teile einer Komposition markiert, die nicht compliant sind. Dies
ermöglicht es, die Compliance der entsprechenden Teile der Komposition noch
während des Auswahlprozesses durch Austauschen der betreffenden Services
wiederherzustellen und dadurch die Notwendigkeit einer möglichen Wiederhol-
ung des Auswahlprozesses zu vermeiden. Es wird demonstriert, wie die entwick-
elten Ansätze in einen genetischen Algorithmus eingebettet werden können um
die Integration mit bestehenden Ansätzen zur Service Composition zu erleichtern.
Die entwickelten Ansätze werden mit modernen genetischen Algorithmen mittels
Simulationen verglichen.
Printing Conventions
In this thesis different type styles are used for highlighting purposes.
Person, product and organization names are written in CAPITALS.
Important terms and expressions are written with italic font.
Terms and expressions with a special meaning for a certain context such as
aspects in answering a question or parts of a concept are written with bold font.
Source codes and links to websites are written with monospaced font.
Citations and phrases from natural language are written with “double quota-
tion marks”.
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Part I
Foundations

Chapter 1
Introduction
“A journey of a thousand miles begins with a
single step.”
– LAO TZU
I N THIS INITIAL CHAPTER the work at hand is motivated at first by briefly dis-cussing the background of service composition and by identifying research
challenges (Section 1.1). Subsequently, concrete research questions are deducted
from these challenges and it is sketched how these are addressed (Section 1.2).
Next the structure of this thesis is illustrated (Section 1.3). The chapter closes with
a presentation of published results and how research has been developed over the
course of time (Section 1.4).
1.1 Motivation
Nowadays, Service Oriented Computing (SOC) [PTD+07] is widely seen as a
promising approach to implement business processes of any complexity. Single
tasks (i. e. process steps) are assigned to external web services which perform these
tasks at a certain Quality of Service (QoS) level. The result of such an assignment is
called a service composition [BSD14]. Each service composition thus implements a
business process at a certain global QoS level. However, in real-world applications
there usually exist global QoS constraints such as maximum response time, price,
etc. The assignment of services to tasks therefore is modeled as an optimization
problem and tackled with QoS-aware service selection algorithms. A common
approach for modeling the service selection problem is the Multidimensional
Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problem (MMKP) which was made popular by YU et
al. [YZL07]. Because MMKP is NP-hard, heuristic approaches such as Genetic
Algorithms (GAs) are utilized to obtain near-optimal solutions in short time.
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Security and compliance are two important issues in SOC since service com-
positions are dealing directly or indirectly with sensitive information (i. e. critical
data which is processed by the composition). As such, data theft, information leak-
age and compliance violations might cause tremendous damage, both financially
and to a business’ reputation1. Compliance in the context of business process man-
agement has been studied thoroughly (cf., e. g., [ALS11; BBG+07; DGM+12; GK07;
GV06; LMX07; MKL+09; SGN07; YMH+06]). To our very best knowledge however,
compliance issues in service selection have not been covered so far. Regarding
security issues in service composition, two major groups of approaches can be
identified. The first group are QoS models (cf., e. g., [LJL+03; OEH02; CDE+05;
CP09; JRM04; SCD+97]) which consider security either as a single QoS property or
as several mutually independent properties. The second group consists of formal
methods (cf., e. g., [BDF06; CFH06; POM08; SYT+10]) which provide facilities to
express security requirements either globally or on the level of single tasks. These
approaches are insufficient for at least three reasons:
1. Security objectives are subject to interdependence2.
2. Some domain-specific applications require security objectives which are
usually not covered by current QoS-models and formal methods such as
location privacy for mobile applications.
3. The implementation of QoS properties (e. g., different implementations of the
same encryption algorithm) might have a significant influence on a security
objective.
Thus the question is how to determine the security of service compositions
with regards to above aspects? Since formal methods and security metrics are
designed with single security objectives in mind, a more flexible approach is re-
quired. One approach to tackle this challenge, first introduced by WANG and
WOLF, is to utilize the notion of structural decomposition in order to identify basic
measurable components for intangible security objectives. For each identified
component the influence on a security objective is determined based on experts’
opinion. Achievement of a security objective is consequently measured as utility
value which thus enables comparison [WW97]. Hence the result is not a formal
security model but a security assessment method. Given such a comparable metric
1 In Germany for instance, the average damage caused by security breaches was $199 per lost
or stolen data record in 2013 [Pon13].
2 WOLF and PFITZMANN discussed the interdependent nature of security objectives and found
that security objectives either strengthen, weaken or implicate each other [WP00].
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for different security objectives, the question arises of “how much” security is nec-
essary? SANDHU proposed the notion of “good enough security” which demands
that security measures should be employed with the application in mind and that
maximum security should not be aimed at if not explicitly requested by the user
[San03]. Obviously, this concept is complementary to structural decomposition as
it implies defining constraints on utility values which, again, represent security
assessments of single security objectives. Therefore the author believes that these
two concepts are essential key factors in designing an approach for assessing
interdependent security in service composition.
1.2 Research Outline
The central question addressed in this thesis is how good enough secure service
compositions can be determined considering interdependent security goals and
compliance requirements. This leads to a number of research questions which
need to be considered. Following is an overview of these questions and how they
are addressed in this thesis.
Research Question 1 What are the requirements for a method for service
composition with respect to interdependent security and compliance?
As a prerequisite to answering this question, the current state-of-the-art in ser-
vice composition is being discussed from various perspectives in Chapter 3. This
discussion forms the basis for deducting concrete requirements for a service com-
position method which considers interdependent security and compliance. Each
requirement is being compared against related works in order to clearly identify
research gaps.
Research Question 2 How can interdependent security objectives be
assessed in service composition?
The basic approach for security assessment by WANG and WULF assumes that
security goals are singletons with no mutual relationships [WW97]. Hence the
focus of this question is how the approach of WANG and WULF can be extended
to cover the structures discovered by WOLF and PFITZMANN (cf. [WP00]). This is
achieved by first discussing interdependencies in security from a high-level per-
spective. Based on the results of this discussion, an approach is developed which
allows for modeling interdependencies between security assessment functions. In
the remainder of this thesis such functions will be referred to as protection functions.
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It should be emphasized that this thesis does not propose new mathematics but
employs the notion of structural decomposition to assess the security of service
compositions with regards to the structures discovered by WOLF and PFITZMANN.
SANDHU’s notion of “good enough security” (cf. [San03]) is captured conceptually
by the presented approach in terms of function constraints.
Research Question 3 How can compliance be verified in service composi-
tion?
As stated, compliance has not been yet considered in the context of service compo-
sition. Hence in order to answer this question and to propose an approach, firstly
a thorough literature review on business process compliance is performed. The
goal is to study which aspects of compliance can be verified by different classes
of approaches. Reversely, this will reveal which compliance aspects have to be
considered in service composition. Subsequently, this finding is utilized to develop
an approach which allows for transforming these aspects of compliance into math-
ematical constraints. It is furthermore shown how this approach can be integrated
with GAs. Since GAs are nowadays a commonly employed technique for selecting
services, the focus was to develop an approach which can be employed in existing
approaches for service composition with minimal efforts.
Research Question 4 What are the impacts of considering interdependent
security and compliance on service composition?
Since “there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch” it is essential to understand the
benefits and associated costs of the methods proposed in this thesis. Hence all
developed approaches are being extensively evaluated employing simulations in
Chapter 7. The goal is to understand the impact of different problem sizes and
numbers of protection functions on service selection in general and on the methods
proposed in this thesis in particular. All results with respect to the approaches
presented here are being compared against state-of-the-art GAs.
To answer these research questions, a variety of research methods are employed,
namely modeling, simulations and prototyping [WH06]. This is in accordance with
FRANK’s conception that the variety of problems in information systems research
can hardly be solved with a single method and thus a pluralistic approach is
required [Fra06]. Hence this thesis follows the paradigm of construction science
which is an established scientific method in German information systems research
(cf., e. g., [Fra07; ÖBF+10]). Moreover, this thesis makes use of further, mainly
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mathematical methods which are:
• Mathematical Modeling,
• Linear Optimization with Multiple Objectives,
• Genetic Algorithms,
• and Decision Making.
Mathematical modeling is used e. g., in formulating the basic service selection
problem. This basic formulation is extended to consider interdependent security
objectives. Security objectives are modeled as linear functions following the no-
tion of structural decomposition. As practitioners are typically dealing with more
than one security objective, multiple objectives need to be considered simulta-
neously. Problems of this class however yield the feature that their solution sets
might contain an infinite number of Pareto optimal solutions. As such heuristics
are utilized, i. e. GAs, in order to approximate the set of Pareto optimal solutions.
Decision making techniques are required in the process of formulating security
objectives as functions, more precisely to estimate the influence of single QoS
attributes on a security objective.
Some related topics had to be excluded in order to sharpen the focus on the
main contributions. In particular, this thesis does not cover procedures for trans-
forming verbal process descriptions to process models. Furthermore, model-
driven transformations of process models into executable forms are also not cov-
ered but only sketched to give the reader an impression of a service composition’s
outcome. Finally, the developed prototype has not been evaluated in terms of
usability. As has been stated, the main purpose of the prototype is to proof the
applicability of the contributions presented in this thesis. Hence ethnographic
studies or empirical evaluations by means of design science are beyond scope. For
further information regarding these topics, the interested reader is kindly referred
to the corresponding standard literature.
1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis consists of nine chapters which are organized in four parts. Part I intro-
duces essential foundations which are necessary for understanding the approaches
presented in Part II. These approaches are subsequently being evaluated in Part
III. Finally, Part IV concludes the thesis. Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure of
this thesis and shows in particular dependencies between chapters of each part.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Chapter 3
Service Composition
Part I
Foundations
Chapter 4
Requirements Analysis and State of the Art
Chapter 5
Approach
Chapter 6
Proof of Concept
Part II
Design &
Implementation
Chapter 7
Numerical Results
Chapter 8
Case Study
Part III
Evaluation
Chapter 9
Conclusion & Outlook
Part IV
Finale
Figure 1.1: Structure of this thesis
Chapters ordered below each other indicate content dependencies while chapters
which are placed next to each other indicate that the respective contents are in the
broadest sense independent from each other. Following is a brief overview of the
remaining chapters.
Chapter 2 introduces the conceptual and mathematical foundations this thesis
is based upon. In particular, these are Business Process Management (BPM), SOC,
interdependent security, compliance as well as models and solving approaches for
mathematical optimization.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of service composition. It covers different
composition topologies, the service selection problem, compliance issues and gives
a brief overview about alternate composition approaches. The content provided in
this chapter is essential for understanding the approaches presented in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4 presents a requirements analysis based on the discussions of the
previous chapters. Elicited requirements are checked against state of the art
approaches in service selection. The primary results of this chapter are thus clearly
identified research gaps in service selection literature.
Chapter 5 covers the proposed approaches for addressing the research gaps
identified in the previous chapter. A framework is presented for assessing the
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security of service compositions with regards to interdependent security objectives.
Furthermore, an approach is introduced for considering compliance requirements
in service selection with GAs. Latter is a drop-in solution which is illustrated by
employing an existing GA.
Chapter 6 presents a graphical tool which has been developed in order to
support users in applying the approaches presented in Chapter 5. The tool aims at
first hand to be a proof of concept for the methods developed in this thesis. Thus
it is not considered a mature software product, but a prototype for demonstration
purposes.
Chapter 7 provides a thorough numerical analysis of the drop-in solution
presented in Chapter 5 against related GAs. It shows the feasibility of the pro-
posed approach in terms of algorithm runtime and consideration of compliance
requirements. Furthermore, areas for further improvement are identified.
Chapter 8 reports an application of the framework for assessing interdependent
security proposed in Chapter 5. The presented case study is from the EU FP7
project di.me3.
Chapter 9 finally summarizes the main results of this thesis, discusses some
open questions, shows possible directions for future research and concludes the
work at hand.
1.4 Publications & Research Development
Parts of this thesis have been previously presented at international academic
conferences and workshops and have also been published in peer-reviewed pro-
ceedings and international journals. This section gives an overview of the parts
which have been previously published and how research has developed since
publication.
The approach for considering interdependent security in service composition
(cf. Section 5.2) has been initially published at the 28th Symposium on Applied
Computing (ACM SAC) [KK13a]. An extended version of this paper has been
published in the Journal Science of Computer Programming [KFK15]. The content of
Section 5.2 is a mostly unmodified reprint of parts of the latter. Some enhancements
have been performed which include connecting the content of the respective article
with sections from this thesis and adjusting the notation used in the article to the
one employed here. An application of this approach in the EU FP7 project di.me has
3 http://www.dime-project.eu/
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been reported in a paper which was published at the 10th International Conference
on Information Technology - New Generations (ITNG) [KHB+13]. This publication
formed the basis for Chapter 8.
The algorithm for compliance-aware service selection (cf. Section 5.3) has
been published at the 11th International Conference on Service Oriented Computing
(ICSOC) [KK13b]. In its original version however, the algorithm did not perform
any kind of initial feasibility check. Hence this step is not covered in the paper. The
remaining parts of Section 5.3 are an almost unmodified reprint of this publication.
Parts of the prototype’s user interface discussed in Chapter 6 have been pub-
lished in a paper which was presented at the 5th International Conference on Online
Communites and Social Computing which was held as part of HCI International 2013
[KBK13]. Particularly, the content of Section 6.2.2 on transforming optimization
problems with subject to user preferences is based on this publication. The remain-
ing parts of Chapter 6 are based on [KFK15].
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
“The beginning is the most important part of
the work.”
– PLATO
T HIS CHAPTER FOCUSES on concepts, definitions and models which are es-sential for understanding the work at hand. At first an overview is given
about Business Process Management (Section 2.1) and Service-Oriented Comput-
ing (Section 2.2) which are the conceptual foundations this thesis is built upon.
What follows next is a discussion about interdependent security (Section 2.3) and
Business Process Compliance (Section 2.4) which are the areas of research to which
this thesis contributes. The contributions of this thesis heavily leverage optimiza-
tion models and solving approaches which are discussed afterwards (Section 2.5).
A short summary concludes this chapter (Section 2.6).
2.1 Business Process Management
The focus of this work is on service-oriented projections of business processes.
All steps from defining over executing to analyzing business processes are sum-
marized under the term business process management. The following sections
provide an overview about the most important terms and definitions as well as
the state of the art in implementing and executing business processes.
2.1.1 Overview
The outcome of each business activity is a product, either tangible or intangible.
Examples include bread, insurances, software and haircuts. In order for these
products to come into existence, a set of single tasks needs to be performed in a
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specific order. The order of these tasks is determined by a set of conditions. Each
task is performed by a certain resource, i. e. a person, a machine or a group of
persons and/or machines [AH02a]. For instance, in order to make a bread, it is
mandatory to have the right ingredients at hand and mix them first. As soon as
the dough takes a certain consistency, it is served to an oven. As soon as the bread
reached a certain coloring, it is taken off the oven. If nothing went wrong over
the course of the process, the result should be a fresh and tasty bread. While in a
private household most tasks except the mixing might be performed by a human,
in industrial production most if not all tasks are performed by machines with
humans rarely performing tasks other than supervision and quality control. In
contrast to processes which can be observed in nature (e. g. decomposition and
fermentation) business processes are characterized by the circumstance that each
single step needs to be actively performed by a resource. On the contrary, natural
processes take place passively and can be controlled only conditionally. Based upon
these observations, a business process is defined as follows4:
Definition 2.1 [BUSINESS PROCESS]. A business process is a set of tasks which are
ordered according to a set of conditions and where each task is actively performed by a
certain resource in order achieve a certain outcome (i. e. product).
The knowledge regarding business processes can be represented using a variety
of graphical notations and models (cf. below). Such a graphical representation of
a business process is what stipulates a business process model5:
Definition 2.2 [BUSINESS PROCESS MODEL]. A business process model is a graphi-
cal representation of the knowledge regarding the execution of a business process.
A business process describes an ideal case of execution, similar to PLATO’S
theory of Ideas. In real-world, a process is executed multiple times in different
contexts. Taking up on the introductory example about making bread, a business
process correlates to the knowledge of making bread as it has been passed from
master baker to master baker over the course of generations. In each period of time
and at each geographical location however, the same business process is executed
utilizing potentially different personnel, technical equipment and ingredients.
Such a single execution of a business process in a certain context is called a business
4 In the remainder of this thesis, the term process is used interchangeably.
5 In the remainder of this thesis, the term process model is used interchangeably.
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process instance6 [Wes07]:
Definition 2.3 [BUSINESS PROCESS INSTANCE]. A business process instance is a
single execution of a business process in a certain context.
In order to (semi-)automatize business processes employing Information Tech-
nology (IT), facilities are required to support all activities related to the lifecycle of
business processes. This lifecycle consists of the following phases (cf. Figure 2.1)
[AHW03; Wes07]:
• Process design: (Re-)Design of processes according to some process descrip-
tion. The outcome is a process model.
• System configuration: Transformation of a process model into a form which
can either be executed itself or which empowers an information system to
execute process instances based on a process model.
• Process enactment: Execution of process instances employing the configured
system.
• Diagnosis: Analysis of operational systems to identify potential problems and
to identify possibilities for improvement.
Process
design
System
configuration
Process
enactment
Diagnosis
Figure 2.1: The BPM lifecycle according to VAN DER AALST et al. (cf. [AHW03])
These facilities are subsumed under the term BPM [AHW03; Wes07]. WESKE
defined BPM as follows:
Definition 2.4 [BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT]. “Business Process Manage-
ment includes concepts, methods, and techniques to support the design, administration,
configuration, enactment and analysis of business processes” [Wes07, p. 5].
6 In the remainder of this thesis, the term process instance is used interchangeably.
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In the past, business processes were performed manually by enterprise person-
nel. With increasing utilization of IT in businesses, software tools were developed
for supporting the enactment of business processes. A necessary requirement for
this kind of tool support is a facility to represent business process in a form which
can be interpreted and executed by software. For these software tools, the term
Business Process Management System (BPMS) has been coined [Wes07]:
Definition 2.5 [BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM]. Business Process
Management System (BPMS) refers to software tools which support the enactment of
business processes based on a process representation.
Two other terms which are frequently encountered in the context of business
processes are workflow and Workflow Management (WfM). According to the
Workflow Management Coalition (WfMC), a workflow is a (partly) automatized
business process which is characterized by an exchange of documents, informa-
tion and tasks between participants [WfM99]. WfM is viewed as a synonym for
workflow by the WfMC [WfM99]. This view is however not shared by the research
community. A still widely adopted position is that WfM is a part of BPM but with
focus on the utilization of software to support process execution [AHW03]. To
put it in the words of VAN DER AALST et al.: “The focus of traditional workflow
management (systems) is on the lower half of the BPM lifecycle” [AHW03, p.
5]. Hence in the remainder of this work, workflows will be regarded as (partly)
automatized business processes and WfM as a subset of BPM.
In the following, further properties of business processes will be introduced
based upon a sample process for insurance claiming. This sample process is taken
from [AH02a]. While in [AH02a] the authors represented the process as process
diagram, it is being modeled utilizing the Business Process Modeling Notation
(BPMN) [OMG11] here instead. The reason is that nowadays BPMN is widely
utilized in the context of SOA and service composition while process diagrams are
rarely seen. Alternative notations for business processes which are in use today are
workflow nets (a class of Petri nets with certain business process-related properties)
[Aal98], Event-driven Process Chains (EPCs) [Sch99] and the Multi-Perspective
Enterprise Modeling (MEMO) framework [Fra98]7. A formal approach which
is frequently used to represent and analyze business processes is the pi-calculus
[PW05].
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the BPMN elements used in the sample
7 An overview and a discussion of these notations (except of MEMO) is provided by e. g. [Wes07,
Chapter 4].
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process. This overview is by no means exhaustive but represents a minimal set of
notation elements which are used throughout this thesis. For a complete overview,
the interested reader is referred to [OMG11].
Table 2.1: Overview of BPMN elements
Element Description Notation
Start Event
As the name indicates, a start event marks an
entry point of a process. It may be decorated with
a marker such as a message (cf. below) to indicate
different triggers. A process may have multiple
start events.
Intermediate
Event
Intermediate events are placed between start and
end events and affect the flow of a process. They
may be decorated with markers such as messages
(cf. below).
End Event
In contrast to a start event, an end events marks
one possible end of a process. It may be decorated
with a marker such as a message (cf. below) to
indicate different results. A process may have
multiple end events.
Task
A task represents an atomic activity in a process,
i. e. a single process step which might not be
further broken down.
Exclusive
Gateway
Exclusive gateways are utilized to indicate ex-
clusive decision and merging points in a process
flow.
Parallel
Gateway
Parallel gateways indicate forks and joins in a
process model.
Normal Flow
A normal flow indicates a path of sequence flow
in a process model which is not subject to any
condition.
Message
Flow
A message flow indicates sending and receiving
of a message between two participants where
each participant has to be represented by a pool
(cf. below).
Message
A message indicates communication between
two participants which are represented by dif-
ferent pools (cf. below).
Pool
A pool represents a participant in a collabora-
tive process. It may have a content, i. e. a pro-
cess model, or may be treated as a black box.
Latter is usually the case when modeling non-
deterministic participants such as customers.
The sample process is triggered by an incoming insurance claim and consists
of the following tasks [AH02a, p. 4]:
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1. Recording the receipt of the claim;
2. Establishing the type of claim (for example, fire, motor vehicle, travel, profes-
sional);
3. Checking the client’s policy, to confirm that it does in principle cover what
has been claimed for;
4. Checking the premium, to confirm that payments are up to date;
5. Rejection, if task 3 or 4 has a negative result;
6. Producing a rejection letter;
7. Estimating the amount to be paid, based upon the claim details;
8. Appointment of an assessor to research the circumstances of the damage and
to establish its value;
9. Consideration of emergency measures to limit further damage or relieve dis-
tress;
10. Provision of emergency measures if approved as part of task 8;
11. Establishment or revision of amount to be paid and offer to client;
12. Recording of client’s reaction: acceptance or objection;
13. Assessment of objection and decision to revise (task 11) or to take legal pro-
ceedings (task 14);
14. Legal proceedings-,
15. payment of claim; and
16. closure of claim: filing.
The BPMN representation of this process is depicted in Figure 2.2. What
is maybe striking most is that the tasks are not simply processed in the same
order as they are enumerated above. The reason for this circumstance is that the
chosen notation naturally dictates by its language elements how to express process
properties such as conditions, dependencies and concurrencies. In the following,
a deeper look will be taken at certain parts of the process description in order to
introduce process related terms. As a visual support, the corresponding parts
in Figure 2.2 will also be referenced (by enumerating the names of the involved
elements in “quotation marks”).
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Tasks 1 and 2 (“Record Claim Receipt” and “Establish Type of Claim”) are
performed in the same order as in the description. If two or more tasks need to be
performed in a strict order like this, it is called a sequence [AH02a].
Tasks 3 and 4 (“Check Client’s Policy” and “Check Premium”) have no mutual
dependencies and thus can be processed in parallel. However, the decision in task
5 (“Check Results Positive?”) requires that tasks 3 and 4 are finished before. This
is achieved via synchronization [AH02a].
The tasks 11, 12 and 13 (“Establish or Revise Amount to be Paid”, “Record
Client Reaction” and “Assess Objection”) might be repetitive, depending on the
client’s reaction and the outcome of the assessment in case of an objection. Each
repetition is called an iteration [AH02a].
As can be seen, business process models are useful to represent structured
processes in a generic fashion. Improper modeling may however lead to structural
errors such as deadlocks and dangling tasks and transitions. The process model in
Figure 2.3(a) causes a deadlock since an XOR-split is being synchronized by an
AND-join which obviously can never be fulfilled. In Figure 2.3(b), task “D” can
never be performed and consequently the transition to task “A” neither as well.
Hence both represent dangling elements with no effect on the process at all. While
some errors such as dangling tasks and transitions may simply lead to redundant
process parts, severe errors such as deadlocks may prevent business processes from
ever being finished. Correctness criteria for business processes are summarized
under the term soundness which is a combination of proper termination and non-
redundancy of transitions. However, a discussion and formal presentation is out
of scope of this thesis. Instead, the interested reader is referred to [Oan07; Wes07].
Since most BPMN editors today support verification of soundness criteria for
given process models, it is assumed in this thesis, that considered process models
are sound.
A
B
(a) Deadlock
D
A
(b) Dangling task and tran-
sition
Figure 2.3: Some structural errors in process models
2.1.2 Implementing and Executing Business Processes
As stated in Section 2.1.1, a BPMS is responsible for the enactment of business
processes. The technical architecture of a BPMS has an impact on the way how
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processes are executed. As business processes are increasingly spanning several
organizations and involve systems from more than one technological era, SOA
(cf. Section 2.2.2) has become a first-choice architectural style for implementing
and executing distributed business logic. Employing SOA, a business process is
implemented as a composition of web services (cf. Section 2.2.2.3). This however
raises the need to coordinate the execution of web services according to a given
process model in e. g. BPMN. For this purposes, several languages have been
proposed which will be shortly reviewed in the following.
Early approaches were the Web Services Flow Language (WSFL) [Ley01] by
IBM and XLANG [Mic] by MICROSOFT. WSFL is a XML-based language which
allows for defining service compositions as a flow model. Single process activities
are represented as nodes in a graph model. The language allows for defining
transition conditions for single nodes in order to capture conditional activity
transitions of process models [Ley01]. XLANG is a proprietary scripting language
by MICROSOFT which was developed for the company’s BIZTALK server. The
language has a block structure and allows for defining nested control flows [Mic].
Today, the de facto standard is the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL)
[OAS07]. It is being maintained by the Organization for the Advancement of Struc-
tured Information Standards (OASIS) and can be considered as a merge between
WSFL and XLANG. The language is XML-based and allows for nested expressions
employing a block structure. Furthermore it allows to define links for expressing
graph-like structures. The language has been thoroughly studied by academia due
to its close link to BPMN8 and several approaches for transforming process models
into BPEL have been proposed. Examples include Petri nets [KM05], workflow
nets [AL08], EPC [SI07] and UML [Gar03]. However, it was also found that a fully-
fledged transformation from BPMN to BPEL is not possible. One major reason is
that BPMN and BPEL represent different classes of languages, i. e. graph-based
and block-structured [ODH+06]. Another reason is that BPMN provides a richer
set of modeling constructs, some of which cannot be expressed with BPEL [RM06].
As such, fully automatic transformations can only be performed on reduced sets
of BPMN elements such as presented in e. g. [ODH+06].
Another current alternative is Yet Another Workflow Language (YAWL) which
was first introduced by VAN DER AALST and TER HOFSTEDE in 2002 [AH02b] and
which is today maintained by the YAWL FOUNDATION. VAN DER AALST et al.
observed that certain workflow patterns (e. g. those including multiple instances)
cannot be realised directly in Petri nets but required additional specification ef-
8 In fact a minor goal of BPMN was to serve as a visualization for XML-based business process
execution languages such as BPEL [OMG11].
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forts. As such YAWL was proposed as an evolution of Petri nets for the needs
of workflow definition. The language itself provides graphical notations as well
as modified Petri net semantics customized to the needs of workflow definition
[AH02b]. YAWL is not as widely used as BPEL. However, in research YAWL is
gaining more and more attention which is illustrated by the fact that in 2013 the
first YAWL symposium took place9.
Finally, the Web Modeling Language (WebML) was introduced in October 2000
and provides a graphical notation as well as a methodology for designing web
applications. It provides different perspectives for specifying structure, presenta-
tion and personalization of web applications for users and user groups. WebML
is patented and maintained by WEBRATIO [Webb]. Several approaches exist for
transforming BPMN models to WebML (cf., e. g., [Bra06]) and WEBRATIO also
provides a range of respective tools [Webb]. In terms of support tools and available
publications however, WebML is not as widespread as BPEL and YAWL, neither
in industry nor in academia.
Currently emerging alternatives for process implementation are the Interaction
Flow Modeling Language (IFML) and the Jolie programming language.
IFML is based on WebML and is also developed by WEBRATIO. In contrast to
WebML it was adopted by the Object Management Group (OMG) in March 2013
for publication as open standard and is, as of November 2014, in the beta phase.
IFML is a generalization of WebML; where WebML focused on web applications,
IFML is a general language for defining content, user interaction and control
behavior for a wide range of applications such as Rich Internet Applications and
desktop applications. IFML allows for binding its models to business logic in
different formats such as BPMN10 [Weba].
Jolie is an open source programming language developed especially for dis-
tributed service-oriented web applications [The13a]. Jolie’s formal basis is the
process calculus SOCK [GLG+06] and the syntax has certain similarities with C.
Listing 2.1 shows an example sending the message “Hello, world!” to operation
“println” of service “Console”. This demonstrates the close syntactical connection
between Jolie and the paradigm of service-orientation (cf. Section 2.2). The appli-
cability of Jolie for implementing business processes has been demonstrated (cf.,
e. g., [Mon13]).
9 http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-982/
10 A thorough example of an online bookstore scenario illustrating the connection of IFML with
Unified Modeling Language (UML) and BPMN models can be found at: http://www.ifml.
org/wp-content/uploads/IFML-Bookstore-Example.pdf
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Listing 2.1: “Hello, world!” example in Jolie
1 include "console.iol"
2
3 main
4 {
5 println@Console( "Hello, world!" )()
6 }
2.2 Service-Oriented Computing
SOC refers to a pool of complementary concepts, the most important one being
service orientation. Service orientation follows the paradigm of Separation of Con-
cerns as discussed by Dijkstra [Dij82] and aims at building applications based on
“building blocks” of application logic. Here, each building block realizes a certain
task of almost any complexity such as validation of email addresses, transforma-
tion of data between certain formats and implementation of a sales process. These
building blocks are called services. As the service concept plays a fundamental role
in SOC, it is being discussed first in the following. The results of this inquiry are
then utilized to define another important term in this context, namely e-service.
With this conceptual foundation being laid, the term SOA and its buildings blocks
are introduced before discussing the most recent incarnation of SOC, namely cloud
computing.
2.2.1 Services and E-Services
Today the service sector is a vital part of each developed country’s economy. For
instance, in Germany the contribution of the service sector to the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) increased from 57% in 1980 to 71% in 201011. The upcoming of
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) lead to a new kind of ser-
vices such as e-mail, e-commerce, video conferencing, etc. These services are
usually called electronic services (e-services). In 2013, e-services made up 4.67% of
Germany’s GDP12. These figures illustrate the importance of services in today’s
economies. But what exactly is a service?
In economics, output is traditionally classified into goods and services where a
service is defined as a product which “perishes in the very instant of its produc-
11 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TETC.ZS
12 https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/09/PE14_306_
811.html
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tion”13 or which is simply “immaterial”14. This classical view dates back to the
late 18th century and has been utilized for about three centuries with more or less
slight modifications. In fact, a publicly little noticed debate regarding the validity
of this view took place behind the scenes15. In the second half of the 20th century,
the classic service definition has been argued by HILL who pointed out that certain
services (namely those affecting goods) have some similar features with goods
while others (namely those affecting persons) have vastly different traits from
goods [Hil77]. Based upon this observation, he found in his later work the classical
dichotomy between goods and services to be insufficient as well [Hil99].
HILL argues that an important feature which constitutes a service is an eco-
nomic relationship between producers and consumers based upon mutual agree-
ment [Hil77; Hil99]. Consequently, he defined services not as a special category
of goods, but as “a change in the condition of a person, or of a good belonging to
some economic unit, which is brought about as the result of the activity of some
other economic unit, with the prior agreement of the former person or economic
unit” [Hil77, p. 318]. This definition was later extended by GADREY for time,
demand and ownership aspects in order to extend the applicability of the service
term to phenomenons which were not or only partly covered by HILLs original
definition [Gad00].
From an information systems perspective, it is possible to simplify this view
as the service term is employed in the context of IT artifacts. As such, a service
definition as wide as proposed by HILL and GADREY is not necessary. This
observation is reflected in proposed service definitions in the context of SOC
by the fact that they usually emphasize technical aspects. Frequently the terms
activity, entity, component and software are being used to describe services, along
with different properties (cf., e. g., [PG03; W3C; KBS04; Erl07; PTD+07; SCK11;
YCY12; WKI+12]).
While from a pure technical point of view this may be a sufficient characteriza-
tion, from an economical it is not since the economical relationship between the
parties stays unclear. For instance, KRAFZIG et al. define a service as “some mean-
ingful activity that a computer program performs on request of another computer
program” [KBS04, p. 14]. While surely sufficient from a technical perspective, this
definition does not state the economical relationship between these two computer
programs. E. g., it remains unclear if these two computer programs need some kind
of former agreement and if this activity is able to exist on its own by means of a
13 Cf. ADAM SMITH (1776), “The Wealth of Nations”, Book II, Chapter III.
14 Cf. JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY (1803), “A Treatise on Political Economy”, Book I, Chapter XII.
15 An overview of the historical development of the service term can be found in [DG92].
2.2. SERVICE-ORIENTED COMPUTING 23
pay-per-use service. Even worse, this definition stresses that an activity needs to be
“meaningful” in order to be regarded as a service. Now the interpretation of what
is meaningful or not certainly lies in the eye of the beholder. A service for checking
credit card numbers might be meaningful for most if not all service consumers.
On the contrary, a trivial service which simply adds two integers and delivers
the result might not be generally meaningful. As such, this definition requires a
further clarification about the meaning of “meaningful” which consequently adds
even more fuzz to the service term. Thus, ironically, the adjective “meaningful”
leads to the point that the service definition of KRAFZIG et al. becomes quite
meaningless.
HILL points out that one essential feature of a service is its transactability, i. e.,
the possibility to be carried out by another economic unit with the benefit being
able to materialize on the consumer. As examples HILL counts housework and
painting activities which might be performed by oneself or by someone else on
behalf of oneself. Other activities such as eating and swimming lack transactability,
i. e. nobody can eat or swim for the benefit of someone else [Hil77]. Applied to
information systems, activities such as performing computations and storing data
can be regarded as transactable in the sense that they can be performed remote by
one entity on behalf of another. On the contrary, other activities such as allocating
memory or loading values into CPU registers cannot be performed remote by one
entity for another. Given this property, services are defined as follows (based on
[Hil77]):
Definition 2.6 [SERVICE]. A service is a transactable activity which is performed by
an economic unit A (service provider) on request by another economic unit B (service
consumer) based upon prior agreement. A and B might be identical.
An obvious advantage of this definition is that it neither reduces the service
phenomenon to some technical terms nor requires fuzzy adjectives such as mean-
ingful. The decision if an activity is regarded as a service or not is solely reduced
to the activity’s potential of being provisioned and consumed by different entities.
The drawback of this definition is of course that it is not generally applicable to
all phenomenons which one would intuitively call a service. In the scope of this
thesis however this is not relevant since the explicit goal was to establish a service
definition which can be applied to information systems as general as possible. In
fact, GADREY remarks, that it is impossible to formulate a service definition which
can be applied to all phenomenons which one would view as a service [Gad00].
This leads to the question of how to define e-services. The common denom-
inator of these services is that they are served via electronic networks which is
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regarded here as the main difference to traditional services16. Utilizing definition
2.6, electronic services can thus be defined as follows (based on [RK02]):
Definition 2.7 [E-SERVICE]. An electronic service (e-service) is a service which is
provided via electronic networks.
2.2.2 Service-Oriented Architecture
Having discussed the service term, the concept of SOA can now be introduced.
Firstly this concept is being motivated from a historical and technical point of view
before giving an overview of the concept itself. Afterwards, web services as a
technical enabler for SOA are being introduced and their QoS properties discussed.
The section closes with a discussion about the practicability of some properties
that the concept of SOA is generally associated with by academia.
2.2.2.1 Motivation
“We [at Lyons] dreamed of some wonderful
machine where all you would need to do
would be to feed in paper and press buttons
and get all the answers you wanted; it was all
very naïve”
– JOHN SIMMONS, FORMER EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR AT LYONS [CAH+97, P. 363]
The role of IT in enterprises has changed considerably from its initial applications
in the first half of the 20th century. In the beginning, IT was expected to provide
computation power and storage to support single business tasks. The first business
computer was the Lyons Electronic Office (LEO) which was installed at LYONS
company in 1951 and performed tasks such as valuation, payroll and inventory
management [CAH+97]. During the second half of the 20th century however, the
environment for most enterprises started to change with the globalization of na-
tional economies. Competition became increasingly tough due to lower customer
loyalty and increased product complexity on the one hand as well as time and cost
pressure on the other hand. Mergers, acquisitions and buy-outs of companies lead
16 In fact, both types of services differentiate in other aspects as well, but since these differences
have no impact on the content of this thesis, they will not be further discussed here. For a
thorough discussion about this topic, the interested reader is referred to [Bla09].
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to the necessity to integrate formerly separate and most of the time different IT
systems17. In this regard, the notion of process-orientation became increasingly
important for enterprises, i. e. cross-divisional and (semi-)automatic handling
of business transactions. This allowed for quick adaptation to environmental
changes such as new laws, changed product portfolios, etc. In this situation, the
role of IT changed as well, namely from providing basic computing capabilities to
supporting processes in distributed environments [Erl05; KBS04].
First technical approaches for distributed computing were Remote Procedure
Call (RPC), Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM), Common Object
Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) and later web services (cf. Section 2.2.2.3)
[KBS04]. While these approaches enabled integration of distributed and diverse IT
systems, the sole usage of these technologies alone leads to tightly coupled systems.
As an example consider a typical scenario from a retailing company utilizing
different software systems for e-shopping, inventory management, supply chain
management, accounting, payroll, customer relationship management, document
management and e-mail (cf. Figure 2.4). A fully meshed integration via point-to-
point connections thus requires a total of
n(n 1)
2
(2.1)
connections. In this simple example this means that a total of 28 connections
need to be specified and implemented. In case that one application is exchanged
(due to software upgrades, licensing issues, etc.) n  1 connections need to be
reimplemented. In the face of ever-changing requirements on enterprise IT, a more
flexible architectural style was required [KBS04].
One famous and frequently employed paradigm to face the changed role of
enterprise IT is Enterprise Application Integration (EAI). EAI refers to a set of meth-
ods and middleware for integrating different physically or logically distributed
applications. Integration is realized by means of enabling data exchange between
applications while avoiding point-to-point integration. Widely used methods for
data exchange are the following [HW03]:
• File Transfer: Applications exchange data by writing to and reading from a
file. It is mandatory to agree in advance on name, location, format, timings
for read an write operations as well as responsibility for deletion of the file.
• Shared Database: Applications share an identical database schema which is
located in a single database. As such, data changes take effect on all involved
17 E. g., [Erl05, Chapter 2] provides some well explained and typical case studies.
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Figure 2.4: Example scenario for a fully meshed point-to-point integration
applications without requiring separate data transfer.
• Remote Procedure Invocation: Applications provide parts of their function-
ality for real-time and synchronous remote access.
• Messaging: Applications push messages to message channels while other
applications read the messages from these channels. In order to enable this
form of asynchronous communication, the applications must agree on a
channel as well as message format.
Among these alternatives, messaging is the most widely used integration
method today. Integration is performed utilizing Message-Oriented Middleware
(MOM) solutions such as ActiveMQ and MSMQ. While EAI enables distributed
applications to communicate, the major drawback of this approach is that it gener-
ally also leads to tightly coupled systems due to the technical nature of integration.
In case of change requests, reconfiguration again needs to be performed on a
fine-grained level such as files, database tables, remote procedure interfaces and
message queues [HW03; KBS04].
The paradigm of SOA has been discussed since the late 1990s. The term itself
was coined by the Gartner Group which described its utilization in a two-part
study [SN96a; SN96b]. It was however not until the upcoming of web service
standards (cf. Section 2.2.2.3) that the paradigm received a broad interest. An
important factor was the observation that SOA and BPM are conceptually closely
related. SOA enabled architectural flexibility which was a requirement for dynamic
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business processes [Bur00; LRS02]. What followed was an explosion of conferences,
publications, software tools and experts for this new paradigm. In the mid-2000s
the SOA hype reached its peak which was coined by books such as “Service Orient
or Be Doomed!” by BLOOMBERG and SCHMELZER [BS06].
In the afterward, the time from the upcoming of the SOA paradigm until its
peak can be viewed as a revival of the machine supremacy thoughts of the first
half of the 20th century; early computers such as the ENIAC and the Harvard
Mark I had caused much excitement due to their previously unknown computing
capability and were called “electro-mechanical brains” and similar exaggerated
names by media18. This reflected the public view of that time which was driven by
the misconception that computers were omnipotent. History repeated, this time
with focus on SOA. Fatal optimists like BLOOMBERG and SCHMELZER expected to
solve all IT-related problems and to gain an increase in enterprise’s productivity
and innovation of unprecedented degree by applying SOA [BS06]. Soon however
it was realized that SOA, as anything else, comes at a price. The flexibility en-
abled by SOA lead to technically complex solutions which in many cases caused
a disproportional increase in IT costs. Furthermore, unawareness about the pre-
requisites of a successful SOA implementation such as a close alignment between
business and IT lead to an increasing rate of failing SOA projects19. Finally, the
SOA paradigm was even declared dead [Man09]. It was not until the upcoming of
Cloud Computing (cf. Section 2.2.3) that SOA experienced a revival as a facility to
integrate internal IT systems with Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components
supplied by external providers.
2.2.2.2 Overview
At its core SOA advocates to encapsulate and provide IT resources as services
which enables Two-Level Programming [DK75]. Services are intended to act as
building blocks to develop software systems in in the large. In the context of BPM
this means building service-oriented workflows by mapping single process steps
to services. On the contrary, services are developed in the small encapsulating e. g.
legacy applications running on diverse operational resources. Figure 2.5 illustrates
the interplay between these different layers in a SOA.
Each service has a description which contains information regarding its func-
18 The titles of two articles from Life Magazine are striking examples: “Overseas Air Lines Rely
on Magic Brain” (August 16, 1937, p. 45) and “The Great Electro-Mechanical Brain” (January
14, 1946, pp. 73-74).
19 A survey conducted by the BURTON GROUP on 20 companies in 2008 reports that only 20% of
the projects were considered a success [McK08].
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Figure 2.5: SOA layers
tional (e. g. input and output parameters) and non-functional properties (e. g. QoS
constraints). Services may but do not have to be under the control of different
domains. In contrast to approaches such as EAI, SOA does not prescribe technical
solutions but provides architectural concepts to tackle integration issues [KBS04;
Erl05; OAS06]. This leads to the question what a software architecture20 is. In fact,
this term is maybe even more ambiguous than the service term and plenty of
definitions can be found in the literature21. Here, the term architecture will be
defined as follows (based on [ISO11]):
Definition 2.8 [SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE]. Software architecture describes the
fundamental concepts or properties of a system in its environment embodied in its elements,
relationships, and in the principles of its design and evolution.
Utilizing this definition of the architecture term, SOA can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.9 [SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE]. A Service-oriented Archi-
tecture is a technology neutral architectural style to organize IT resources as services and
a guiding idea to develop applications utilizing services as building blocks. These services
may be under the control of different domains.
20 In the remainder of this thesis, the term architecture will be used interchangeably.
21 A vast collection of definitions can be found e. g. here: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/
architecture/start/glossary/index.cfm
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This definition exhibits obvious similarities with component-based software
engineering (cf., e. g., [HC01]). In fact, services can be viewed as a special kind
of component. Where components in the traditional sense are viewed as static
building blocks that can be plugged together, services are components which
provide their functionality only upon request and do not require tight coupling
with the application being developed.
In a SOA, a total of three roles is differentiated [Bur00; Erl05; KBS04]:
• Service Provider: The service provider serves one or more services. For each
service, the provider publishes a service description, providing information
regarding functional and non-functional properties, in a service registry.
• Service Registry: Similar to a phone book a service registry acts as a central
instance which can be used to search and find services. It provides the service
description to interested service consumers.
• Service Consumer: A service consumer is an entity which is seeking a service.
In order to find a suiting service offer, the service consumer consults a service
registry.
A typical sequence from publishing a service description to service consump-
tion is as follows. A service provider publishes a service description at a public
service registry. An interested service consumer consults the service registry and
searches for a service suiting its needs. As soon as the consumer found one, the
registry sends the consumer the service description which among others includes
the address of the provider. The service consumer then binds this service into
its SOA, either statically at development time or dynamically at runtime. Finally
at each request of the consumer, the provider serves the service to the consumer.
Figure 2.6 illustrates this sequence.
As stated, SOA is not a technology but in the first hand a paradigm. Thus
there is not “the” implementation of a SOA but different implementations yield
certain characteristics. While some characteristics are a matter of discussion, there
is consensus on the following [Bal04; Erl05; MSD]:
• Autonomy: The encapsulated application logic is under the sole hegemony
of the service. Changes made to one service have no effect on another. In a
broader sense this also includes as much control over its runtime environ-
ment as possible by e. g. reducing shared access to service resources and
a maximum physical isolation. An outcome of this autonomy is that the
runtime behavior of each service becomes more predictable. For services
which are composed of other services this means that the maximum level
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Figure 2.6: Roles and their interaction in a SOA (based on [Bur00])
of autonomy achievable is determined by the autonomy of the services it is
composed of.
• Loose Coupling: There is no dependence between applications and services.
In consequence this means that applications can be changed without affecting
the services it is composed of and vice versa. The latter might not be as
obvious, but remember that a service is accompanied by a service description
which defines what task it solves. How the task is solved is another question
and should have no effect on the defined task. A storage service which does
not store any data it receives obviously violates its description. However, if
the service is storing data on a hard disk using the NTFS or ext3 file format
is usually not a matter of interest for the service consumer.
• Reusability: Services can be reused in different contexts. While this is a
almost trivial requirement for services which perform basic activities such as
storage and computations, it becomes harder for services delivering complex
activities such as seat reservation in a flight booking application. For service
design this means that services need to be agnostic to a) the applications they
are used in and b) the technical environment they are executed in. In case of
the mentioned seat reservation service, a well-designed solution would be a
service which is neither bounded to a certain airline nor to a certain travel
information system such as AMADEUS.
• Composability: Services can be composed without any knowledge about
technical details of the underlying implementation. Thus a SOA allows
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for programming in the large where single services can be replaced with
little effort to fulfill change requirements. From a conceptual point of view
this requires that services are the result of a systematic decomposition of
an application. The number of special services to address technical issues
should be kept to a minimum to increase their reusability.
Services in a SOA can be classified according to certain properties. A widely
used classification proposed by PAPAZOGLOU and GEORGAKOPOULOS differenti-
ates between basic, composite and managed services. The employed criterion for
classification is the role that a service plays in a SOA or a composition. The latter
part causes conceptual inaccuracies as a composite service which is used in another
composite service is suddenly considered as a basic service [PG03; PTD+07]. An-
other classification which was proposed by KRAFZIG et al., differentiates services
only by their role in a SOA [KBS04]. The resulting classification scheme is thus
more consistent and creates less confusion. In total, KRAFZIG et al. differentiate
between four types of services [KBS04]:
• Basic services: From a functional point of view, these services form the smallest
building block in a SOA. They are willingly kept simple and implement only
simple data processing and/or logical steps in a process. Basic services are
stateless and highly reusable.
• Intermediary services: Intermediary services are intended to bridge technical
inconsistencies or architectural design gaps. They are stateless and usually
yield low reusability as to their specific role.
• Process centric services: This type represents service-oriented representations
of business processes. Accordingly, these services are usually highly complex
and stateful. Reusability of process centric services is usually low.
• Public enterprise services: While the other types of services are usually em-
ployed internally, this type of service is made publicly available. Accordingly
this type of service acts as a facility for cross-enterprise integration. State-
fulness and complexity are depending on the task the service is intended
to deliver. Usually these services exhibit a high degree of reusability. Be-
sides of a task-specific implementation, these services require additional
functionalities for e. g. billing, security and reliability.
As can be seen, SOA is at first abstract and needs to be fleshed out by uti-
lizing concrete technologies. Nowadays frequently used are web services for
implementing the building blocks and BPEL for service composition (cf. Section
2.2.2.3).
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2.2.2.3 Web Services and Related Standards
The original Internet, also called Web 1.0 or “content web”, was dominated by
static content and participants could do little more than viewing and linking
contents. With the transition to the web 2.0 (the so-called “service web”), the
concept of web services was created as a facility to provide functionality over
the Internet [Kno03]. Today web services are omnipresent and one of the most
frequently used communication methods for applications and devices. Already
in 2008 Amazon reported that the Amazon Web Services (AWS) were consuming
more bandwidth than all retail sites22. In the consumer field, web services are
used to e. g. integrate data from different sources such as mobile apps and social
networks to enhance user profiling in order to customize marketing [KR11]. In
the business world, web services gained a lot of attraction in the context of cloud
computing which enables organizations to rent infrastructures, platforms and
software on demand [MLB+11].
The web service term is not used uniformly and in fact describes at least
two groups of approaches (cf. below). As such, definitions vary as well. Some
definitions solely focus on technical aspects, i. e. that web services are components
delivering functionality over a network such as the Internet [PG03; SCK11; YCY12].
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, this excludes the economical aspect and is thus an
incomplete view. Other definitions imply the utilization of certain standards with
web services [W3C04b; YCY12]. This however excludes alternate web service
implementations and is thus too limited. Let us first examine existing groups of
web services and analyze their features before formulating a definition.
Two major groups of web services can be distinguished:
• Web services which utilize standards based on Extensible Markup Language
(XML) for interface description and communication [KBS04]. These are also
called XML web services.
• Web services following an architectural style known as Representational
State Transfer (REST) [Fie00]. These are also called RESTful web services.
Web services of these major groups exhibit the following features [KBS04;
Fie00]:
1. Unique Identifier: A web service is uniquely identified. In case of XML web
services, this identifier is typically an Uniform Resource Locator (URL). In
case of RESTful web services, an URL identifier is mandatory.
22 http://aws.typepad.com/aws/2008/05/lots-of-bits.html
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2. Interface description: XML web services utilize the Web Services Descrip-
tion Language (WSDL) standard (cf. below) to provide an overview about
all operations the web service supports, including input and output param-
eters. In case of RESTful web services, interface description is provided
by the HTTP standard [FGM+99] as available operations are solely HTTP
commands such as GET, POST, PUT and DELETE.
3. Provision via the Internet: Both XML and RESTful web services are pro-
vided via the Internet.
4. Interaction via message exchange: Web services interact with service con-
sumers by exchanging messages. XML web services typically utilize SOAP
(cf. below) for this task. In case of RESTful web services, service requests are
simple HTTP request messages. The type of the response message depends
on the requested operation and might be either HTML, JSON or XML.
With these groups and features of web services in mind, it can now be tried
to capture these in a definition. Ideally, a definition should also include the eco-
nomical aspects of the service term while allowing for alternate implementations.
Thus Definition 2.7 for e-services as presented in Section 2.2.1 is being utilized and
extended for the distinguishing features of web services identified above:
Definition 2.10 [WEB SERVICE]. A web service is an e-service which is uniquely
identified, has an interface description and is provided via the Internet. Interaction with
other entities takes place via message exchange.
In the scope of this thesis, the focus will be on XML web services. Thus, in
the following relevant standards for building a SOA will be presented which
are WSDL, SOAP and Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI)
[LRS02]. Finally, a brief overview of BPEL as the de facto standard for service
composition will be given.
WSDL
WSDL is a XML-based standard which is being maintained by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C). Its first version has been published in September 2000 and was
developed in cooperation between IBM, MICROSOFT and ARIBA. At first, it was a
joint effort to consolidate service description concepts found in earlier proposals.
This initial release has been re-released in a formalized version 1.1 in March 2001
[CCM+01]. The latest version is 2.0 and became a W3C recommendation in June
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2007 [W3C07b]. Here the focus will be on the previous version 1.1 since it is still
more widely in use than 2.0.
Figure 2.7 shows the basic structure of a WSDL document. The root element
is always named definitions. The child elements are divided in a so-called
abstract and a concrete part. The abstract part has the child elements types,
messages and portType. WSDL supports the basic data types defined in XML
Schema Definition (XSD) such as xs:string and xs:integer. If there is further
need for complex data types such as a customer data record, these can be defined
in the types element. These complex data types along with the basic types of XSD
can be used in the messages element to define different message formats for web
service interactions. Finally, the portType element contains all operations
the web service offers. WSDL supports different transmission primitives for
operations which are: One-way, request-response, solicit-response and notification.
Depending on the transmission primitive of each operation, the message types
defined in the messages element can be assigned to each operation as input,
output and fault message type [CCM+01].
<types>
<messages>
<operation>
<binding>
<port>
<definitions>
<portType>
<service>
A
bs
tra
ct
P
ar
t
C
on
cr
et
e
P
ar
t
Figure 2.7: Structure of a WSDL document
The concrete part of a WSDL document contains the elements binding and
service. The binding element allows for specifying the protocol as well as
the message format for an operation defined in the portType element. This
message format is not to be confused with the ones defined in the messages
element. It refers to the concrete messages exchanged between endpoints utilizing
the specified protocol. The abstract messages defined in the messages element
will be transformed into these concrete messages during service invocations. An
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operation can have more than one binding (e. g. for different versions of
the specified protocol). Finally, the service element is used to group one or
more port elements. A port element assigns an address to a binding and thus
specifies an endpoint of the service [CCM+01].
SOAP
SOAP is a protocol for exchanging XML-based messages. It was developed by
MICROSOFT in 1998 but was later standardized by the W3C which is still the
maintainer. The latest version is 1.2 which became a W3C recommendation in
April 2007 [W3C07a]. Originally SOAP was an abbreviation for “Simple Object
Access Protocol” [BEK+00] but this has been dropped since version 1.2 [W3C07a].
The basic form of a SOAP message is depicted in Figure 2.8. Messages are
always enclosed by an envelope. This envelope has two elements, namely a
header and a body. The optional header element contains meta information
regarding the communication such as expiration dates, utilized encryption algo-
rithms, etc. The mandatory body element contains the actual payload. In case
of a XML web service described with a WSDL document, the body contains a
message of the type associated with the invoked web service operation. SOAP can
be bound to several protocols such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [W3C07a]. Especially the binding to HTTP is
used frequently.
<Header>
<Body>
<Envelope>
Figure 2.8: Structure of a SOAP message
UDDI
The idea behind UDDI was to act as a web-based registry for web services, similar
to a phone book. It was actively supported by MICROSOFT, IBM and SAP which
also hosted individual UDDI registries. UDDI was later standardized by the
OASIS. The last published version was 3.0.2 which was made available on October
19th, 2004 [BCC+04]. On January 12th, 2006 however, MICROSOFT, IBM and SAP
stopped operations of their UDDI registries [SAP05].
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A UDDI registry contains information about web services and their providers
in form of a XML document. This information is either published by the providers
themselves or on behalf of them. Interested service consumers can search such
registries for information about services they are interested in. In case that a service
consumer found a service which suits her needs, the UDDI registry provides the
consumer with a WSDL document of the service. For communication with a UDDI
registry, the standard suggests the utilization of SOAP [BCC+04].
Utilizing these standards, a SOA can be implemented as depicted in Figure
2.9. It should be noted that this represents an ideal view which is not found in
real-world SOA implementations (cf. Section 2.2.2.5).
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Figure 2.9: Realization of a SOA with web services
BPEL
BPEL is a XML-based language for web service orchestration (cf. Section 3.1). The
structure of a BPEL process can be seen in Figure 2.10.
Each process definition must have a root element process. This element has
two mandatory attributes name and targetNamespace. The name attribute is
a simple textual representation of the process name while targetNamespace
defines the context of the process [OAS07].
The element partnerLinks is used to group one or more partnerLink ele-
ments. Each partnerLink constitutes a communication channel with a partner,
i. e. a web service. As previously stated, WSDL describes functionality provided
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Figure 2.10: Structure of a BPEL process
by a web service on an abstract and a concrete level as well as the transmission
type of each operation such as one-way or request-response. Depending on this
transmission type, a different relationship is established between a business pro-
cess and a web service. For instance, one-way leads to a peer-to-peer relationship
such that it is also possible for a business process to be a provider and for a web
service to be a consumer. A partnerLink element is employed to model this
relationship between a business process and a partner based on the portType
element in the respective WSDL file. Consequently, BPEL allows for defining
multiple partnerLink elements for a single web service [OAS07].
As the name indicates, the variables element allows for defining one or
more variable elements. Each variable represents a typed variable which
can be utilized to hold state information of the process in form of messages or
temporary data. When executing the business process logic (cf. below), these
variables can be read, written and utilized by single activities for e. g. distinction
of cases [OAS07].
The core of a BPEL process is the business process implementation which is
represented as a set of activities. Two groups of activities are to be distinguished:
basic activities and structured activities. Basic activities are characterized by the
fact that they implement elemental steps of a process flow such as invocation
and assignment operations. Frequently used activities are e. g. invoke which
performs a web service call and receive which waits for the partner to invoke
the business process by sending a message. Structured activities are used to model
control flows and may be comprised of basic activities or other structured activities.
Typical examples are sequence which allows to model a sequence of activities
and pick which allows to select one of several alternative paths [OAS07].
Another important language feature of BPEL are so-called handlers. Handlers
are special functions which are called automatically under certain circumstances.
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They are utilized to handle message exchange, process failures and to model
compensation logic in case of process failures [OAS07].
2.2.2.4 Quality of Service
As stated, a service performs an activity which yields some kind of utility for a
requester. The question how this service is provided in terms of non-functional
properties such as response time, uptime probability etc. is covered by the topic
QoS. Thus QoS describes the modalities at which a service is constituted. Un-
fortunately there is no agreed upon definition of the term QoS. SABATA et al.
describe QoS as “a combination of metrics and policies” [SCD+97, p. 100] whereas
O’SULLIVAN et al. consider service quality as “a measure of the difference between
expected and actual service provision” [OEH02, p. 125]. These two definitions
agree upon that 1) QoS can be measured by means of single parameters and that
2) there is a previously agreed behavior which can thus be expected (and also
controlled in terms of QoS parameters) by the service requester. A definition which
precisely captures these aspects has been formulated by SCHMITT:
Definition 2.11 [QUALITY OF SERVICE]. “QoS is the well-defined and controllable
behavior of a system with respect to quantitative parameters.” [Sch01, p. 4]
Similar to the definition of the QoS term, there is no general consensus about
the question which QoS parameters are relevant in the context of web services. A
working group of the W3C prepared a note on this topic in 2003 (cf. [LJL+03]). As
of December 2015 however, this note still did not achieve the status of an official
draft. Further proposals have been made in the literature (cf., e. g., [SCD+97;
MN02; Men02; OEH02; ZBD+03; MS04; YL04]). The reason for this disagreement
seems to be fourfold [Ber07]:
1. Web services deliver a vast array of different functionalities such as com-
putation and storage,
2. Web services can be utilized for different purposes such as outsourcing IT
capabilities or renting required IT capabilities,
3. Web services can be utilized in different environments such as finance in-
dustry and public service sector,
4. Web services can be viewed from different perspectives such as purely
functional, as software component or as network component.
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Thus it is to be doubted if all these differences can be unified in a consolidated
QoS model for web services. Hence in the following the most frequently used QoS
properties will be enumerated and discussed:
• Availability: Availability describes the probability that a service is operating
and available for the user. This probability is usually calculated on the basis
of a maximum annual downtime hours [Men02; MN02; OEH02; LJL+03;
MS04; YL04]. A metric which is also associated with availability is Time-
to-repair (TTR) which expresses the period of time the provider expects to
require to make the service up and running again in case of a failure [MN02;
LJL+03]. Additionally to this temporal availability, O’SULLIVAN et al. also
proposed to include spatial availability, i. e. where a service is available
[OEH02].
• Performance: The performance of a web service is described by multiple
quality metrics where latency, response time and throughput are most frequently
used. Latency describes the time an empty message needs to travel from
the requester to the service provider and back again, excluding any service
operations. Response time describes the time a service needs to response to a
request, including latency. Throughput describes the rate at which a service
is able to process requests in a certain time period [SCD+97; MN02; LJL+03;
MS04; Men04; YL04]
• Reliability: Reliability describes the degree at which a service is able to
maintain its functionality and deliver an expected outcome. This degree
is typically calculated based on the number of service failures for a certain
time period, usually a month or a year. Reliability also includes assured and
ordered message exchange between service requesters and providers [MN02;
LJL+03; ZBD+03; MS04].
• Robustness: The degree of robustness describes the ability of a web service
to function correctly and deliver deterministic results in case of invalid,
incomplete or conflicting inputs [SCD+97; LJL+03; MS04].
• Scalability: Scalability refers to the ability of a web service to increase its
computing capacity in order to serve an increased number of user requests,
operations or transactions in a given time period. It refers to the number of
requests and transactions that can be served and is related to performance
[LJL+03; MS04].
• Security: Mechanisms and techniques for ensuring confidentiality and in-
tegrity are summarized under the general term security. This includes en-
crypting message exchange between requester and provider as well as se-
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curing service constitution itself. Latter especially requires mechanisms for
authentication, access control and non-repudiation [SCD+97; MN02; OEH02;
LJL+03; MS04]. For MENASCÉ this also includes resilience to denial-of-
service attacks [Men02].
QoS properties of a web service are being negotiated between a requester and
a provider in the context of a Service-Level Agreement (SLA). For web services,
two XML-based standards are available which allow for capturing SLAs formally,
namely the Web Service Level Agreement (WSLA) [LKD+03] language and WS-
Agreement [ACD+07].
WSLA has been designed to capture a wide range of assertions associated
with SLAs. These include organizational as well as QoS perspectives. From
an organizational perspective, WSLA allows for defining management actions
which are exposed to other parties involved in the SLA. From a QoS perspective,
the standard covers details such as what metrics are used and who is in charge
of computing them. The current version has been published by IBM in 2003
[LKD+03].
WS-Agreement is a web services protocol for establishing an agreement be-
tween two parties, i. e. a provider and a consumer. It is a facility for documenting
service requirements as well as guarantees and is thus similar to WSLA. However
as part of the WS-* family of specifications23, WS-Agreement does not aim at
providing a standalone language but an extension to SOAP/WSDL and depends
on other WS-* specifications. WS-Agreement has been published by the OPEN
GRID FORUM in 2007 [ACD+07].
2.2.2.5 Discussion
SOA gained considerable attention by both academia and industry. While many
theoretical properties formulated by academia are reflected in real-world SOA
implementations, others proved to be not practical. In this section some of the
major discrepancies are explored.
23 The term “WS-*” refers to a family of web service specifications that have evolved around the
three initial standards WSDL, SOAP and UDDI. As the initial standards are general purpose,
extensions for special purposes have been covered in separate specifications which can be
combined with each other as well as the initial standards. An overview can be found in e. g.
[WCL+05].
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Discoverability
One characteristic of a SOA frequently mentioned in the literature is discoverability
(cf., e. g., [Bur00; LRS02; OEH02; PG03; Erl05]), i. e. the capability to discover single
web services to subsequently utilize them automatically. UDDI had long been
considered as a technical enabler for this characteristic. But as mentioned in
Section 2.2.2.3, the public UDDI repositories of MICROSOFT, IBM and SAP have
been shut down in 2006 with the last version of the standard being published in
2004. Consequently the question arises why neither UDDI nor any alternative
technology was widely adopted to implement public service registries.
Two possible explanations can be considered. The first one was formulated
by BLOOMBERG and blames the desire of businesses to establish relationships
based on “a human element” rather than automatically based on the interaction
of computers [SAP05]. The second possible explanation is that the technical
complexity introduced by UDDI (the last version of the standard counts more
than 400 pages) was considered out of proportion with the benefit to discover and
automatically bind a relatively limited number of publicly available web services24.
It was furthermore criticized that UDDI only offers a simple search function
allowing to lookup services of certain providers offering specified capabilities. On
the contrary, advanced matchmaking mechanisms based on e. g. similarity search
were missing which are crucial in cases of e. g. non-uniform naming and ordering
of input and output parameters [FFH+03].
Today, web services are usually discovered manually a priori by the future
consumers. When utilizing BPEL for service composition, web services are bound
statically at design-time by referencing the respective partnerLink in the process
(cf. Section 2.2.2.3). A more dynamic approach is to change the endpoint of a
partnerLink at runtime using the endpointReference element. This element
can be assigned at runtime by the process, e. g. by employing a BPEL variable
and hence allows for more flexibility [OAS07].
Reported real-world SOA implementations [KBS04; Bra07; LH07; BLN+09;
BCH+10; Mur13] make use of service repositories which act as company-wide
storage for service descriptions such as WSDL documents. While some of these
repositories are merely more than a folder on a server, some repositories also
24 The exact number of publicly available web services is controversial. ZHENG et al. re-
ported in 2010 a total of 21,358 obtained web service addresses “by crawling web ser-
vice information from the Internet” [ZZL10, p. 83]. On the contrary, ProgrammableWeb
(http://www.programmableweb.com/) lists a total of 11,129 web service APIs as of March
8th 2014. Whatever the real number is, it is to be expected that this figure was considerably
lower before 2006. To the authors best knowledge, official figures on the number of web
services do not exist as of March 2014.
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contain information about each service such as the developer, associated SLA, im-
plemented fault handling strategies, etc. The main advantage of these repositories
is in coordinating the development efforts of several distributed teams working on
different services. None of the reported cases however contained a service registry
supporting automatic discovery and binding of services. As such, discoverability
is not considered a feature of SOA in this thesis.
Service-Orientation
Although service-orientation forms the core of the SOA paradigm, solely focusing
on services does not lead to a successful SOA. The BURTON GROUP reported in
2008 that out of 20 analyzed case studies for SOA projects only 5 were successful.
One of the major reasons for failure was the sole focus on technical aspects, es-
pecially on implementing services. In consequence organizations implemented
many web services, each solving one integration task but lacking reusability25. In
other words, SOA had been confused with EAI [Mee08].
In both, the case studies analyzed by the BURTON GROUP as well as the ones
reported in the literature, a crucial success factor is a focus on the business view
[KBS04; Bra07; LH07; Mee08; BLN+09; BCH+10; Mur13]. In most success cases,
SOA introduction started from an examination of the organization’s current situa-
tion in terms of conducted business processes. Service design in these cases was
primarily guided by the question what the business needed instead of what was
technically possible. This approach naturally lead to a high reusability of services
in other business processes. Consequently, SOA introduction was found to be an
evolutionary process which is hard to plan completely beforehand. An extreme
example is the SOA of CREDIT SUISSE for which preparatory work started as early
as 1998 and which is still evolving today. In 2013 the SOA of CREDIT SUISSE
consisted of over 1,000 services which were added iteratively over the course of
time [Mur13].
Summary
The SOA paradigm describes an ideal which can be technically realized in different
ways as proved by several reported case studies [KBS04; Bra07; LH07; BLN+09;
BCH+10; Mur13]. Regardless of employed technologies, a common result of
all reported case studies was an IT infrastructure consisting of highly reusable
25 MCKENDRICK coined the term “Just a Bunch of Web Services” or JBOWS to describe such a
situation [McK05].
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components. A crucial factor of success was to align the technical development
with the business needs instead of exploiting all technical possibilities.
2.2.3 Cloud Computing
As discussed in Section 2.2.2.1, enterprise IT departments are under constant
pressure to reduce costs. From an economical point of view, IT is no longer
considered as necessary business asset but as cost factor. As such, possibilities to
turn capital expenditures to operational expenditures are always welcomed by
enterprises [Car05]. For several years, the term cloud computing has been present
in research, news and media. Although the concept received a lot of criticism in
the past from business executives such as LARRY ELLISON as well as software
activists such as RICHARD STALMAN (cf., e. g., [AFG+09, p. 3]), the topic seems
nowadays to have been generally accepted by the business world. Despite the
global surveillance disclosures regarding the NSA which shook the world in 2013,
the demand for IT services from “the cloud” is increasingly gaining in importance.
By the end of 2013, about 40% of companies in Germany of all sizes and branches
were using cloud services which is an increase of 3% compared to 2012 [KPM14].
The German IT industry association BITKOM estimates that in Germany revenue
for cloud services reached EUR 8 billion in 201326.
The conceptual groundwork for cloud computing had been established in
the last century under the term utility computing [FHJ+74]. In occasion of the
ARPANET’s birth (which should later become the Internet), KLEINROCK described
the vision of utility computing as follows: “As of now, computer networks are
still in their infancy. But as they grow up and become more sophisticated, we will
probably see the spread of ‘computer utilities’, which, like present electric and
telephone utilities, will service individual homes and offices across the country”
[Kle69]. Today utility computing is considered to provide IT resources from
computing resources such as CPU hours to complex business processes over
the Internet27. Essential characteristics identified in the literature are shared
infrastructures, scalability, reliability and the utilization of pay-per-use as well
as pay-as-you-go billing schemes [Rap04; LMH+06; VWB09]. As such, utility
computing is defined as follows (based on [VWB09]):
Definition 2.12 [UTILITY COMPUTING]. Utility computing is the provision of com-
26 http://www.bitkom.org/de/markt_statistik/64086_75301.aspx
27 In the years 2000/2001 Intel offered Intel Computing Services which provided CPU hours.
The service was not successful though as participation required negotiating a contract and
did not allow utilization on a per hour basis, but on longer terms [AFG+09].
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puting resources, infrastructures, applications and business processes which are available
in a shared, scalable and reliable environment over the Internet on a pay-per-use or pay-as-
you-go basis.
Cloud computing has been discussed as a potential solution for delivering IT
resources via utility computing by means of an on-demand service. The main
driver behind this development was the potential to achieve large economies of
scale by concentrating IT capabilities in huge data centers at low-cost electricity
locations [AFG+09]. The term cloud is derived from telecommunications of the
1990s. At this time telephone companies in the US started to switch from hardwired
connections to digital Virtual Private Network (VPN) solutions. This digitization
led to cost reduction while keeping service quality at a similar level. The digital
infrastructure, which was thus responsible for tasks such as dynamic routing and
load distribution, was called Telecom Cloud [Kau09].
Applying the cloud metaphor verbatim from telecommunication to computing
naturally caused some confusion. In some definitions it was used as synonym
for the Internet or more specifically to describe the parts of an IT infrastructure
which are out of the own sphere of influence [MKL09; VVE10]. Obviously these
definitions are too general as they allow to define every online service as cloud
service. The conceptual mistake here is that in telecommunications, a connection
between two partners is the actual service. In computing however the connection
is just the transport medium, not the service itself. The nowadays widely adopted
NIST definition of cloud computing takes this point into consideration by defining
cloud computing as a model which enables access to a shared pool of computing
resources (i. e. a cloud) which exhibits certain properties [MG11]. Although a mat-
ter of discussion, the following properties are commonly viewed as characterizing
a cloud [AFG+09; Gro09; MKL09; WAB+09; RCL10; VVE10; MG11]:
• Shared Resources: All users of a cloud share the same physical resources. These
resources are centrally managed, e. g. utilizing virtualization technology. For
single users this creates the illusion of exclusivity.
• Configurability: Provided resources can be configured by users to a certain
degree. This degree depends on the virtualized resource as well as the
technical implementation of the cloud.
• Elasticity: Provided resources can be (automatically) scaled depending on the
utilization by the user. To users this creates the illusion of infinite available
resources and thus potentially avoids shortages. For providers this leads to
a higher utilization of available physical resources.
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• Rapid Provisioning and Release: User requests for resource provisioning and
release can be fulfilled instantly and require only minimal provider interac-
tion.
• Service Metering: Resource utilization is thoroughly recorded and thus trans-
parent for the user. Employed metrics depend on the type of service.
Considering these properties, a cloud in the context of cloud computing is
defined as follows (based on [MG11]):
Definition 2.13 [CLOUD]. A cloud is a shared pool of configurable and elastic computing
resources such as networks, servers, storage, applications and services which can be
metered, rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service
provider interaction. Services provided by a cloud are called cloud services.
Cloud and utility computing interrelate in the sense that cloud computing
employs utility computing principles for service metering such as pay-as-you-go
and pay-per-use. The main difference is that utility computing solely focuses on
the properties of the provided resources. Cloud computing on the other hand also
addresses the question of how these resources are accessed. The following features
are frequently cited in the literature [AFG+09; Gro09; MKL09; WAB+09; RCL10;
VVE10; MG11]:
• Ubiquity: Cloud services can be accessed from a variety of devices and are
usually also location-independent.
• Usability: Cloud services offer sophisticated user interfaces which require
little knowledge about technical details and thus can also be utilized by
non-experts. This leads to lower upfront costs and increases acceptance of
the service.
• On-Demand Self-Service: Similar to a supermarket, users can search and utilize
services they require with minimal provider interaction. This is enabled by a
high degree of automation in a cloud.
Employing these properties, cloud computing can be defined as follows (based
on [MG11]):
Definition 2.14 [CLOUD COMPUTING]. Cloud computing is a model for enabling
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a cloud based on utility computing
principles.
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Many different service models have been discussed in the context of cloud com-
puting of which three are generally accepted [AFG+09; Gro09; MKL09; WAB+09;
RCL10; VVE10; MG11]:
• Software as a Service (SaaS): SaaS focuses on providing multiple users with
an access to software which is hosted in a cloud. Users can customize this
software to their needs at different granularity levels such as user interfaces
and database schemes. This service model has been criticized as being a
new term for Application Service Providing (ASP). The main difference
is however that ASP is an approach to host COTS software in a dedicated
environment and to provide users with an access to this environment. The
software licenses of COTS software usually do not permit hosting in a virtu-
alized environment. SaaS software on the other hand is designed to run in a
virtualized environment. In comparison to ASP this leads to reduced costs
as reserve capacities for catching up phases of over-utilization can be kept to
a minimum.
• Platform as a Service (PaaS): PaaS empowers users to upload and run indi-
vidual code in an environment which is being run and maintained by the
provider. Depending on the service, this code can be either written in any
programming language, a proprietary language or might require including
some platform-specific libraries. Some PaaS services can also be utilized for
application delivery.
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): IaaS provides users with access to elementary
IT capabilities such as storage and networks or to operating systems (usually
in the form of virtual servers). The underlying infrastructure for service
provisioning is run an maintained by the provider.
Figure 2.11 shows the interrelation between these service models. As can
be seen these service models form a stack (the so-called cloud stack) which are
usually provider-dependent and not interoperable. The idea of utilizing SOA
approaches to achieve interoperability has been discussed [TSB10]. However,
currently available open source cloud stacks (cf. below) are lacking this property.
In the context of cloud computing, several deployment models have been
discussed. The following three are broadly agreed upon [AFG+09; Gro09; MKL09;
WAB+09; RCL10; VVE10; MG11]:
• Public Cloud: Public clouds offer their services to the general public. As this
enables economies of scale, public cloud services are usually cheaper than
private cloud services (cf. below). Users and providers typically do not
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Figure 2.11: Interrelation between cloud service models
belong to the same organization. In consequence users have minimal to no
control about how their data and applications are being handled.
• Private Cloud: Private clouds offer services to a closed user-group exclusively.
Typically users and providers belong to the same organization. Alternatively,
a private cloud can be run and maintained by a 3rd party for exclusive use.
This exclusivity however leads to higher costs at the benefit of a higher
degree of control of data and applications.
• Hybrid Cloud: As the name indicates, hybrid deployment is an approach to
combine the best of both worlds. This empowers cloud user on the one hand
to utilize private cloud services for sensitive and critical assets and public
cloud services for everything else.
Figure 2.12 shows the interrelation between these cloud deployment mod-
els. Similar to the SOA paradigm, cloud computing describes an ideal which
can implemented utilizing different technologies. Besides of commercial cloud
offerings there are currently several open-source implementations available which
exhibit the properties discussed above. Examples are CloudStack28, Eucalyptus29
and OpenStack30. Furthermore there are several ongoing standardization efforts.
Prominent examples are the Open Cloud Manifesto31 which focuses on cloud
computing in general and the Cloud Security Alliance32 which concentrates on
security issues.
28 http://cloudstack.apache.org/
29 http://www.eucalyptus.com/eucalyptus-cloud/iaas
30 http://www.openstack.org/
31 http://www.opencloudmanifesto.org/
32 https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/
48 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
User
Organization A
User
Organization B
Provider
Organization C
Provider
Organization D
Provider
Organization E
Internet
Private
Cloud
Private
Cloud
Hybrid
Cloud
Public
Cloud
Public
Cloud
Public
Cloud
Figure 2.12: Interrelation between cloud deployment models (based on [BKN+11])
2.3 Interdependent Security
This section first introduces basic security terminology utilized throughout this the-
sis. Next, an overview about formal methods for security verification is provided.
Finally, interdependence effects in security are discussed.
2.3.1 Basic Terminology
In this work, security is being considered in the context of IT systems which are
defined as follows (translation of the definition in [Eck12, p. 3]):
Definition 2.15 [IT SYSTEM]. An IT-System is a closed or an open, dynamic technical
system which has the capability of storing and processing information.
In this context, a closed system is considered as a proprietary system which is
• built on the technology of a single manufacturer,
• incompatible to products of other manufacturers,
• reserved to a closed circle of users,
• usually homogeneous in terms of hard- and software and
• centrally administered.
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On the contrary, an open system is characterized as a physically distributed
system which is
• composed of networked subsystems where each subsystem can communicate
with other systems on its own,
• making use of standards for exchanging information with other systems,
• usually heterogeneous in terms of hard- and software and
• not centrally administered.
IT systems are subject to a wide array of threats. A threat aims at exploiting one
or more vulnerabilities or weaknesses of an IT system in order to unauthorizedly ac-
quire or modify information assets. In this context, the term information is employed
in a broad meaning and includes data, programs as well as hardware structures
[Pfi00]. Examples for threats are malicious users, hard- and software faults and
user mistakes. Classifications of threats are covered thoroughly in the literature
[BK02; Bis05; Eck12]. Each threat is directed against one or more security objectives.
A usual classification of security objectives in the context of IT systems is as follows
(cf., e. g., [VK83; GR95; Bis05; ALR+04]):
1. Confidentiality: Access to information is exclusively granted to authorized
entities.
2. Integrity: Information is not being modified or deleted in an unauthorized
and undetected manner.
3. Availability: Information is available to authorized entities, regardless of
location and time.
This classification is also referred to as the “CIA model”. More fine grained
classifications have been proposed by e. g. KESDOG˘AN which allow for subdi-
viding these aforementioned security objectives into more specific concerns. For
instance, anonymity is being viewed as part of confidentiality and accountability as
part of integrity [Kes00]. Alternative classifications have been proposed by e. g.
[Gov93; BK02; Eck12; ISO08].
The distinction of what is allowed from what is not with respect to information
assets is being expressed by security policies. In other words, a security policy
specifies which actions are secure and non-secure respectively and can be either
formal or informal. Security policies are enforced utilizing one or more security
mechanisms. A security mechanism might be technical (e. g. a method or a tool) or
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nontechnical (e. g. organizational procedures) and aims at preventing or detecting
an attack or to recover from an attack [Bis05]. For instance, restricting access
to information by means of confidentiality can be technically enforced utilizing
cryptography (cf., e. g., [Den82; MOV97]).
Figure 2.13 shows the interrelation of the terms introduced in this section.
It should be emphasized that the terminology presented here is by no means
exhaustive but represents a minimal set which is necessary for the understanding
of this thesis. For a thorough presentation the interested reader is referred to the
corresponding standard literature such as [Bis05; Eck12].
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Figure 2.13: Interrelation of Security Terms
2.3.2 Formal Methods
In a perfect world, every developed IT system would exactly behave as specified
and correctly implement its security policies. This is however rarely the case.
In fact, delivering functionality as expected via legitimate channels only is a fun-
damental security property. According to PFITZMANN this corresponds to total
correctness [Pfi00]. The question is thus how to ensure this property of IT systems.
Formal methods are a prominent approach to support this goal and can be applied
at different phases of the systems development life-cycle (e. g. specification and
implementation) and for different aspects of an IT system (e. g. hardware, soft-
ware and protocols). They aim at modeling, analyzing and verifying (parts of) IT
systems [WLB+09; KTV+10; GG13].
A formal method is characterized by a sound mathematical basis which pro-
vides the foundations to precisely define and reason about notions such as sound-
ness. It also serves to prove certain properties of an IT system based on a model.
This model is specified in some (formal) specification language. Another essential
characteristic is a methodology which describes how to effectively apply a formal
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method. This also includes a clear definition of the problem scope and the target
user group the method is designed for. Some formal methods also provide tool
support [Win90; WLB+09; GG13]. Due to this wide scope, it is naturally difficult
to formulate a definition which captures all nuances of formal methods. Hence
the definition of GARAVEL and GRAF is employed which the author believes is
well-suited for the scope of this thesis:
Definition 2.16 [FORMAL METHODS]. “Formal methods in a broad sense are mathe-
matically well-founded techniques designed to assist the development of complex computer-
based systems; in principle, formal methods aim at building zero-defect systems, or at
finding defects in existing systems, or at establishing that existing systems are zero-defect”
[GG13, p. 15].
As the adverb “in principle” in Definition 2.16 indicates, it is the sublime
goal of formal methods to prove that systems are zero-defect. This goal is how-
ever accompanied by several challenges which reach from fundamental results
in computability theory to communication problems in general [Win90; And08;
GG13]:
• Undecidability: Formal methods aim at verifying certain properties of systems.
However, Rice’s theorem states that deciding if a program yields a certain non-
trivial property can be reduced to the halting problem which is known to be
undecidable [Ric53]. Hence, there can be no algorithm which can automate
this task. This issue can be potentially circumvented by restricting a formal
method’s scope. For instance, the expressiveness of the utilized specification
language can be restricted to problem classes which are decidable. Another
possibility is to restrict tool support such that a formal method produces
output which needs to be manually verified by human beings.
• High-Complexity: Assuming that a formal method considers a problem scope
which is (semi-)decidable, the problem can still yield a high complexity.
Particularly, if a problem is NP-complete, exact solutions are not generally
feasible, but only for problem instances up to a certain size. While clever
tool design can certainly support avoiding high complexity, this challenge
remains a real obstacle for the analysis of large-scale systems.
• Model inaccuracies: Since a model is just a simplified projection of the real-
world, it can never capture all facets. This is especially true for the environ-
ment where a system is intended to run. As a system rarely runs in isolation,
it can be affected by its environment in ways which were not anticipated
during its formal specification and verification. Particularly, some aspects
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such as human errors and natural hazards are impossible to model. Another
crucial factor are unrealistic (or outdated) assumptions regarding the envi-
ronment. Such model inaccuracies lead to formally verified systems which
might fail in real environments.
• Inadequate specification: A challenge which can occur even in a fully verified
system is that the initial specification proves to be inadequate. The reasons
for this mismatch between requirements and specification might be multiple
but can be typically traced back to either inconsistent or misinterpreted
requirements. The result will thus be a system which is formally verified
but which does not deliver what was intended. This kind of challenge
does not exclusively occur when applying formal methods but is a general
issue which frequently occurs in systems development. According to the
STANDISH GROUP, only 39% of IT projects were classified as “successful” in
2012 which among budget and time constraints also includes completeness
in terms of features and functions [The13b].
As a result of these challenges, formal methods are employed for comparably
small systems or for small parts of systems respectively. According to a survey
conducted by WOODCOCK et al. in 2009, out of 62 projects which utilized formal
methods, most had a size of up to 100,000 lines of code. Most of these projects were
systems from transportation and financial sectors. Predominant system types were
real-time applications, distributed applications, transaction processing and high
data volume. 30% of these projects were furthermore applying for certification
[WLB+09].
Since formal methods cover a vast field, a comprehensive survey it not possible
here. Hence this section will concentrate on two major classes of formal methods
which are frequently employed in security, namely model checking and theorem
proving. This decision has been taken since the concepts introduced here are also
employed in the research fields of compliance and secure service composition
and hence support understanding related works discussed in Sections 2.4 and 3.3
respectively. For a more exhaustive overview of formal methods in general and
for security, the interested reader is referred to [Mon03; GG13].
The common denominator of the approaches discussed here is that security
of an IT system is verified with regards to some security model. Frequently en-
countered security models in this context are the models of BELL-LAPADULA,
BIBA and CLARK-WILSON. BELL-LAPADULA is a secrecy model which aims at
preventing information leakage from high to low levels in a hierarchy. This is
achieved employing no read-up and no write-down rules [BL73]. Similar, but
aiming at integrity, is the model of BIBA which defines the no read-down and
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no write up rules [Bib75]. Another, but less formal, model for integrity is the
CLARK-WILSON model which employs a set of nine rules of practice [CW87].
Model Checking
Model checking has been firstly described by CLARKE et al. in 1983 [CES83] and
involves the construction of an abstract modelM as well as a specification formula
f which represents some desired property. M is defined using state-transition
graphs while f is defined using temporal logic. Model checking then aims at
finding all states s P M which satisfy f , i. e. M, s |ù f . A major advantage of
model checking approaches is that they do not require constructing correctness
proofs. However, since model checkers perform exhaustive state explorations,
state space explosion is a perilous soft spot of this kind of approaches [Cla08].
The predominant application area for model checking in security research is
analysis of cryptographic protocols (cf., e. g., [MCF87; Mea96; Bla01; BMV05]).
These approaches usually build upon the DOLEV-YAO model where the network
is represented as a set of abstract participants who are mutually connected via
bidirectional communication channels. Participants can exchange messages with-
out authorization. At any given time new participants can enter the network and
current users can leave it. The adversary in this model is assumed to be capable of
overhearing, intercepting and synthesizing any message in the network. The only
limitation for the adversary are cryptographic operators which are assumed to be
“perfect”, i. e. no information is leaked. In other words, the only way an adversary
can read encrypted messages is to have the proper decryption key [DY81].
Available works on cryptographic protocol analysis are mostly about protocol
analyzing tools written in Prolog. First approaches in this direction are the IN-
TERROGATOR and the NRL PROTOCOL ANALYZER which employ multiple state
machines for representing protocol participants. The states of these machines
correspond to protocol interactions where certain states are defined to be insecure.
In this model a protocol is secure if insecure states are proven to be unreachable
[MCF87; Mea96]. A similar, but light-weight approach has been proposed by
BLANCHET which makes use of several abstractions in order to avoid state space
explosion [Bla01]. Another work which aims at circumventing state space explo-
sion is the OFMC MODEL CHECKER by BASIN et al. which builds the state space
in a demand-driven fashion. This enables to significantly reduce the search space
and thus allows for analyzing bigger problems [BMV05].
Other application areas for model checking in security include (but are not
limited to) verifying security properties of control flow graphs (cf., e. g., [BJL+01])
and business processes (cf., e. g., [ACP+11]).
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Theorem Proving
Theorem proving in its current state can be traced back to two fundamental works
by HOARE and DIJKSTRA which were published in 1969 and 1975 respectively
[Hoa69; Dij75]. The goal is to prove the general validity of a formula f (also called
theorem in this context), i. e. |ù f . This is achieved by showing that f is the logical
consequence of a set of other formulas by employing proof inference over a set of
inference rules and axioms [Ber02]. An inference rule is given in the following form:
P1, P2
C
(2.2)
Here, P denotes a premise (with “,” denoting concatenation) and C a conclusion.
An inference rule states that if all premises are derivable, then the conclusion is
guaranteed to hold. Inference rules without any premises are called axioms. A
proof obtained by theorem proving has the form of a derivation tree. The nodes
of this tree represent formulae with the root node representing f . Every node of
the tree is at the same time the conclusion of an associated inference rule while its
child nodes are premises of this inference rule. Leave nodes are associated with
axioms. A theorem is proven valid if it can be logically deducted from the leave
nodes to the root (cf. Figure 2.14).
Theorem
In f erenceRule
Theorem
Inference Rule
Axiom
In f erenceRule
Axiom
Axiom
Figure 2.14: Example of a derivation tree (black node representing the root node)
In contrast to model checking approaches, theorem provers do not require
to exhaustively search the state space of a program and hence can even handle
problems of infinite size. However, theorem proving often requires interaction
with a user to guide the process (interactive theorem proving) while some approaches
can work autonomously on rather simple problems (automatic theorem proving)33.
Similar to model checking approaches, a major application area for theorem
proving is reasoning about cryptographic protocols. Early works such as [DS97;
Pau97] employed general-purpose provers for this task. DUTERTRE and SCHNEI-
DER embedded CSP34 in the PVS prover. This combination allowed them to verify
several authentication protocols [DS97]. PAULSON employed the ISABELLE/HOL
33 Cf. [Ber02] for a detailed comparison of model checking and theorem proving.
34 A formal language for describing interactions between processes developed by HOARE.
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prover to demonstrate his approach to reason about authentication protocols using
induction [Pau97]. More recently, MOEBIUS et al. utilized the interactive theorem
prover KIV35 to verify application-specific security properties of cryptographic
protocols. This approach uses an application’s UML model to generate a tailored
formal specification [MSR10].
Other major lines of security research involving theorem proving deal with
verifying the correctness of cryptographic protocol implementations (cf., e. g.,
[BFG+08]) and information flow properties in software systems (cf., e. g., [DHS05]).
Furthermore theorem proving techniques have been used as building blocks of
several security-related verification approaches. For instance, NECULA developed
a framework called Proof-Carrying Code which formally proves that a program
meets certain safety and correctness requirements. These proofs are generated
employing a theorem prover and are subsequently attached to the program. An
entity receiving this program can validate the proof and thus ensure that a program
actually fulfills its claimed safety and correctness requirements prior to running it
[Nec98].
Summary
Utilizing formal methods can ensure to a certain degree that an investigated IT
system behaves as specified. However, formal methods come along with some
challenges as discussed above. Hence they are usually employed for rather small
(sub-)systems. Employing them in greater systems requires a certain degree of
abstraction which usually increases with increasing system size. This leads to the
question to what degree formal verification results can still be viewed as reliable
if achieved at a high abstraction level. It also needs to be explicitly stated that
utilizing formal methods is no guarantee that an IT system is bug free since the
absence of bugs can never be proved [Dij72]. Furthermore, there are to the best
of our knowledge no formal methods which are able to cover interdependence
effects between security goals (cf. Section 2.3.3).
2.3.3 Interdependence Effects
Security mechanisms are usually assumed to be independent of each other. How-
ever, as early as 1995 interdependence effects have been discussed in the context
of technical and organizational mechanisms by the National Institute of Standards
35 A dedicated prover to reason about correctness of software systems, cf.: http://homepages.
inf.ed.ac.uk/wadler/realworld/kiv.html
56 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
and Technology (NIST). The NIST handbook on computer security discusses
several such effects for different types of mechanisms and emphasizes that careful
selection might lead to synergy effects. On the contrary, if the scope and the effects
of mechanisms are not fully understood, they might undermine each other. It is
however also stated that the identification of interdependence effects is a tough
challenge since factors such as system management, legal issues, quality assur-
ance as well as internal and management controls may also affect the effectivity
of mechanisms. Exemplarily the interdependence of physical and logical access
controls will be discussed. Logical access controls restrict access to information to
authorized entities in non-physical environments such as web-based applications.
This however can be easily circumvented if insufficient physical access controls to
the respective IT systems are employed. For instance, an attacker could directly
access the hardware and storage media which would leave logical access con-
trols completely ineffective. Hence, logical access controls need to be flanked by
appropriate physical access controls to be effective [GR95].
Similar to security mechanisms, security objectives are also silently assumed
to be independent of each other by most authors. In this regard, WOLF and
PFITZMANN were the first who discussed the interdependent nature of security
goals [WP00]. They identified three different types of interdependencies for two
security goals A and B:
1. A might strengthen B. Sometimes, A is a weak form of B.
2. A might weaken B.
3. A might implicate B, i. e. A is a guarantee for B or A is a sufficient condition
for B. B may be a weak form of A.
This classification yields some similarities to the interdependence effects de-
scribed in [GR95]. Strengthening relationships correspond to “synergy” effects
and weakening relationships to “potential undermining” effects. Implication
relationships have no correspondent in [GR95].
The presented types of interdependence were discussed based upon the secu-
rity model shown in Fig. 2.15. Here, this security model will be used in order to
explain the different types of interdependence with simple examples. For a more
thorough discussion on each security goal and the model itself, the interested
reader is referred to [WP00].
Strengthening relationships will be explained on the basis of the security goals
confidentiality and anonymity. Confidentiality generally means that in case of com-
munication nobody except the communication partners knows about the content
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Figure 2.15: The security model of WOLF and PFITZMANN (cf. [WP00])
of the communication while their identities may be known. Anonymity means
that a user is able to use a service or resource without disclosing his/her identity
[WP00]. This means that the security of systems which utilize techniques for confi-
dentiality (e. g. encryption) can be further enhanced by employing anonymization
techniques such as MIX-networks (cf., e. g., [KP06]) and vice versa36. Therefore
confidentiality strengthens anonymity and vice versa.
For explaining weakening relationships, again anonymity and accountability will
be employed. Accountability provides proof of communication, i. e. no commu-
nication partner can successfully deny having sent or received a certain piece of
information [WP00]. Systems which require accountability need to be able to link
actions to identities which in general is not possible if users employ anonymization
techniques. On the other hand, systems which require anonymization cannot link
actions to identities. Thus, accountability and anonymity mutually weaken each
other.
Finally, implication relationships will be explained on the basis of the security
36 Of course, MIX-networks already employ encryption for building routes from the sender
to the recipient. The previous statement refers to encrypting the plain messages exchanged
between communication partners, independently from the MIX-network.
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goals unobservability and anonymity. Unobservability is understood as the ability
of a user to use a service or resource without anybody being able to observe that
usage [WP00]. As such, unobservability can be viewed as a stronger form of
anonymity. Therefore, a system which ensures unobservability of users automati-
cally guarantees their anonymity as well. But in case that unobservability is not
given, users may be anonymous or not. However, it can never be the case that a
user is unobservable but not anonymous. In this case the implication relationship
between unobservability and anonymity would not be true.
Research about interdependent security can be classified into the following
groups: Technical approaches [GR95; WP00; Bis09; NL12] and descriptive models
based upon game theory (e. g. [KH03]). Besides of the works discussed in the
previous section [GR95; WP00], only few technical works have been published.
BISKUP provides a discussion regarding the relation between security objectives
as well as their support for autonomy and cooperation of communication part-
ners [Bis09]. Interdependence is not explicitly addressed. NIETO and LOPEZ
present a domain-specific QoS ontology aiming at integrating different types of
networks [NL12]. This model takes interdependence between security objectives
into account by means of single quality attributes.
In the group of descriptive models, the first seminal work was published by
KUNREUTHER and HEAL [KH03]. This paper laid the foundation for a plethora of
complementary research considering interdependent security in varying settings
and under different assumptions. The drawback of these models is that they are
not well suited to deduct real-world QoS requirements.
Conceptually related is the work of YAU et al. [YYA09] which presents a
tradeoff model for balancing performance and security in service-based systems.
Interdependence between security objectives is not addressed.
2.4 Business Process Compliance
In real-world scenarios, business processes or even single tasks are subject to
semantic constraints which arise from guidelines, regulations, corporate policies
and laws. These semantic constraints which for instance may restrict the execution
of tasks at certain locations are called compliance rules. Generally, a compliance
rule can refer to one or more compliance aspects (cf. below). A business process is
called compliant if it does not violate any compliance rules it is subject to. Tech-
niques for ensuring the compliance of business processes are subsumed under the
term business process compliance [RW12]. Compliance management has become
particularly important after the confidence of stakeholders has been erupted by
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several collapses of major enterprises in the early 2000s. Measures for increasing
the transparency of business processes are intended to regain trust [Kar08].
Two groups of compliance approaches can be distinguished (cf. Figure 2.16).
The first group are regulatory approaches which either stem from mandatory legal
regulations such as SOX, EUROSOX and MIFID or from strategic goals such as
corporate responsibility. Legal regulations are intended to increase transparency
of companies’ business by introducing mandatory standards for activities such
as reporting (cf., e. g., [US 02]). Corporate governance on the other hand is a
facility to supervise the achievement of self-declared goals of organizations. Such
self-declared goals may be either monetary or non-monetary and are typically
formulated by the board of directors [Kar08].
The second group consists of standardized approaches which were either
developed by independent organizations such as International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) or by groups of interest such as Information Systems Audit
and Control Association (ISACA). In both cases the goal is to create uniform
guidelines to increase efficiency and transparency of organizations on a voluntary
basis [Kar08].
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Figure 2.16: Elements of Compliance Management (cf. [Kar08])
As previously mentioned, a compliance rule refers to one or more compliance
aspects. In total, the literature (cf., e. g., [CKO92; SZ01; SCM+07; CRR10; ALS11;
RW12]) differentiates between five compliance aspects for workflows, namely
Activities, Data, Location, Resources and Time limits37. In the following, the
37 Some authors view the aspects Location and Resources as belonging together by means of an
organizational perspective (cf., e. g., [CKO92]). In this thesis however these aspects will be
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primary question which is addressed by each compliance aspect will be named
and an example from either Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [US 96] or the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG)38 [Bun90] will be cited:
• Activities: Which tasks are performed in which sequence? (BDSG:4) requires
that users need to agree to the collection of their personal data before corre-
sponding actions may take place. In terms of BPM this aspect refers to the
control flow of process models.
• Data: What data objects are being produced and consumed in the process
and which management rules are applied? (BDSG:3a) requires that personal
data has to be anonymized or pseudonymized if there is no justified need to
access these kinds of data in plain text. In a strict sense, this aspect refers to
two distinct properties of processes. On the one hand, it refers to the data
flow in processes and the general lifecycle of data in a process from creation
to deletion. On the other hand, this aspect defines data management rules
which can be considered as local restrictions for single tasks in a process.
• Location: Where are tasks performed? (BDSG:4b) requires that personal data
might be transferred to 3rd parties outside of Germany only if an appropriate
level of protection can be assured by the 3rd party for the transferred data.
This aspect defines a local constraint on single tasks in a process.
• Resources: By whom are tasks performed? (HIPAA:164.530.a.1.ii) requires
that institutions implementing HIPAA must appoint a person or office re-
sponsible for receiving privacy complaints. In terms of a process model this
aspect restricts the entities that are allowed to perform a task.
• Time limits: Within which time constraints are tasks being performed?
(HIPAA:164.524.a.1; HIPAA:164.524.b.2.i) give patients the right to be in-
formed about certain types of their stored protected health information (PHI)
within 30 days. Applied to a process model this aspect defines a time scope
on a subset of tasks.
Given these aspects, the question is how to model compliance rules in order to
capture each case. This decision also depends on the question when a compliance
check shall be performed. Regarding the BPM lifecycle (cf. Section 2.1.1) there are
four possibilities, i. e. process design, system configuration, process enactment and
diagnosis. This view is however different from the classical dichotomy between
considered separately since they lead to different requirements in terms of service composition.
38 German Federal Data Protection Act
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design-time, run-time and backward approaches for business process compliance
as proposed by e. g. EL KHARBILI et al. [EMS+08] and LY et al. [LRG+12]39.
Mapping the BPM lifecycle on this tripartition reveals that the phase system
configuration has an exceptional position between design-time and runtime. On
the one hand, system configuration is timely located after design-time since process
modeling is finished in principle40. On the other hand, system configuration is
still before runtime as there are obviously no running process instances yet (cf.
Figure 2.17).
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Figure 2.17: Mapping of BPM lifecycle phases to the classical tripartition of approaches for business
process compliance
In the following, proposed approaches for business process compliance will be
reviewed. The approaches have been classified according to the phases of BPM
lifecycle instead of the classical tripartition. This decision was taken in order to
show which compliance aspects are being tackled by proposed approaches at
each phase. Furthermore, this will serve as a preparatory step for the subsequent
discussion where it will be investigated which compliance aspects can be verified
at each phase of the BPM lifecycle. Due to the sheer mass of available literature for
this topic the author has tried to select a representative number of works for each
phase. The search was conducted over the databases ACM Digital Libaray, IEEE
Xplore, AIS eLibrary and Springer Online. Furthermore, the citations of literature
found as well as their references sections were analyzed to find further works.
39 EL KHARBILI et al. additionally consider design-time and runtime approaches to be related
and proposed a meta-level called forward compliance checking as counterpart to backward
compliance checking [EMS+08]. This more coarse-grained view will however not be adapted
here.
40 “In principle” because in a strict sense this is only true in case of directly executable process
models. In case of non-executable process models such as BPMN, remaining open questions
after design-time/process design phase are which services to select and how to transform the
process model into an executable form.
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Process Design
Approaches for design time compliance checking range from methods to guide
users in the design process to static checking methods for verifying compliance of
modeled processes.
Maybe the most straight-forward way to model compliance requirements is
to semantically enrich process models by annotating activities. Respective ap-
proaches have been proposed by SADIQ et al. [SGN07], THOMAS and FELLMANN
[TF09] as well as D’APRILE et al. [DGM+12]. Compliance annotations are utilized
in order to check control and data flow properties of processes against compliance
rules after the design is finished. Proposed annotations include formal constraint
languages [SGN07], ontologies [TF09] and temporal logic [DGM+12].
SCHLEICHER et al. proposed an approach which provides process designers
with compliant process templates in a generic notation. Compliance rules are
modeled utilizing so-called compliance activities which have a fixed position in
the process model and thus cannot be moved. Between these compliance activities
are so-called opaque activities which act as placeholders for designing individual
process flows [SAL+09]. Similarly, KITTEL and SACKMANN propose the concept of
reference controls for enriching process models. Each reference control implements
a compliance requirement and more complex requirements can be captured with
multiple reference controls. Furthermore, the authors propose to parametrize
these controls in order to allow for dynamic adaptation of control flows during
runtime [KS12].
GHOSE and KOLLIADIS proposed an approach for detecting compliance vi-
olations in terms of activities in BPMN models. In case that a process model is
found to be not compliant, modifications are suggested to restore compliance
again. The basis for these suggestions are so-called compliance patterns. A com-
pliance pattern is an anti-pattern which models commonly occurring compliance
violations [GK07]. Conceptually similar approaches were proposed by NAMIRI
and STOJANOVIC [NS07] as well as GOVERNATORI et al. [GHS+09]. SCHUMM et
al. present a complementary approach which additionally allows for identifying
compliant parts of processes which can be reused [STK+10].
Besides these guiding approaches, a number of methods were proposed to
check compliance properties of process models after the design is finished. A
major group of these approaches are based on deontic logic and rule Petri nets.
GOEDERTIER and VANTHIENEN utilize temporal deontic logic to verify sequences
and timings of activities in process models [GV06]. A more formal approach has
been proposed by AWAD et al. which operates on process models transformed into
finite state machines and compliance rules expressed as temporal logic formulas.
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Model checking is employed to verify if the temporal logic formulas are respected
by the finite state machine. State-space explosion is circumvented by employing
a set of reduction rules [ADW08]. BRÄUER et al. propose a generic model query
language for identifying compliance violations in process models. The approach
operates on a graph-based representation of process models as well as attribute
values of object variables in order to identify the occurrence of certain patterns.
Each pattern corresponds to a compliance violation [BDD+13].
ACCORSI et al. model compliance rules as rule Petri nets and statically check
process models if they violate any rule. This approach is able to fully cover
the aspects activities and resources. Data flows are also covered, however data
management rules in terms of e. g. required encryption schemes are not as this
depends on the concrete services employed to implement the process. Similarly
location and time limits are only marginally covered as these aspects also depend
on employed services and thus cannot be determined during design time [ALS11].
A work similar to [ALS11] but solely focusing on data flow properties in
workflows, is presented by MEDA et al. It utilizes a graph traversal algorithm to
detect compliance violations regarding data flows in nested as well as unstructured
workflows. And like the work presented in [ALS11], the presented approach does
not cover data management requirements [MSB10].
The works of BECKER et al. aim at bridging the gap between compliance and
business rules. Compliance requirements are modeled as business rules which are
mandatory or which must not occur in process models. Validating that a process
model contains or does not contain certain business rules is performed employing
model-checking. The authors make use a of a domain-specific business process
notation called SBPML which has been developed for the financial sector [BBD+11;
BAC+11].
In summary, approaches belonging to the process design phase of the BPM
lifecycle are able to fully cover the compliance aspects activities and resources.
Data aspects are only partly covered, i. e. data flow properties are covered but
data management is not. Similarly restricted are location and time limit aspects.
Single tasks in the process model can be annotated to mark such restrictions. But
since the compliance of these aspects cannot be determined during design-time,
they are considered only to be partly covered at this phase.
System Configuration
Compliance checking at this phase can be performed in basically two ways, namely
by considering compliance 1) during transformation or 2) after transformation.
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Surprisingly, proposed approaches for the first group are limited to detecting
and solving structural issues such as deadlocks in service choreographies (cf.
Section 3.1) using process calculi (cf., e. g., [BZ07; BBM+08]). The author is not
aware of any approaches for service selection in orchestrations with respect to
compliance aspects.
Approaches which aim at transformed process models usually perform checks
against compliance rules and are thus very similar to static compliance checking
methods proposed for the process design phase. An important difference is how-
ever that at this stage concrete services are already selected and thus compliance
checks can be extended to these as well. Temporal logic is often utilized to model
compliance rules while verification is performed utilizing either model checking
or finite state automata.
The approaches proposed by YU et al. [YMH+06], LIU et al. [LMX07] and
MONAKOVA et al. [MKL+09] all consider control and data flow properties of BPEL
processes. In [YMH+06] and [LMX07] compliance rules are modeled in temporal
logic. YU et al. however additionally provide a domain-specific language called
PROPOLS to ease modeling of compliance rules by process designers [YMH+06].
Both works verify the compliance of process models utilizing finite state automata.
In [LMX07] however the process model is first transformed into a equivalent
formal representation utilizing the pi-calculus [Mil93]. MONAKOVA et al. propose
to model compliance rules as logical assertion expressions using predicate logic.
Verification is performed by means of checking the satisfiability of these logical
assertions using a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver [MKL+09].
The work of TRCˇKA is related to the works presented in [YMH+06; LMX07;
MKL+09] in the sense that it also focuses on detecting compliance violations
in terms of control and data flow errors. However, the approach is applied to
workflow nets (cf. [Aal98]). Instead of compliance rules, the work focuses on
anti patterns which model compliance violations utilizing temporal logic. Process
models are verified against these anti patterns utilizing model checking techniques
[TAS09].
BARESI et al. developed an assertion language for BPEL processes called
ALBERT. The language supports the verification of control flow and time limit
constraints of service compositions. Latter is possible as this approach considers
QoS properties of selected services. The work also proposes a component for
monitoring and evaluating compliance rules at runtime (cf. below) [BBG+07].
Similar approaches for BPEL processes include the works presented in [XCZ+08;
LQS12]. XIAO et al. propose to verify SLA conformance of BPEL processes
utilizing simulations [XCZ+08]. In the approach of LOMUSCIO et al., contracts are
specified as BPEL behaviors. These contract descriptions are then transformed into
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a domain-specific language which forms the basis for verifying BPEL processes
employing a model checker [LQS12]. An approach for visually modeling contracts
was proposed by MARTINEZ et al. Compliance of processes against these constracts
is verified using timed automatons [MDC11].
Regarding the verifiability of compliance aspects at this phase, it is necessary
to consider approaches for service selection and approaches for checking composi-
tions separately for the following reasons. During service selection it would be
possible to verify aspects such as data management, location and time constraints
by considering QoS properties of service alternatives. The sequence of activities
on the other hand has to be taken as granted as it is not the purpose of the service
selection problem to question the validity of the process model (cf. Section 3.2.4).
The resources aspect finally requires configuration effort and is thus out of scope of
service selection. As the author was not able to find any service selection approach
providing this kind of compliance-awareness, this is considered a research gap.
On the contrary, approaches for transformed process models additionally consider
the order of tasks, data flow properties and resources. Generally, at this point of
the BPM lifecycle and in all following phases, it is possible to verify all compliance
aspects as necessary information is now available in the form of either process
traces or service SLAs.
Process Enactment
At the third phase, process instances are deployed and running. As such, com-
pliance verification at this phase of the BPM lifecycle is basically monitoring of
running process instances.
PESIC and VAN DER AALST utilize linear temporal logic to construct state au-
tomatons [GPV+96] for monitoring and detecting violations in running process
instances [PA06]. AGRAWAL et al. propose using activity logging and adapting
running process instances according to these activity logs to enforce compliance
[AJK+06]. A similar work is presented by ROZINAT and VAN DER AALST who
verify conformance of process instances by analyzing event logs at runtime using
a set of domain-specific metrics [RA08]. SACKMANN and KÄHMER propose the
ExPDT language for codifying compliance policies which have to be checked by
a reference monitor at runtime in order ot validate process compliance [SK08].
RODRIGUEZ et al. propose a method for defining so-called Key Compliance Indi-
cators to monitor running process instances and detect possible future compliance
violations. These indicators are applied to decision trees which are mined from
process execution logs [RSD+10]. Similarly, LY et al. propose building compliance
rule graphs from compliance requirements. The compliance of running process
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instances is verified by monitoring process traces and checking them against
modeled compliance rule graphs [LRK+11].
Some works related to these monitoring approaches stretch several phases of
the BPM lifecycle. NAMIRI and STOJANOVIC (cf. Process Design) propose validat-
ing process instances during runtime utilizing a knowledge-based approach. This
approach utilizes process traces such as log files, message queues and database
entries [NS07]. BARESI et al. (cf. System Configuration) developed a framework
for checking compliance during runtime employing a set of software components
for monitoring ALBERT statements [BBG+07].
Several works have been proposed which consider compliance in terms of de-
tecting business contract violations. These contracts are specified employing (for-
mal) languages and verified at runtime using a variety of techniques. WEIGAND
and VAN DEN HEUVEL employ deontic control messages for verifying business
contracts [WH02]. MILOSEVIC et al. propose a framework for monitoring process
execution to detect compliance violations [MJD+02]. Similar approaches were also
proposed by GIBLIN et al. [GMP06] and ALBERTI et al. [ACG+08].
Diagnosis
The diagnosis phase finally deals with finished process instances. Verifying com-
pliance at this stage is a forensic task which is performed analyzing process traces.
VAN DER AALST et al. proposed to analyze log files for this task. In their work
the authors model compliance rules utilizing linear temporal logic. Compliance is
verified employing model checking [ABD05].
The author is not aware of any approaches other than the one presented by
VAN DER AALST et al for verifying compliance at this phase of the BPM lifecycle.
Considering the circumstance that compliance of process instances should be
ensured no later than at runtime, the reason seems obvious. Detecting compliance
violations of finished process instances is usually an act of evidence gathering for
legal disputes. Thus at this stage of the BPM lifecycle, there is a smooth transition
from compliance to IT forensics.
Summary
It has been shown that the classical dichotomy between design-time, runtime
and backward compliance checking is insufficient to classify approaches for busi-
ness process compliance. Furthermore it became clear that at each phase of the
BPM lifecycle different compliance aspects can be considered. The methodical
consequences for service composition is that not all compliance aspects can be
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considered during service selection and that instead techniques need to be aligned
with compliance checking measures taking place during process design. Table 2.2
summarizes these findings.
Table 2.2: Verifiability of compliance aspects at different stages of the BPM lifecycle
Aspect
Compliance Checking Time
Process System Configuration System DiagnosisDesign Service Post Enactment
Selection Transformation
Activities  #    
Data G# G#    
Location G#     
Resources  #    
Time Limits G#     
Note:  = fully verifiable, G#= partly verifiable, #= not verifiable
2.5 Optimization Models and Solving Approaches
This section introduces optimization concepts which are utilized in this thesis.
After a brief introduction to optimization in general, the concepts of linear and
particularly integer linear programming are introduced. Next an overview is given
about optimization with multiple objectives, followed by a brief presentation of
heuristics and finally genetic algorithms.
2.5.1 Introduction
The goal of real-world decision and planning problems is usually to either generate a
certain output with minimal input or to maximize output for a given input. Hence
decision and planning problems are typically characterized by a set of multiple
alternative solutions as well as by a set of certain restrictions which might stem
from e. g. technical capacities or natural limits. The task of finding the “best”, i. e.
optimal solution with respect to these restrictions is what constitutes an optimization
problem. The meaning of optimum highly depends on the problem at hand and
might refer to quantities or qualities such as price. An optimization model is the
formal (usually mathematical) representation of an optimization problem. The
application of an optimization model for a concrete data set is called a problem
instance. The general form of an optimization problem is defined as follows [HL01;
DD07]:
Maximize (max)/Minimize (min) z = F(x) (2.3)
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Here, x is a variable vector with n components (x1, . . . , xn) which are the
decision variables of the problem. The vector itself is called solution vector. A solution
vector is being evaluated by an objective function F(x) (2.3) which has to be either
maximized or minimized. A set of equalities and inequalities (2.4) is used to
describe the restrictions of the problem at hand. Finally, for each component of the
solution vector the corresponding domain must be specified (2.5). Each component
of the solution vector must not be negative and can be either continuous (xj P R+),
discrete (xj P Z+) or binary (xj P B).
2.5.2 Linear Programming Problems
Linear Programming (LP) problems are characterized by a linear objective function
which has to be either maximized or minimized with respect to linear restrictions.
This is also called a Single-Objective Optimization (SOO) problem. Decision
variables have to be continuous and usually must not be negative. A minimization
problem can be turned into a maximization problem and vice versa by negating
the objective function as well as the restrictions (cf. [DD07, p. 17] for a detailed
description). Hence, any LP problem can be written in the following general form
[HL01; DD07]:
max F(x1, . . . , xn) =
n¸
j=1
ujxj (2.6)
s.t.
n¸
j=1
wijxj ¤ ci (i = 1, . . . , m) (2.7)
xj ¥ 0, xj P R+ (j = 1, . . . , n) (2.8)
In this formulation, uj denotes the utility associated with the j-th decision
variable from an output perspective, wj its weighting from an input perspective
and ci a capacity constraint.
A vector x which fulfills all restrictions (2.7) is called a solution of the LP problem.
If x furthermore fulfills (2.8), it is called a feasible solution. A feasible solution x
is called an optimal solution of a given LP problem if no other feasible solution x
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yields a greater function value than F(x). While LP problems usually have one
optimal solution, some problem instances might have multiple optimal solutions.
In this case the problem is said to have a parametric solution. Given two optimal
solutions x1 and x2, all convex combinations obtained by
x = λx1 + (1 λ)x2, 0   λ   1
are also optimal solutions of the problem instance [DD07].
One of the most powerful and universal methods for solving LP problems is the
Simplex method. To put it briefly, the Simplex method explores the boundary of
an optimization problem’s feasible area for an optimal solution. Since the method
has been thoroughly studied in science and is widely used in practice, it is covered
in-depth in the standard literature [HL01; DD07].
2.5.3 Integer Linear Programming
An Integer Linear Programming (ILP) problem is a LP problem with discrete or
binary decision variables. More commonly, these problems are called Integer
Programming (IP) problems in the literature. From the authors point of view
however, this does not sufficiently reflect the relationship between LP and ILP
problems. Hence, in this thesis the term ILP will be used. In case that the problem
uses discrete as well as continuous decision variables, it is called a Mixed Integer
Programming (MIP) problem [HL01; DD07].
Many combinatorial problems can be formulated with an ILP model. One of
the most frequently encountered problems which is modeled as an ILP problem
and which has many real-world applications is the Knapsack Problem (KP). A
classical 0-1 KP considers on the one hand a set of items, each having a weight
and an utility value and on the other hand a knapsack with a certain capacity. The
challenge is then to find the subset of items with maximum utility while respecting
the capacity of the knapsack. In its basic form the classical 0-1 KP is defined as
follows [MT87]:
max z =
n¸
j=1
ujxj (2.9)
s.t.
n¸
j=1
wjxj ¤ c (2.10)
xj P B (j = 1, . . . , n)
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Here, uj and wj denote the utility and the weight of item j respectively, c the
capacity of the Knapsack, n the number of items and xj represents a binary decision
variable which indicates if item j is selected (xj = 1) or not (xj = 0).
The 0-1 KP and also all other ILP problems cannot be solved with the Simplex
method since this method requires all decision variables to be continuous. Instead,
for solving ILP problems, several exact approaches have been proposed which can
be classified into the following groups [DD07]:
1. Decision tree approaches: This group includes enumeration approaches such as
full and partial enumeration with the Branch-and-Bound algorithm [LD60].
Furthermore, approaches for dynamic programming belong to this group
(cf., e. g., [CLR+09, Ch. 15]).
2. Cutting-plane methods: Approaches of this group iteratively improve the
solution set of a given optimization problem by adding additional linear
inequalities to the model (so-called cuts). Especially for MIP problems, such
algorithms are popular for finding integer solutions. An introductory to this
topic is given in e. g. [Cor08].
3. Hybrid approaches: These approaches combine principles from the former two
groups. One prominent example is the Branch-and-Cut algorithm [PR91].
All exact approaches have in common that they guarantee to find an optimal
solution after a finite number of steps. While this is undoubtedly a convenient
property, employing exact approaches is not feasible in the following cases:
• Large problem size: A given problem instance might be too large to be
handled on given computing capacities. The notion of “too large” however
highly depends on the problem complexity. Especially for NP-hard problems
exact approaches are usually infeasible.
• Time constraints: A solution might be required in a certain period of time.
Exact algorithms however cannot give any guarantees regarding running
time.
In case that exact approaches cannot be applied to an optimization problem,
either because the problem size is too large or because of strict time constraints,
heuristics are preferred (cf. Section 2.5.5). Another important area of application
for heuristics are Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) problems (cf. Section 2.5.4)
which differ fundamentally from SOO problems in certain aspects [Deb01; HL01;
DD07].
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2.5.4 Optimization with Multiple Objectives
The most essential feature of MOO problems is that at least two conflicting objec-
tive functions need to be optimized simultaneously. Having several conflicting
objectives is a trait which many real-world optimization problems share. A simple
example is selecting a car with maximum performance in terms of horsepower and
minimal fuel consumption. However, the major drawback is the complexity in-
volved with considering multiple objective functions simultaneously. Particularly,
the notion of optimality is different for MOO problems than for SOO problems.
Whereas SOO problems typically have one optimal solution (if any at all), MOO
problems usually have multiple Pareto optimal solutions in case of discrete de-
cision variables. If any decision variable is continuous, MOO problems even
have infinite Pareto optimal solutions. This requires to reconsider the notion of
optimality in the context of MOO problems [Deb01; CLV07; BDM+08].
With respect to the general form of optimization problems as defined in Section
2.5.1, the general form of a MOO problem only differs regarding the objective
functions and is defined as follows [Deb01; CLV07]:
max/min F(x) = ( f1(x), . . . , fk(x)) (2.11)
s.t.
gi(x)
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For MOO problems, the same rules as for SOO problems apply for converting
maximization problems into minimization problems and vice versa. Hence, in
the following the focus will be on maximization problems without any loss of
generality.
Let Ω denote the set of feasible solutions of a given MOO problem. Then each
solution xPΩ represents a compromise with respect to the objective functions. That
is, a solution may yield better than average results for one objective, but perform
worse than average for the remaining objectives. Thus, the solutions in Ω are
partially ordered which is expressed by the dominance relation [Deb01; CLV07]:
Definition 2.17 [DOMINANCE RELATION]. A solution x P Ω is said to dominate
another solution x1 P Ω (denoted x ¨ x1) iff:
1. x is no worse than x1 in all objectives, i. e.: @i P t1, . . . , nu, fi(x) ¥ fi(x1)
2. x is strictly better than x1 in at least one objective, i. e.: Di P t1, . . . , nu, fi(x) ¡
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fi(x1)
Given this property of Ω, a solution xPΩ is regarded as optimal, if no com-
ponent of the solution vector can be further improved without deteriorating at
least one other component. Such a solution is called Pareto optimal. Utilizing the
dominance relation, Pareto optimality can be defined as follows [CLV07]:
Definition 2.18 [PARETO OPTIMALITY]. A solution x P Ω is called Pareto optimal
if it is not dominated by any other solution x1 P Ω, that is:  Dx1 PΩ.F(x1) ¨ F(x).
The set of all Pareto optimal solutions is denoted by P. The representation of Pareto
optimal solutions in objective space is called the Pareto Front PF, i. e.: PF := tz =
F(x) |xPPu.
Figure 2.18 illustrates the relationship of above terms based on a fictitious MOO
problem consisting of two objective functions which have to be maximized. Here,
the red line indicates PF of the given problem instance. The solutions x1 and x2
are Pareto optimal since they are not dominated by any other solution. That is,
neither violates any restriction nor can be further improved with regards to one
objective function without deteriorating its function value for the other objective
function. Solution x3 is dominated by x1 and x2 since both solutions yield better
objective function values. Finally, x4 represents an infeasible solution and is thus
not considered in terms of Pareto optimality although it yields better results than
x1 and x2 for each objective function.
f1(x)
f2(x)
PF
x1
x2
x3
x4
Figure 2.18: Sample MOO problem instance
While Pareto optimality of a solution can be unambiguously determined uti-
lizing the dominance relation, it is not possible to decide per se which Pareto
optimal solution is “the best”. As already stated above, each solution represents a
compromise with respect to the objective functions. Hence it cannot be decided
automatically which compromise to choose. Instead a decision-maker needs to
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manually pick a solution, either based on individual preferences or on some set
of (organizational) rules [Deb01; CLV07]. DEB proposed what he called an “ideal
multi-objective optimization procedure”[Deb01, p. 4] consisting of two steps
[Deb01]:
1. Find multiple Pareto optimal solutions with a wide range of values for
objectives.
2. Choose one of the obtained solutions using higher-level information.
The first step is especially a challenge for rather complex MOO problems
where finding even a single Pareto optimal solution is time consuming. Hence
GA techniques are often employed in the context of MOO problems for finding
a set of diverse and near-optimal solutions in a comparably short period of time
(cf. Section 2.5.6). This does not necessarily mean finding all Pareto optimal
solutions but usually refers to determining only a certain number of solutions up
to a predefined maximum.
An alternative solving approach is to reduce MOO problems to SOO problems.
While this reduces the mathematical complexity, a general disadvantage of this
approach is that it does not allow for thoroughly exploring the search space.
In particular, some Pareto optimal solutions are usually missed depending on
the employed technique. In these cases a thorough search requires multiple
applications of the method with no guarantee that all Pareto optimal solutions
will be obtained. Several reduction methods have been proposed. Frequently
employed are the weighted sum method and lexicographic goal programming.
In the following these two methods will be briefly explained. For a detailed
overview, discussion and classification of available techniques, the interested
reader is referred to the corresponding standard literature such as [Deb01; CLV07;
DD07].
Weighted Sum Method
Given a MOO problem with k objectives, the weighted sum method aggregates
all objective functions into a single objective function Φ(x) by multiplying each
objective fi(x) with a real number 0 ¤ λi ¤ 1 such that
°k
i=1 λi = 1.
As an example, let us consider a MOO problem with three objective functions
which have to be maximized (cf. [DD07]):
max f1(x1, x2) = 10x1 + 20x2 (2.14)
max f2(x1, x2) = x1 + x2 (2.15)
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max f3(x1, x2) = 60x1 + 40x2 (2.16)
s.t. x1 + x2 ¤ 100 (2.17)
6x1 + 9x2 ¤ 720 (2.18)
x2 ¤ 60 (2.19)
x1, x2 P R+ (2.20)
Given three objective weightings λ1 = 110 , λ2 =
8
10 and λ3 =
1
10 , the objective
functions (2.14) – (2.16) are aggregated into a single objective function as follows:
max Φ(x1, x2) =
1
10
f1(x1, x2) +
8
10
f2(x1, x2) +
1
10
f3(x1, x2)
= 7.8x1 + 6.8x2
Tackling Φ(x1, x2) with methods such as Simplex, one obtains the optimal
solution x = (60, 40) which yields the objective function values f 1 (x
) = 1400,
f 2 (x
) = 100 and f 3 (x
) = 5200.
The advantage of the weighted sum method is that it is intuitive and easy to
use. However, the method also yields a number of disadvantages for ILP problems
with multiple objectives. The major disadvantage is that this method is usually not
able to find more than one optimal solution for given weightings. Only in case that
chosen weightings lead to a parametric solution, multiple optimal solution can
be obtained. In case of MIP and non-linear optimization problems, this method
yields several more disadvantages. But since these topics are out of the scope of
this thesis, they will not be further discussed here [Deb01; DD07].
Lexicographic Goal Programming
This approach first requires the decision-maker to order objectives according to
their priorities. For two given objectives A and B, the decision maker needs to
decide whether A has higher priority than B (denoted A " B) or if B has higher
priority than A (denoted B " A). A goal with a higher priority is regarded as in-
finitely more important than goals with a lower priority. Hence, this approach first
exclusively considers the objective with the highest priority and the corresponding
constraints for optimization. If the result is a parametric solution, the objective
with the second highest priority and corresponding constraints are considered.
Goals of the first objective are used as hard constraints and solutions are required
not to violate these goals. Ultimately, this approach will result in a single Pareto
optimal solution for a given MOO problem. The obtained solution however de-
pends on the chosen order for the objectives. Especially in case of MOO problems
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consisting of many objective functions, testing all combinations might become a
time consuming task [Deb01; DD07].
As a demonstration, this method will be applied to the objective functions (2.14)
– (2.16). Assigning either f1 or f3 the highest priority will lead to an optimal solution
in a single step without any further consideration of the remaining objectives. If
however the highest priority is assigned to f2, the result is a parametric solution.
Depending on whether f1 or f3 is assigned the second highest priority, a different
optimal solution will be obtained. Applying lexicographic goal programming to
this MOO problem thus yields a total of four Pareto optimal solutions depending
on the priority order (the “. . .” indicate that no further objective functions are
considered):
f1 " . . . : x = (30, 60); f 1 (x) = 1500, f 2 (x) = 100, f 3 (x) = 4200
f2 " f1 " . . . : x = (60, 40); f 1 (x) = 1400, f 2 (x) = 100, f 3 (x) = 5200
f2 " f3 " . . . : x = (100, 0); f 1 (x) = 1000, f 2 (x) = 100, f 3 (x) = 6000
f3 " . . . : x = (100, 0); f 1 (x) = 1000, f 2 (x) = 100, f 3 (x) = 6000
2.5.5 Heuristics
In contrast to exact approaches, heuristics are usually capable of finding a “good”
feasible solution in a comparably short period of time. The major drawback is
however, that in general heuristics cannot guarantee to find an optimal solution.
In order to successfully find a “good” feasible solution, heuristics incorporate
procedure rules which are known or assumed to be successful in the scope of a
certain problem structure. Heuristics can be broadly categorized into constructive
and local search heuristics (for a more thorough discussion cf. [DD07]) [BK05].
Constructive heuristics aim at generating a first feasible solution for a given
optimization problem. The quality of the resulting feasible solution greatly de-
pends on the construction rules applied. Thus, results can vary from “very bad”
to close to optimal [BK05; DD07].
Local search heuristics usually start with a feasible solution which has been de-
termined either randomly or by employing a constructive heuristic. Starting from
this initial solution, other solutions nearby (so-called neighbors) are considered for
potential replacement. If a neighbor is accepted as replacement, the algorithm
“moves” to this new solution. This procedure is repeated until a pre-defined termi-
nation criterion is reached. Termination criteria might be a certain period of time
which has passed since starting the heuristic or a certain number of consecutive
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iterations without any improvement of the solution. An example for a common
local search heuristic is hill climbing [BK05; DD07].
Constructive and local search heuristics can be further classified into deter-
ministic and stochastic or randomized approaches. Deterministic approaches are
characterized by the fact that when applied to a certain optimization problem
with identical starting conditions, multiple applications will always yield the same
solution. On the contrary, stochastic heuristics usually yield different results due
to a random component [DD07].
Some heuristics such as hill climbing tend to get stuck in a local optimum. In
case of hill climbing, the reason for this behavior is the replacement rule which
dictates that a neighbor solution is only considered if it yields better results in terms
of the objective function. Hence in order to avoid getting stuck in a local optimum,
heuristics are required to allow for a temporary worsening of the solution in order
to explore the search space more thoroughly. Such a guiding principle or master-
strategy which can be applied to improve the overall results of other heuristics
is called metaheurisic. An example for such metaheuristics are genetic algorithms
[BK05; DD07].
2.5.6 Genetic Algorithms
A GA is a stochastic metaheuristic which mimics evolutionary principles of nature
for search and optimization procedures41. Instead of a single solution, a set of
solutions is generated. In case of optimization problems having a single optimal
solution, this set can be expected to converge towards this optimum. In case
of multiple optimal solutions as is the case for MOO problems, GAs can be ex-
pected to obtain multiple optimal solutions in their final set. However, due to the
stochastic nature of GAs, it cannot be guaranteed that any optimal solution will
be found at all. The set P of solutions that a GA obtains is thus hoped to hold
P=P or PP, but this is usually not the case. In this regard the only guarantee
is that all solutions in P are not dominated by any other solution found during the
optimization process. Hence the resulting front of P is called the non-dominated
front NF 42 [FF93; Bäc96; Deb01; CLV07].
The basic component of a GA is an individual which is an encoded solution to
41 For a detailed discussion of the biological foundations and their application to the field of
computing cf. [Bäc96].
42 In [CLV07] P andNF are denoted Pknown and PF known respectively. From the author’s point
of view however this notation is misleading since it does not sufficiently reflect that P and
NF do not necessarily contain any Pareto optimal solution.
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some problem. The encoding of a solution corresponds to a biological genotype. It
typically consists of a single chromosome corresponding to the solution vector for
a given optimization problem represented as string. This chromosome consists
of multiple genes which can take on certain values or alleles from a certain genetic
alphabet. Usually this genetic alphabet is either binary or continuous in the context
of GAs. In the simplest case each gene corresponds to a single component of the
solution vector for an optimization problem. However, different encodings are
also possible43. As in biology, the genotype of an individual defines its phenotype
which in the context of GAs is the concrete objective function value(s) that the
solution yields. The set of all individuals is called a population. Starting with an
initial population, a GA evolves the population iteratively towards increasingly
better regions of the search space by applying genetic operators on the population,
namely selection, crossover44 and mutation. Each iteration of a GA produces a new
generation of individuals. In conjunction with genetic operators, probabilistics
are used for a better exploration of the search space. Probabilistics are step-wise
reduced in order to achieve a better exploitation of discovered good areas of the
search space. Furthermore, GAs utilize a diverse set of techniques such as distance
measures to preserve diversity among the population. This aims at obtaining an
equal distribution of the population along or close to PF. The process ends as
soon as some termination condition is met [Bäc96; Deb01; CLV07].
Figure 2.19 shows the working principle of GAs in a general form as flowchart.
In the following, essential concepts in the scope of GAs will be briefly presented
and discussed based on this depiction. It should be noted however, that real-
world GAs usually differ from this form, either by using a different sequence
of genetic operators or by performing additional steps. Furthermore, for each
genetic operator a wide array of different strategies and modifications have been
proposed. Hence this general form along with the following description do by no
means represent the only true form of GAs but aim at providing a foundation for
understanding the GA which has been developed in the scope of this thesis (cf.
Section 5.3) and the reference GAs against which it was tested (cf. Chapter 7).
The first step of a GA is to generate the initial population of individuals. Two
essential questions in this regard are how to generate individuals and how many.
Individuals of the starting population are usually generated randomly since GAs
are intended to be general purpose. However, customized GAs for specific prob-
43 For instance, in [Deb01] a problem instance is presented with a solution vector consisting of
two discrete components. Each decision variable is encoded using five binary genes.
44 Frequently the term recombination is used synonymously (cf., e. g., [Bäc96; CLV07]). In this
thesis however the term crossover will be used exclusively since this is also the name of the
biological process which this operator mimics.
78 CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
Start
Initialize Population
gen = 0
Evaluation Assign Fitness
Cond?
Stop
Selection
Crossover
Mutation
gen = gen + 1
Yes
No
Figure 2.19: The working principle of a GA as flowchart (based on [Deb01])
lems sometimes utilize heuristic approaches to (partly) generate a good initial
population (cf., e. g., [KIH12]). This may improve the speed of convergence and the
quality of the final solutions [ZDT00; BGK04]. With regards to the population size,
the question is not easy to answer. A “small” population size is usually expected to
deliver poor solutions while a “large” population size may cause the GA to spend
too many resources [Ala92]. PISZCZ and SOULE proposed to choose the size of
the population depending on the problem complexity. However, determining the
optimal population size quickly becomes very difficult for increasingly complex
optimization problems [PS06]. Hence, as a rule of thumb, populations with a size
of 50 to 200 individuals are commonly used today in conjunction with most GAs
[CLV07].
At each generation, the population is being evaluated. This evaluation consists
of computing the objective function value(s) that each individual yields as well
as counting the constraints that are violated by each individual. Based on this
information, a fitness function computes a fitness value for each individual. In other
words, the fitness value is a metric expressing the desirability of an individual.
The definition of the fitness function depends on the concrete GA [Bäc96; Deb01;
CLV07].
After the population has been evaluated, the GA checks if a pre-defined termi-
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nation condition is satisfied. If this is the case, the GA terminates and otherwise
the population is modified by applying genetic operators which results in a new
generation. This new generation is again evaluated before rechecking the ter-
mination condition and so on. In the simplest case the termination condition
is a strict generation limit, i. e. the GA automatically terminates after a certain
number of generations. More sophisticated termination conditions are convergence
criteria which can also be combined with a generation limit. For a known PF
of a given optimization problem, convergence criteria measure the distance of
the population to PF. If PF is unknown, quality indicators are utilized to
measure the improvement of a population from one generation to the next. In
this case, convergence relates to the continuous improvement of the population
towards a certain quality value. The termination criterion then is usually a min-
imum improvement that every new generation must yield. Otherwise the GA
terminates. Several quality indicators have been proposed (cf., e. g., [CLV07] for a
thorough discussion). A frequently utilized quality indicator is the Hypervolume
(denoted HV) which measures the dominated portion of objective space [ZT99;
Deb01; CLV07]. Figure 2.20 shows an example for a fictitious MOO problem with
two objective functions which have to be maximized (the corresponding PF is
depicted by the red line). The points x1, . . . ,x4 represent a fictitious solution, i. e.,
a NF (depicted by the blue line), as it might be obtained from a GA. The grey
shaded area finally represents the correspondingHV .
f1(x)
f2(x)
PFx
1
x2
x3
x4HV
NF
Figure 2.20: Hypervolume of a population of solutions for a MOO problem
Selection operators are utilized to decide, which individuals of the current
population will survive to be part of the next generation. This decision is usually
based on the fitness value and follows a certain strategy. A common strategy is to
rank solutions according to their fitness value by performing pairwise comparisons.
From this ranking, a certain number of individuals is selected as members of the
next generation. The pairwise comparison approach is called binary tournament and
it belongs to the class of elitist selection operators. In order to preserve diversity
among the population, a common strategy is to randomly select a certain number
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of bad solutions, especially at earlier generations [Bäc96; Deb01; CLV07].
The crossover operator aims at producing new individuals by combining the
chromosomes of two parent individuals. In combination with the selection oper-
ator, which sorts out individuals from the population, the purpose of crossover
is thus to fill up the resulting gap in the population with new individuals. In its
most basic form, crossover works by first selecting a cutting point in two chromo-
somes. After that, the subsequences of genes, from the cutting point to the end of
the chromosome, are exchanged (cf. Figure 2.21(a)). This is also called single- or
one-point crossover [Bäc96; Deb01; CLV07].
Mutation randomly changes one or more genes in a chromosome at a certain
probability. This may prevent potential stagnation of the population in a local
optimum and lead to a better exploration of the objective space. Chosen genes
are replaced with random alleles (cf. Figure 2.21(b)). One frequently employed
mutation operator is the non-uniform mutation. This operator is characterized by a
mutation probability which decreases with each generation. The strategy behind
this behavior is to better exploit discovered feasible areas in objective space at later
generations [Bäc96; Deb01; CLV07].
Chromosome 1
Chromosome 2
3 7
9 2
8 9 5 2
1 5 7 6
(a) Crossover
Chromosome 1
Chromosome 1’
3 7 8 9 5 2
3 7 8 5 26
(b) Mutation
Figure 2.21: Working of basic genetic operators
2.6 Summary
This chapter introduced a broad spectrum of topics which form the conceptual
and methodical foundation this thesis is built upon. Due to the mass of avail-
able literature on certain topics, a representative selection of works have been
discussed. The selection has been performed such that each direction of research
with relevance for this thesis has been covered. A particular result of this chapter
is that interdependent security and business process compliance have not been
covered so far from a service selection perspective.
Chapter 3
Service Composition
“The whole is greater than the sum of its
parts.”
– ARISTOTLE
I N THIS CHAPTER service composition will be discussed which is the main fo-cus of the work at hand. Conceptually, service composition belongs to the 2nd
phase of the BPM lifecyle, i. e. system configuration (cf. Section 2.1.1). Hence,
service composition includes all activities which are necessary to transform a
process model into an executable composition of services. At the network level,
such a composition can be implemented with different communication patterns
for participating services. This results in different composition topologies which
will be discussed first (Section 3.1). The transformation itself can be performed
employing different approaches. A majority of these approaches are collectively
referred to as QoS-aware service selection45. Since this thesis contributes to service
selection, this topic is discussed next (Section 3.2). Subsequently covered are the
the consideration of process requirements regarding security (Section 3.3) and
compliance (Section 3.4) during the transformation. Besides of service selection, al-
ternative composition approaches exist which will be shortly presented afterwards
(Section 3.5). The chapter closes with a brief summary (Section 3.6).
3.1 Composition Topologies
Services can be composed in two fundamentally different ways, namely as orches-
tration and as choreography. Each type of composition leads to a different kind of
service topology [Erl05].
45 The term service selection is used interchangeably in this thesis.
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Service Request
Service
Mediator
Service 1
Service 2
Service 3
(a) Orchestration
Service Request
Service 1
Service 2
Service 3
Service 4
(b) Choreography
Figure 3.1: Service composition topologies
In an orchestration one service acts as a mediator and centrally coordinates the
invocation of other services (cf. Figure 3.1(a)). This coordination is based on user
inputs as well as service outputs and follows some formalism such as BPEL (cf.
Section 2.1.2). The mediator is also responsible for implementing service states
[Erl05]. The foremost advantages of this approach are that the mediator as the
central instance is in control of all service invocations and data delegation while
the invoked services do not need to know each other. On the other hand, the
mediator is at the same time a single point of failure which in case of an outage
causes the whole composition to crash. Another drawback is that in the face
of multiple process instances, the mediator may become a bottleneck causing
delays in process execution. The languages for implementing business processes
discussed in Section 2.1.2 are all service orchestration languages. It should be
noted that here the term ‘central’ refers to the logical system layer. On the physical
layer, the mediator may run on multiple distributed physical machines.
A choreography is characterized by the circumstance that no central mediator
is present, but every participating service may act as mediator and recipient
at the same time (cf. Figure 3.1(b)). Participating services fulfill their activity
as they are invoked by some other service and may themselves invoke other
services. Effectively this leads to a peer-to-peer topology [Erl05]. Such a distributed
execution of processes eliminates the problem of a single point of failure and
furthermore allows for collaborative process modeling. In particular, this enables
participants in a process to model their individual subprocesses independently
from each other. On the flipside however, choreographies require services to
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Table 3.1: Advantages and disadvantages of composition topologies
Orchestration Choreography
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s • Mediator as central instance con-
trols all service invocations and
delegates all process data among
the services
• Single service don’t need to know
each other
• Distributed execution eliminates
the problem of single point of
failure
• Enables collaborative process
modeling allowing partners to
model their local processes inde-
pendently from each other
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es
• Outage of the mediator causes
outage of the whole composition
(single point of failure)
• In case of many process instances,
the mediator may become a bot-
tleneck causing delays in process
execution
• Services need to know all ser-
vices they want to interact with
• Local changes to process mod-
els may lead to inconsistencies or
errors regarding the interaction
with other collaboration partners
• Logging and determination of er-
ror sources is usually more diffi-
cult in a distributed environment
know the partner services they are interacting with. Another issue is that local
changes to process models may lead to inconsistencies or errors regarding the
interaction with other collaboration partners. Logging and determining the source
of errors in such distributed environments is also usually more difficult than in a
centralized environment [RW12]. Service choreographies are not as common as
service orchestrations. Accordingly there are only few languages supporting this
kind of service composition. Alternatives include academic proposals such as Let’s
Dance [ZBD+06] and BPEL4Chor [DKL+07]. Furthermore, the W3C maintains a
standardized language called Web Services Choreography Description Language
(WS-CDL) [W3C05].
Table 3.1 briefly summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of both com-
position topologies. Especially due to the central mediator in orchestrations which
allows to control the execution of processes and thus yields verifiability, orchestra-
tions are clearly preferred for business applications. In contrast, the difficulties
associated with collaboratively executing processes, hindered a broad adoption
of choreographies [RW12]. Currently however, choreographies are being inves-
tigated in the context of military settings, particularly at the tactical level. These
settings are characterized by requirements on robustness in the face of temporary
unavailable network connections, data-driven process execution and real-time
constraints on reaction to events [CSN+13]. Since the focus of this thesis is on
business applications, it will concentrate on orchestrations in the following.
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3.2 QoS-Aware Service Selection
This section firstly motivates service selection with a simple example before dis-
cussing how to determine global QoS properties of compositions by means of QoS
aggregation. Subsequently it is presented how to normalize QoS of compositions
which is a mandatory prerequisite for determining the quality of different alter-
natives and choosing the “best” solution. Latter is covered in the last subsection
where the service selection problem is being introduced and discussed.
3.2.1 Motivation
The motivation and need for service selection will be illustrated with a simple
example. Figure 3.2 shows a process model in BPMN for validating customer
data as it may occur in e. g. online shops. As soon as the process is triggered, it
first validates the provided e-mail address. Next the process validates either the
bank account or the credit card number of the customer, depending on the data
provided (i. e. the payment method selected by the customer). As soon as these
checks are performed, the process is finished.
Check e-mail
address
Check bank
account
Check credit
card number
Figure 3.2: Sample process
In order to transform this process model into an executable service composition
in e. g. BPEL, generally three steps are necessary:
1. Service Tracking: At first it is necessary to identify potential service candidates
delivering required functionality. Identification of a service’s provided func-
tionality can be performed either manually or automatically. For automatic
identification, technologies such as Resource Description Framework (RDF)
[W3C04a] and Web Ontology Language (OWL) [W3C12] can be employed.
This enables uniform description of service capabilities and reduces language
barriers46. The potential service requester then requires appropriate match-
making mechanisms in order to interpret this meta-information. The final
46 The inherent danger of using natural language alone for describing the provided functionality
of a web service is that the description might be in a language which the potential service
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result of this step is a service repository including relevant service candidates
along with their QoS values.
2. Selection of Services: As soon as relevant service alternatives are identified,
the next step is to determine the optimal assignment of services to tasks.
Optimal in this case means the solution which delivers the best QoS values
while respecting the QoS constraints of the process.
3. Transformation: After the optimal solution is determined, the process model
is transformed into an executable form utilizing the selected services.
As stated, each task requires a different kind of functionality which in the
following will be referred to as service class Si. For the remainder of this thesis,
three simplifying assumptions are made regarding service selection:
1. Service Atomicity: Some services might deliver functionality required by
more than one task47. For the sake of simplicity however, atomicity of
services will be assumed, i. e. each service delivers functionality required
by exactly one task and can thus be unambiguously assigned to a certain
service class. From a granularity point of view, this means that services are
assumed to have an equal functional coverage. In fact, considering services
with different granularity in a composition leads to economic trade-offs (cf.,
e. g., [KHH+11; HZ12]). This is however beyond the scope of this thesis.
2. Interface Uniformity: Real world services of the same service class usually
differ in terms of types, naming and ordering of input as well as output
parameters. It is assumed that within a service class each service has a
uniform interface in this regard.
3. Data Homogeneity: Some real world services (e. g. for encryption and stor-
age) have to deal with different types of data such as text, video and music
files. The type of data may have a crucial impact on the performance of
a service. For instance, performing asymmetric encryption on video files
requires more resources in terms of memory and CPU power than for small
text files. Hence the performance of an encryption service will vary for these
two different types of data. Thus it is assumed that all data passed to a
requester does not understand. E. g. a web service for checking credit card numbers might be
described as “Überprüfung von Kreditkartennummern” in German and “Kredi kartı numarası
dog˘rulama” in Turkish.
47 In fact, especially the payment checking tasks in the sample process are good candidates
for bundling. Web services such as Optimal Payments (http://www.optimalpayments.
com/) provide functionality for checking bank account and credit card numbers.
86 CHAPTER 3. SERVICE COMPOSITION
Table 3.2: Service alternatives for sample process
Service Service Price Response AvailabilityClass Candidate Time
S1
s11 2.25 7 0.92
s12 2.45 4 0.96
s13 2.30 5 0.93
S2
s21 2.80 3 0.91
s22 2.70 2 0.92
s23 2.65 4 0.95
s24 2.45 5 0.94
S3
s31 2.35 4 0.92
s32 2.55 4 0.94
service is homogeneous and has no significant impact on the performance of
a service.
Given the tasks in Figure 3.2, let the corresponding service classes be defined
as follows:
• S1: Check e-mail address
• S2: Check bank account
• S3: Check credit card number
Furthermore, a process might be subject to different QoS requirements. For
the sake of simplicity, the focus will be on three QoS attributes in this example,
namely price, response time and availability. Let the sample process be subject to
the following QoS requirements:
• Price ¤ 5
• Response Time ¤ 10 sec
• Availability ¥ 90%
What is now needed is a repository of service candidates providing required
functionality. Table 3.2 provides a list of fictitious service alternatives which fulfill
this criterion. For each service class Si, different service alternatives sij are available
which deliver the same functionality. However, each service alternative sij delivers
its functionality at a different QoS level which will be referred to as QoS vector qij.
Given these service alternatives, the challenge is to find the optimal solution (if
any exists) which on the one hand delivers the required functionality and on the
other hand respects the global QoS requirements of the process.
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For this motivating example, the problem will be considered from a combi-
natorial perspective (cf. Section 3.2.4). To solve the selection problem, a full
enumeration of all possible assignments of services to tasks is performed. The
overall QoS of each solution is obtained by inserting the QoS vectors tq1i, q2j, q3ku
for each triple of services ts1i, s2j, s3ku into the following aggregation functions48:
ΦPrice(q1i, q2j, q3k) =q11i + max(q
1
2j, q
1
3k) (3.1)
ΦAvailability(q1i, q2j, q3k) =q21i min(q22j, q23k) (3.2)
ΦResponseTime(q1i, q2j, q3k) =q31i + max(q
3
2j, q
3
3k) (3.3)
A total of 24 possibilities exist in which to assign the fictitious service alternatives
to the tasks of the sample process (cf. Table 3.3). In general, for a given process
model with n tasks (and a corresponding number of service classes), the total
number c of possible service compositions is given by the following term:
c =
n¹
i=1
|Si| (3.4)
As can be seen in Table 3.3, the only solution fulfilling all QoS requirements is
ts12, s24, s32uwhich offers price 5.00, response time 9 sec and availability 90,24%.
Hence, this solution is at the same time the optimum. Having determined the
optimal solution, the final step is to transform this selection into an executable
form. Figure 3.3 sketches a BPEL process as it may be produced by e. g. a model-
driven approach (for an overview about model-driven software engineering cf.
[OMG03]).
Obviously, enumerating all possible combinations is not an efficient approach
for finding the optimal solution, especially for large process models or in the face
of tight time constraints. Latter is the case for e. g. autonomic systems which are
required to repair themselves automatically in case of failures such as unexpected
performance lags of single services in a composition [KC03].
Tackling these situations efficiently requires facilities for dynamic service selec-
tion with respect to end-to-end QoS constraints [YZL07]. Determining the global
QoS vector of a selection of services however requires aggregating the QoS vectors
of each selected service.
48 For the moment the reader is asked to take these functions for granted. How they are deducted
from the process model will be explained in detail in Section 3.2.2.
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Table 3.3: Full enumeration of all possible solutions for the example
Solution Price Response AvailabilityTime
ts11, s21, s31u 5.05 11 0.8372
ts11, s21, s32u 5.05 11 0.8372
ts11, s22, s31u 4.95 11 0.8464
ts11, s22, s32u 4.95 11 0.8464
ts11, s23, s31u 4.90 11 0.8464
ts11, s23, s32u 4.90 11 0.8648
ts11, s24, s31u 4.70 12 0.8464
ts11, s24, s32u 4.80 12 0.8648
ts12, s21, s31u 5.25 8 0.8736
ts12, s21, s32u 5.25 8 0.8736
ts12, s22, s31u 5.15 8 0.8832
ts12, s22, s32u 5.15 8 0.8832
ts12, s23, s31u 5.10 8 0.8832
ts12, s23, s32u 5.10 8 0.9024
ts12, s24, s31u 4.90 9 0.8832
ts12, s24, s32u 5.00 9 0.9024
ts13, s21, s31u 5.10 9 0.8463
ts13, s21, s32u 5.10 9 0.8463
ts13, s22, s31u 5.00 9 0.8556
ts13, s22, s32u 5.00 9 0.8556
ts13, s23, s31u 4.95 9 0.8556
ts13, s23, s32u 4.95 9 0.8742
ts13, s24, s31u 4.75 10 0.8556
ts13, s24, s32u 4.85 10 0.8742
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<process>
<sequence>
<invoke>
s12
<invoke>
<if>
<condition BankTransferPayment/>
<invoke>
s24
</invoke>
<elseif>
<condition CreditCardPayment />
<invoke>
s32
</invoke
</elseif>
</if>
</sequence>
</process>
<!- Check e-mail address ->
<!- Check bank account ->
<!- Check credit card number ->
Figure 3.3: Sketch of BPEL process incorporating the optimal service selection
3.2.2 QoS Aggregation
As previously stated, service selection is subject to global QoS constraints as
defined by a process designer. In order to obtain the global QoS vector Q for a
selection of services, QoS vectors qij of each selected service alternative sij need
to be aggregated along the process model. Three major types of approaches
have been proposed for this task in the literature about service selection. While
sequences, loops and parallelisms are handled mostly identical, they differ in
the way how conditional branches such as XOR-splits are treated. Hence in the
following these three approaches will be shortly presented with a special emphasis
on this difference. A thorough discussion of all details including minor variations
and hybrid approaches is however beyond the scope of this thesis.
The first type of approach begins with determining all execution paths of a
process model prior to performing QoS aggregation on each path separately (cf.,
e. g., [ZBD+03; YL04; ZBN+04; AZA+05; XB05; AP06; BSR+06; YZB11; HL13]). In
case of conditional branches, this means that each branch represents a single path
of execution. For instance, the sample process in Figure 3.2 can be decomposed into
two different execution paths (cf. Figure 3.4). This approach generally delivers
more accurate results in terms of QoS. However, it generally also consumes
more resources in terms of computing time and memory since aggregation (and
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Check e-mail
address
Check e-mail
address
Check credit
card number
Check bank
account
Figure 3.4: Execution paths of the sample process
subsequently also service selection) needs to be performed multiple times, i. e. for
each execution path. This can become especially critical in cases of big process
models containing lots of conditional branches.
In the second type of approach QoS values for all execution paths are aggre-
gated simultaneously. In case of conditional branches however, each branch i is
assigned a probability pi such that
°n
i=1 pi = 1 holds for all branches of a condi-
tional gateway (cf., e. g., [Men04; CDE+05; YZL07; CDE+08; WCS+08; MCD10;
KIH11; LM11; SPG+11]). Applied to the sample process in Figure 3.2 and assum-
ing equal probabilities for each execution path (i. e. p1 = p2 = 0.5), the aggregated
price for the composition can be determined as follows:
ΦPrice(q1i, q2j, q3k) =q11i + p1q
1
2j + p2q
1
3k (3.5)
This type of approach has a major advantage over the first in that all execution
paths of a process model are captured implicitly in the aggregation functions.
On the other hand however, each conditional branch needs to be associated with
a probability value. Depending on the service candidates, this might require
continuous monitoring of running process instances in order to obtain accurate
probabilities.
The third type of approach finally is similar to the second, i. e. QoS aggregation
is also performed for all execution paths simultaneously and all execution paths of
a process model are implicitly captured in terms of aggregation functions (cf., e. g.,
[Lee03; GJ05; CCG+07; JM07; MBK+09; ARN12; YCY12]). In contrast however, it
considers only the branch with the worst QoS value at conditional gateways for
aggregation. This is performed for each QoS attribute separately. In case of the
sample process in Figure 3.2 and the optimal solution, the worst conditional branch
in terms of response time was s24. Hence this value went into the aggregation.
In terms of price however, s32 had the worst (i. e. highest) price. The respective
QoS values of the other service were not aggregated. This approach ensures that
a solution for the service selection problem (cf. Section 3.2.4) respects the worst
(i. e. critical) path for each QoS attribute along the whole composition. Since all
other conditional branches yield at least the same or a better QoS value, it is at the
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same time ensured that these execution paths respect the global requirement for
each QoS attribute as well. In the following the optimal solution for the sample
process shall be utilized to clarify this. Computing the price for each execution
path (denoted as priceupper and pricelower in correspondence with Figure 3.4) yields
the following prices:
priceupper =2.45+ 2.45 = 4.90
pricelower =2.45+ 2.55 = 5.00
As can be seen, the price for each execution path respects the global QoS constraint
of the process. The major advantage of this approach is that probabilities are not
required for computing the aggregated QoS of conditional branches. On the other
hand however, it lacks the possibility for a differentiated examination of individual
execution paths in terms of aggregated QoS. Nevertheless this approach has been
applied in the motivation (cf. Section 3.2.1) as well as in the remainder of this thesis
for two reasons: 1) The focus of this thesis is not on examination of execution paths
and 2) like the second type of approach it aligns more closely with a combinatorial
problem formulation for service selection (cf. Section 3.2.4) which is the focus of
this thesis. Hence, this decision was rather a simplification.
Considering proposed approaches for QoS aggregation such as [PS97; Car02;
YPH02; JRM04; Men04; JRM05], it can be concluded that aggregation of a QoS
dimension is subject to two factors:
• Semantics of QoS Dimension: QoS dimensions are usually described by means
of properties such as direction and value type. However, when aggregating
a QoS dimension, different semantics may apply which cannot be logically
derived from a QoS dimension’s properties. For instance, price and availabil-
ity are both numerical dimensions. However, aggregating these properties
for a sequence is different: Price needs to be added and availability to be
multiplied. Another aspect of numerical QoS dimensions is that they might
be based on a statistical definition such as variance or mean. In case of
composition patterns such as parallelisms, such QoS dimensions would re-
quire specific aggregation schemes. Finally, some QoS dimensions such as
encryption scheme are not numerical and thus require aggregation schemes
based on e. g. a rule-based approach.
• Composition Pattern: Composition patterns determine the order in which
services are invoked. As mentioned previously, this order might have an
influence on the way a QoS dimension needs to be aggregated. It is thus im-
portant to determine relevant composition patterns which have an influence
on QoS dimensions.
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Based upon these observations, QoS aggregation is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 [QOS AGGREGATION]. QoS aggregation is the process of determining
the global QoS vector Q of a service composition by aggregating the QoS vectors of
the selected services based upon the semantic of each QoS attribute and the composition
patterns the process model consists of.
QoS aggregation has long been a field of active research. PUSCHNER and
SCHEDL proposed a graph-based approach to determine maximum execution
times for distributed real-time systems. Although the work considers several
composition patterns and execution sequences, it is limited in the way that it
only focuses on a single QoS dimension [PS97]. MENASCÉ proposed a model to
determine if selected web services in a composition offer sufficient throughput.
The work considers simple sequential and parallel composition patterns [Men02].
An extended version of this work takes time and cost into consideration and also
more composition patterns such as forks and joins. The work fails however to
identify general structures for aggregating QoS attributes as well as the influence
of composition patterns on aggregation. Instead, case-based schemes are proposed
[Men04]. YANG et al. differentiate between data oriented, sequential and parallel
composition structures [YPH02]. Similar to the works of MENASCÉ this approach
lacks in identifying general interrelations as well.
A more general approach was proposed by CARDOSO who considers time,
cost, reliability and fidelity. On a given process model, a step-wise reduction is
performed along certain composition patterns until finally one task is left. At each
reduction step, the QoS dimensions of the respective piece of process are being
aggregated according to a general aggregation scheme [Car02]. Unfortunately, this
approach does not consider all composition patterns found in real-world process
models and is limited to certain QoS dimensions as well.
Currently the most general approach has been proposed by JAEGER et al.
[JRM04]. The work is based on an analysis of 20 workflow patterns which was
conducted by VAN DER AALST et al. on a total of 15 commercial workflow manage-
ment systems [AHK+03]49. JAEGER et al. studied the relevance of these patterns for
service compositions and identified a total of seven relevant Composition Patterns
(CPs)50. In their original work these patterns have been depicted using a generic
49 In the meantime an expanded and revised version has been published [RHA+06]. Furthermore,
a website has been launched providing rich information on this as well as related topics:
http://www.workflowpatterns.com/
50 In a later work JAEGER et al. extended this approach to consider service dependencies and
QoS violations to obtain more accurate compositions at runtime [JRM05]. But since this thesis
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notation explaining that this “can be applied to different composition descriptions”
[JRM04, p. 150]. The author has done here so for BPMN with Figure 3.5 showing
the result. An impression of how these CPs can be expressed in BPEL can be found
in Appendix A.1. In the following these CPs will be briefly explained:
(...)
CP 1
CP 2 (...)
CP 3
(...)
CP 4
(...)
CP 5
(...)
CP 6
(...)
CP 7
Figure 3.5: Composition patterns for QoS aggregation (based on [JRM04])
• CP 1: This pattern is a simple sequence of tasks which are executed in the
defined order.
• CP 2: A loop, potentially with a predefined maximum number of iterations
(cf. below). To indicate loops, BPMN offers a loop marker in the form of a
curved arrow which is attached to a task [OMG11].
• CP 3: XOR-split followed by a XOR-join (cf. Section 2.1.1).
• CP 4: AND-split followed by an AND-join synchronizing all parallel flows
(cf. Section 2.1.1).
• CP 5: AND-split followed by an m-out-of-n AND-join (1 ¤ m ¤ n). This
kind of join synchronizes at least one flow and is also called a discriminator
is about design-time service composition, this approach will not be further investigated here.
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[AHK+03]. To support this kind of synchronization behavior, BPMN pro-
vides a complex gateway element which is a diamond shape containing a
marker in the shape of an asterisk [OMG11].
• CP 6: OR-split followed by an OR-join synchronizing all active parallel flows.
This kinds of splits and joins are modeled as a diamond shape gateway
including a circle [OMG11].
• CP 7: OR-split followed by an m-out-of-n OR-join (1 ¤ m ¤ n). Again the
join is a discriminator. As for CP 5, this is also modeled utilizing the complex
gateway provided by BPMN [OMG11].
While most CPs are pretty straight-forward, loops and OR-splits require some
further explanation due to some specific properties regarding BPMN and QoS
aggregation.
The loop marker in BPMN actually leads to repeatedly evaluating a boolean
expression. As long as this boolean expression evaluates to true, the task is
repeated, possibly ad infinitum. Thus, utilizing the loop marker effectively results
in a while-loop. It is however possible to specify a numeric cap by attaching an
intermediate conditional event to the loop task (cf. Figure 3.6). This ensures that
as soon as the cap is reached, the event triggers the next task [OMG11]. In either
case this means that an aggregation of QoS dimensions which are affected by
loops is not exact, but based on an assumption regarding the number of iterations.
Employing a cap as shown may however limit the degree of inaccuracy. This issue
with loops is not specific to BPMN, but applies to all modeling languages where
the number of loop iterations depends on runtime conditions [JRM04].
Do 10
Iterations
Figure 3.6: Defining a cap for a loop with an intermediate event in BPEL
OR-splits lead to an aggregation issue since it is not clear during design time
which execution paths need to be taken into account. Thus JAEGER et al. proposed
to utilize a simple probabilistic model assuming that the probability for each
path to be taken is equal. Given the set N of all tasks in a process model, let T
denote all sets of the power-set ofNwhich may be triggered by an OR-split, i. e.
each possible flow between an OR-split and the corresponding join. Determining
upper and lower bounds for QoS dimensions in T requires taking all possible
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combinations of flows into account which is denoted by the power-set P(T). In
order to simplify the notation of aggregation operations which are applied on
P(T), JAEGER et al. defined that the following must hold [JRM04]:
f (P(T)) := f (tx : x = f (S), @S P P(T)u) (3.6)
This allows to first aggregate the subsets S of P(T) with an aggregation func-
tion f which results in a new set, denotedM in the following. In a second step,
the same aggregation is applied onM as well. This definition is useful for rather
simple QoS dimensions requiring e. g. the maximum or the minimum of P(T).
The usual aggregation in cases of OR-splits is however that the inner and the outer
function are different, depending on the semantics of the considered QoS dimen-
sion. Following is a simple example for clarification. Let T = ts1j, s2ju be two
potential flows between an OR-split and an OR-join. The corresponding power-set
is then P(T) = ttHu, ts1ju, ts2ju, ts1j, s2juu. It is assumed that the semantics of a
hypothetical QoS dimension requires that QoS values need to be added. Then for
the piece of process between the OR-split and the corresponding join, upper and
lower bounds for the aggregated QoS vector Q can be determined as follows:
1. M = tx : x = °
yPS
qα
ι(y), @S P P(T)uwhere ι(y) denotes the index of y which
in our example can be eitherH, 1j or 2j.
2. Determine the upper bound for the hypothetical QoS dimension by max(M)
and the lower bound by min(M).
In the remainder of this thesis all aggregations of OR-splits and joins will be
assumed to apply this probabilistic model if not stated otherwise. As mentioned
before, aggregating QoS dimensions requires assigning an aggregation scheme for
each of these CPs depending on the semantics of each considered QoS dimension.
In the following this will be done exemplarily for price, availability and response
time since these were employed in the sample process in Section 3.2.1. Hence in
the following the semantics of these QoS dimensions will be discussed and how
they behave for different CPs:
• Price: Price is maybe the most simple QoS dimension and behaves additive.
Each potential invocation of a service is bound to a cost, even repetitive
invocations of the same service. In case of conditional branches such as XOR-
and OR-splits, the third type of strategy as outlined at the beginning of this
Section is applied. That is, when assigning services to tasks in conditional
branches, only the branch with the highest price is considered for aggregation.
This ensures that the price of all other branches is at least the same or lower.
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• Availability: Availability represents the probability that a service executes
successfully. Each service execution is assumed to be independent. Thus
the corresponding probabilities are multiplied. As for price, in case of con-
ditional branches only the branch with the lowest availability is considered
for aggregation. Hence it is ensured that the services of all other conditional
branches yield at least the same or a better (i. e. higher) availability.
• Response Time: As the name indicates, response time measures the time that
a service requires to handle a request and send an answer. Response times
of different service invocations are considered independent and are thus
additive. In case of response time, parallelisms are treated like conditional
branches. Only the branch with maximum response time is considered
for aggregation. Again this ensures that the response times of the other,
non-critical execution paths yield the same or a lower response time.
Table 3.4 shows the aggregation schemes for these QoS dimensions with qαij
denoting the QoS vector of service alternative sij. These were adapted from
[JRM04] to fit with the notation employed in this thesis. In the shown aggregation
schemes, Qα denotes component α of the global QoS vector Q, n the number of
tasks involved in the respective CP and k the number of (assumed) loop iterations
[JRM04].
Given a set of aggregation schemes, Q can be determined by step-wise col-
lapsing the process model into a single node. CARDOSO proposes to alternately
aggregate sequences and parallelisms/conditional branches. The reduction rules
are quite simple: Parallelisms or conditional branches are reduced first if the flows
consist of exactly one task, otherwise sequences and loops are reduced first. Then
iteratively the alternate group is reduced until the process model finally consists
of only one task. The result of this reduction is an aggregation expression for
each QoS dimension for a given process model [Car02; JRM04]. Applying this
decomposition scheme to the sample process shown in Figure 3.2 leads to the
following steps:
1. Aggregate the XOR-split
2. Aggregate the sequence
This yields the aggregation expressions as shown below with Φα denoting the
aggregation function for QoS attribute α:
• Price: Φ1(qij) = q11j + max(q12j, q13j)
• Availability: Φ2(qij) = q21j min(q22j, q23j)
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• Response Time: Φ3(qij) = q31j + max(q32j, q33j)
Hence every dimension of Q correlates to an aggregation function or, in a
general form:
Qα = Φα(qij) (3.7)
3.2.3 Normalizing Quality Attributes
In the previous section it has been explained how to aggregate QoS properties
of a service selection. Obviously this is a necessary requirement to decide if a
solution fulfills given QoS requirements or not. However, if multiple (Pareto opti-
mal) solutions fulfill QoS requirements, the question arises which one is better?
The sample in the previous chapter employed three QoS attributes, namely price,
availability and response time. For availability the rule is “the higher the better”
while for price and response time it is “the lower the better”. Furthermore, each
QoS attribute is quantified using a different measure. Hence Multiple Attribute
Decision Making (MADM) tools such as Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) can-
not be applied [YH95]. Generally, to make different QoS attributes comparable,
some kind of normalization is required depending on the scale of measure [JD88].
Normalizing QoS attributes is particularly crucial for modeling service selection
as an optimization problem (cf. Section 3.2.4).
Measurement theory differentiates between a total of four measurement scales.
The scale defines, among other things, which mathematical operations are valid
on measured values [Ste46; JD88]. In the following, each measurement scale will
be briefly introduced with a short example from web services:
1. Nominal: A nominal scale is employed to classify elements into different
categories with no order between these categories whatsoever. Examples for
nominal scales include categorization of parliament members into political
parties or of answers into categories “yes” and “no”. In the context of web
services, nominal scales are employed to measure QoS properties such as
provider country or utilized encryption algorithm. Allowed mathematical
operations are tests for equality and inequality [Ste46; JD88].
2. Ordinal: An ordinal scale is characterized by two properties. First, it allows
for defining categories of elements like a nominal scale. Second, it allows
to define an ordering relation between these categories. However, it does
not make any assertions regarding the distance between two categories. For
instance, the distance between the natural numbers 1 and 2 is the same as
between 2 and 3, i. e. one. However, in terms of e. g. military ranks (as an
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example for an ordinal scale), a general is greater than a major and a major is
greater than a private. But it is not possible to make any statements regarding
the distance between these ranks. More precisely, a mathematical operation
such as General  Private = Major does not make any sense. In the context
of web services, typical candidates for QoS properties measured using an
ordinal scale are key lengths for encryption algorithms and resolutions of
video streams. Mathematical operations allowed are equality, inequality as
well as comparison operations [Ste46; JD88].
3. Interval: Interval ratios are similar to ordinal scales. However, they addi-
tionally incorporate a unit of measurement which implicitly defines an equal
distance between measured values. For instance, the difference between 2
and 3 Celsius is the same as between 3 and 4 Celsius, i. e. 1 Celsius. QoS
properties such as response time (measured in ms) and backup intervals
(measured in any unit of time) are typical examples from the web services
domain. Valid mathematical operations are the operations for ordinal scales
as well as addition and subtraction [Ste46; JD88].
4. Ratio: In addition to the properties of an Interval scale, Ratio scales have an
absolute zero value. Temperature measured in Kelvin is an example from
real-world. For web services, QoS properties measured utilizing Ratio scales
are price (measured in any currency) as well as availability (measured in
% of a year’s time). In addition to the mathematical operations allowed
for Interval scales, Ratio scales also allow for applying multiplication and
division [Ste46; JD88].
Nominal and Ordinal scales are also referred to as qualitative scales while the
Interval and Ratio scales are subsumed under the term quantitative scales [Ste46;
JD88]. A remaining challenge is however the distinction of different ordering
relations. In particular, for some QoS properties such as availability a higher value
is better while for other such as price a lower value is better. To differentiate these
two kinds of ordering relations, a simplification will be utilized in the remainder of
this thesis: If the ordering relation of an Ordinal, Interval or Ratio scale is increasing
(such as availability), it will be referred to as ascending and if the ordering relation
is decreasing (such as price) as descending.
In the following, proposed approaches for normalizing quantitaive QoS at-
tributes in the context of web services will be discussed. Respective methods have
been proposed by [ZBD+03; Ber07; YZL07; AR09; LDS+10; YCY12]. It should
be noted, that the approach described in [ZBD+03] has also been used in e. g.
[ZBN+04; GJ05; AP06; AP07; MBK+09; BYL+11; SSS11; SLI12]. To the best of the
author’s knowledge, the method proposed in [AR09] has been reused only once
100 CHAPTER 3. SERVICE COMPOSITION
in [ARN12]. All other approaches have not been employed in other publications
so far. Thus, the approach presented in [ZBD+03] is the most widely used normal-
ization method in service composition. The approaches presented in [LDS+10]
and [YCY12] are slightly modified versions of [ZBD+03]. Table 3.5 provides an
overview of these approaches.
The discussion will be started with the normalization method of ZENG et al.
Following are the equations employed for normalization [ZBD+03]:
q1αij =
$&
%
qαijQ
α
min
QαmaxQαmin
if Qαmax Qαmin  0
1 if Qαmax Qαmin = 0
(3.8)
q1αij =
$&
%
Qαmaxqαij
QαmaxQαmin
if Qαmax Qαmin  0
1 if Qαmax Qαmin = 0
(3.9)
Here, qαij denotes the actually measured quality value while Q
α
max and Qαmin
denote overall maximum and minimum values of the currently observed QoS
attribute over all Si. Equations (3.8) and (3.9) are used to normalize ascending and
descending QoS attributes respectively. This method ensures that quality values
are normalized into the interval [0, 1]. Independently of the reading direction, a
higher normalized value means “better”. LI et al. extended this model in order
to cope with QoS values that might differ from design to execution time. The
basic idea is to predict QoS values at execution time and use this predicted value
in the process of service selection. In case that no prediction is possible for any
reason, equations (3.8) and (3.9) are extended for a third possible outcome for q1αij
which is 1 [LDS+10]. YAN et al. use equations (3.8) and (3.9) in reverse order, i. e.
equation (3.8) is utilized to normalize descending and equation (3.9) to normalize
ascending QoS attributes. The reason is that service selection is modeled as a
graph problem aiming at finding the shortest path through the graph employing
DIJKSTRA’s algorithm (cf. [Dij59]) and is thus a minimization problem [YCY12].
BERBNER aims at providing a scoring for QoS values in the range [0, 10] where
10 is interpreted as best. This scoring is utilized to order web services for each
service class Si according to user preferences. Consequently (and contrary to
[ZBD+03]), Qαi,max and Q
α
i,min are determined for each service class Si rather than
globally for all possible service compositions [Ber07].
The approach of YU et al. normalizes QoS values utilizing statistical measures
rather than maximum and minimum values. In their formulation, µαi and σ
α
i
denote the average and the standard deviation respectively for qα in service class
Si [YZL07].
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ALRIFAI and RISSE employ a simplified version of the normalization method
presented in [ZBD+03]. In particular, the case for normalizing QoS attributes
where Qαmax Qαmin = 0 has been skipped. What is however remarkable is that
the normalization expression which is used in [ZBD+03] to normalize descending
QoS attributes, is employed by the authors to normalize descending as well as
ascending QoS attributes. These differences lead to two problems:
1. QoS attributes where only a single value is measured (i. e. Qαmin = q
α
ij = Q
α
max)
cannot be represented as this would require a division by 0 due to the skipped
case differentiation.
2. As the only normalization expression employed was originally proposed for
descending values, normalized values for ascending values have an opposite
reading direction. This especially hinders comparison of QoS attributes
with different reading directions and thus contradicts the motivation for
employing normalization.
Especially due to the second issue, this approach has to be considered erro-
neous.
Regardless of the chosen aggregation scheme, aggregation of a normalized
QoS attribute q
1α
ij is in the following denoted with the aggregation function Φ
1
α.
Aggregation schemes are applied to normalized QoS values as presented in Section
3.2.2.
3.2.4 The Service Selection Problem
The service selection problem can be verbally expressed as follows: For a given
process model, find the best service for each task from the corresponding service
class such that the QoS constraints of the process model are respected. Figure 3.7
shows a fictitious result of a selection process for the sample process.
The task of finding the best selection of services for a given process model is
obviously an optimization problem. In Section 3.2.1 a brute force approach was
presented, i. e. all possible solutions were enumerated and the best alternative was
picked. The example was in particular simple as it yielded only one valid solution.
Real-world service selection problems are however facing several challenges:
• Multiple feasible solutions: It is unlikely that for a process model only one
feasible solution exists. Even if there are only two, service selection must
support the user in the process of deciding which solution is “better”.
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Check e-mail
address
Check bank
account
Check credit
card number
Figure 3.7: Sample process with an exemplary service selection
• Big search space: Real-world processes contain a lot more tasks than the pre-
sented sample process and there are numerous available service alternatives.
As such exhaustive search space exploration in terms of full enumeration is
infeasible for real-world process models.
• Strict time constraints: In some cases, service selection is subject to strict
time constraints. Particularly, this includes cases where a maximum service
outage time has been codified in form of an SLA as well as autonomous
systems which are required to recover from any service outage in a certain
time span.
Facing these challenges, more effective approaches than simple brute force have
been proposed to tackle the service selection problem. Two major groups of ap-
proaches are combinatorial and graph-based approaches. Combinatorial approaches
(e. g. [YL04; CDE+05; AP06; YZL07; CDE+08; KIH11]) utilize mathematical prob-
lem formulations and solving approaches known from standard literature on
operations research (cf. Section 2.5). Depending on the chosen optimization model,
different solving approaches can be employed. A pivotal advantage of combinato-
rial approaches is that the structure of a process model in terms of composition
patterns generally does not require special consideration in either the optimiza-
tion model or the solving approach. The control flow in terms of composition
patterns is addressed separately by utilizing aggregation functions. Aggregated
QoS vectors then form the basis for the actual selection and optimization process.
On the contrary, suiting optimization models for service selection usually cannot
be solved exactly at all or in acceptable time since the problems considered are
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usually NP-hard. Hence, combinatorial service selection often generates only a
sufficiently well solution rather than an optimal and usually does not give any
guarantees on algorithm runtime.
Graph-based approaches (e. g. [Men02; ZBD+03; YL04; CCG+06; YCY12]) uti-
lize a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) as system model. This leads to a shortest path
problem which can be solved exactly in P and is well-suited for process models
which are mainly sequential. Hence, the control flow in terms of composition
patterns becomes part of the problem formulation. The major drawback of graph-
based approaches is however that any non-sequential process structure needs
special consideration in the problem formulation or the solving approach. Loops
for instance need to be unrolled to multiple nodes in the DAG which might lead to
a tremendous growth of the model. Forks and joins require special consideration
in the problem formulation, the solving approach or both.
Table 3.6 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of these groups of
approaches. The assumption that the underlying models of business processes as
considered in the scope of this thesis are mainly sequential, is in general untenable.
This is already illustrated by the sample process utilized in this chapter. Hence,
this thesis focuses on combinatorial approaches for service selection.
Table 3.6: Advantages and disadvantages of composition approaches
Combinatorial Graph-based
A
dv
an
ta
ge
s • All CPs can be considered
• CPs do not require special con-
sideration in modeling or solving
approach
• Sequential flow structures can be
formalized as DAG and solved
exactly in P
D
is
ad
va
nt
ag
es • Problem formulations usually
NP-hard, hence exact solutions
usually unfeasible
• Usually no runtime and optimal-
ity guarantees
• Non-sequential flow structures
need special consideration in the
problem formulation, the solving
approach or both
3.2.4.1 System Model
The combinatorial system model is an integer array with a length equal to the
number of tasks in a process model. This system model forms the basis for the so-
lution vector of an optimization problem. Depending on the problem formulation,
the system model can be used either as it is as a solution vector or might require
a certain transformation. Each array entry corresponds to a service class Si and
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indicates which service alternative sij to select. Thus, the value of each entry is
limited by |Si|. Figure 3.8 shows the combinatorial model for the sample process
and the service alternatives presented in Table 3.2. As stated above, the control
flow is considered separately by means of aggregation functions and is thus not
reflected at all by the system model.
S1
S2
S3
s1j s2j s3j
s11
s12
s13
s21
s22
s23
s24
s31
s32
Figure 3.8: Combinatorial model for the sample process
3.2.4.2 Problem Formalization
The service selection problem is often formalized as KP. The classic 0-1 KP intro-
duced in Section 2.5.3 assumes that all objects belong to one class and that possibly
multiple items are selected based on a single abstract utility value with respect to
a capacity restriction. However, the service selection problem has two properties
which are not captured by this basic model:
1. Different classes of objects (i. e. service classes) and from each class exactly
one item has to be selected.
2. Different dimensions of utility (i. e. QoS attributes), some of which yield
better utility with increasing value, some with decreasing and again others
by means of a partial ordering.
Due to these properties the MMKP51 has become popular to model the service
selection problem since first employed by YU et al. [YZL07]. Similar to the classical
0-1 KP, the MMKP aims at finding a subset of items with maximum utility while
51 Alternate names found in the literature are e. g. “Multiple-Choice Multi-Dimension Knapsack
Problem” [Kha98] and “Multidimension Multichoice Knapsack Problem” [YZL07].
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respecting m constraints on capacity (3.11). In contrast to the classical 0-1 KP, items
are divided into k distinct groups or classes Gi with each item belonging to exactly
one group. From each group Gi, exactly one item is to be chosen (3.12). The basic
form of the MMKP is as follows [KPP04]:
max z =
k¸
i=1
¸
jPGi
uijxij (3.10)
s.t.
k¸
i=1
¸
jPGi
wαijxij ¤ cα (α = 1, . . . , m) (3.11)
¸
jPGi
xij = 1 (i = 1, . . . , k) (3.12)
xij P t0, 1u (i = 1, . . . , k; j P Gi)
Generally, weights wij can be properties of any kind. In the context of service
selection, the weights represent QoS properties of a single service alternative.
The basic formulation of the MMKP assumes that weights are summarized. As
has been seen in Section 3.2.2, the aggregation scheme is dictated by the control
flow of a process model as well as the semantics of a QoS property. Additionally,
the reading direction of each QoS property might be different. Therefore, in
the context of service selection, the capacity constraint (3.11) is reformulated to
refer to the normalized aggregation function Φ1 and normalized quality vector
q1ij. Normalized global capacity constraints on QoS dimension α are denoted by
C 1α. Furthermore, the utility value uij is replaced with a utility function Fij. This
function calculates a utility value based on all (normalized) QoS properties of
selected service alternatives sij with respect to user preferences (cf. Section 3.2.4.3
for a thorough discussion). Thus, the MMKP as adapted for service selection has
the following form:
max z =
k¸
i=1
¸
jPSi
Fij(sijxij) (3.13)
s.t. Φ1α(q
1α
ij xij) ¤ C
1α (α = 1, . . . , m) (3.14)¸
jPSi
xij = 1 (i = 1, . . . , k) (3.15)
xij P t0, 1u (i = 1, . . . , k; j P Si)
In a strict sense, MMKP is a hybrid model. By settings α = 1 one obtains
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the Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problem (MCKP). Setting k = 1 and omitting the
choice constraint (3.12) or (3.15) respectively yields the Multidimensional or d-
dimensional Knapsack Problem (d-KP). Both problems are known to be NP-hard
[KPP04]. This makes MMKP one of the more challenging KP variants.
MMKP has been employed in several real-world applications such has resource
management in multimedia systems (e. g. [Kha98; AMS+01]). Due to its com-
plexity however only few algorithms exist for solving problem instances exactly
[Kha98; Sbi07; RG09; GR11]. All of these approaches make use of the branch and
bound method [LD60] and are designed only for a single objective function. To the
best of the author’s knowledge, there is currently no exact approach for tackling
MMKP by means of a MOO problem.
Besides these exact algorithms, numerous heuristics have been proposed utiliz-
ing either general concepts such as convex hulls or problem-specific knowledge
(e. g. [Kha98; AMS+01; ARK+06; IBR10; CHM+12]). Reported results indicate that
these heuristics deliver good near-optimal solutions in a comparatively short time.
For instance, KHAN reports that his heuristic is able to achieve objective function
values within 4% of the optimum while being 17 to 28152 times faster than his
proposed optimal algorithm for a single objective function [Kha98].
In the context of service selection, MMKP has been utilized numerous times
for problem formulation (e. g. [LJL+03; CDE+05; CAH05; AP06; YZL07; CDE+08;
WCS+08]). This underlines that MMKP is well suited for representing the service
selection problem.
3.2.4.3 Utility Function
The utility function is used to obtain an utility value for a service alternative
based on its actual (normalized) QoS properties. The obvious advantage of this
approach is that service alternatives can be ranked according to this utility value.
Utility functions furthermore enable users to express preferences regarding QoS
dimensions. Implicitly this also allows for defining the MMKP for service selection
as a SOO problem. More precisely, the objective in this case is to optimize utility
rather than multiple QoS properties. However, employing a utility function leads
to a restriction of the search space similar to the weighted sum method presented
in Section 2.5.4. The reason is that in cases where no user preferences are given,
utility methods assume uniform importance of QoS attributes which leads to a
single (rarely few) optimal solution(s). But as has been discussed in Section 2.5.4,
this usually excludes compromise (i. e. Pareto optimal) solutions which would
have been obtained if the problem had been formulated as a MOO problem.
The most often employed utility function in the field of service selection is
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SAW which is a classic technique from the field of MADM. Furthermore, sev-
eral proprietary utility functions have been proposed for either normalized or
non-normalized QoS attributes. Following is a brief presentation of these utility
functions.
The general SAW method for service selection is defined as follows [JD88]:
Fij =
m¸
α=1
wαq
1α
ij (3.16)
Here, m denotes the number of QoS attributes and wα the weight of normal-
ized QoS attribute α. The SAW method assumes that preferences are mutually
independent. Although not explicitly part of the SAW method, applications often
require that
°m
α=1 wα = 1 holds
52. The reason is that the SAW method presumes
that weights are proportional to changes of QoS values. For instance, if a util-
ity function is defined over two QoS attributes with weightings w1 = 13 and
w2 = 23 , changes of two units of q
11
ij and one unit of q
12
ij must yield the same util-
ity value [JD88]. To the author’s best knowledge, the unrestricted SAW method
has only been used in [AP07; WLH07; AM10] while the restricted version has
been employed in [ZBD+03; ZBN+04; GJ05; CCG+06; AP06; CCG+07; AR09;
KIH11; ARN12; Sim12; YCY12]. VU et al. use a slightly modified unrestricted
SAW method where the utility value is divided by the sum of weights in order
to receive a proportional utility score as in the restricted SAW method [VHA05].
Another variant of the unrestricted SAW method is utilized by BERBNER et al.
QoS attributes are differentiated in three distinct groups or types, i. e. additive,
multiplicative and min-aggregated. The classification is based on the aggregation
function which is applied on the respective QoS attribute in sequential workflows.
The attributes of each type are handled by the unrestricted SAW method. The final
utility value is the sum of these three values [BSR+06; BSR+07].
The utility function proposed by YU et al. is applied on non-normalized QoS
attributes. It performs normalization utilizing statistical measures (cf. Section
3.2.3) and is defined as follows [YL04; YZL07]:
Fij =
x¸
α=1
wα
(
qαij  µα
δα
)
+
y¸
β=1
wβ
1 qβij  µβ
δβ
 (3.17)
where δα, δβ  0. This function assumes that x QoS attributes are to be maximized
52 In the remainder of this thesis, this version will be referred to as the restricted SAW method
whereas the classic formulation will be called the unrestricted SAW method.
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and y QoS attributes to be minimized. wα and wβ are weights for which 0  
wα, wβ   1 and
°x
α=1 wα +
°y
β=1 wβ = 1 must hold. As already mentioned in
Section 3.2.3, µ and δ are the average and the standard deviation respectively
of the QoS values for all service candidates in a service class [YL04; YZL07].
Recently, HEINRICH and LEWERENZ showed that limiting µ and δ on a single
service class may easily lead to confusing results when modeling service selection
as a graph problem. In particular, compositions incorporating different paths and
service classes may be systematically under- or overrated. In other words, a “bad”
composition may be considered as optimal [HL13].
Finally, MABROUK et al. utilize a rather simple utility function which is defined
globally as the average of normalized and aggregated QoS values [MBK+09]:
F =
°m
α=1Q
1α
m
(3.18)
where m  0. As already stated, employing an utility value instead of multiple
QoS values reduces mathematical complexity because it allows for defining the
MMKP as SOO problem. An important question in this context is how the weights
are obtained? Generally, these are considered to be determined by the user himself.
For rather simple QoS models consisting of three attributes (e. g. [CCG+06]) this
might be an almost trivial task. But how about rather complex QoS models such
as the proposal of the W3C which consists of 13 attributes, some of which are
even subdivided into more fine-grained measures [LJL+03]? It turns out that while
employing a utility function reduces mathematical complexity, its usage might
lead to non-trivial semantic problems and restricts the search space. Furthermore,
some combinations of problem formulation and certain utility functions may
lead to confusing results [HL13]. Hence the formulation of the service selection
problem as MOO problem is raising in popularity.
3.2.4.4 Multi-Objective Service Selection
As has been stated in Section 2.5.4, a MOO problem is characterized by at least
two conflicting objective functions which have to be optimized simultaneously.
Applied to the service selection problem, each QoS attribute forms an objective
on its own. Taking up the aggregation functions introduced in Section 3.2.2, the
service selection problem for normalized QoS attributes can be formulated as a
MOO problem as follows:
max tΦ11(q
11
ij xij),Φ
1
2(q
12
ij xij),Φ
1
3(q
13
ij xij)u (i = 1, . . . , k; j P Si) (3.19)
s.t. Φ1α(q
1α
ij xij) ¤ C
1α (α = 1, . . . , m) (3.20)
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¸
jPSi
xij = 1 (i = 1, . . . , k) (3.21)
xij P t0, 1u (i = 1, . . . , k; j P Si)
As can be seen, the objective in this formulation is to maximize each QoS
dimension separately. Achievement of this goal is measured employing multiple
aggregation functions. The major advantage of this approach is that it does not
require to define a utility function in order to optimize. Instead the aggregation
functions can be used unchanged as objective functions. However, as outlined
in Section 2.5.4, the major drawback is the complexity of considering multiple
objective functions simultaneously. As has been recently discussed in Section
3.2.4.2, there are only few exact approaches for solving the MMKP but these
require a single objective function.
For tackling service selection as a MOO problem, GAs (cf. Section 2.5.6) are
being frequently employed [CDE+05; CAH05; JM07; CDE+08; WCS+08; KIH12;
WKI+12]. The respective approaches will be reviewed in Chapter 4. Here, the
principles of aligning service selection with GAs will be discussed.
Encoding the solution vector as chromosome is performed based on the system
model presented in Section 3.2.4.1. This means, that the chromosome is an integer-
array with a length equal to the number of tasks in a process model. The i-th array
element hence corresponds to the i-th task and the respective array entry reflects
the chosen service alternative sij. An important property of this chromosome
representation is that it implicitly respects the one-item-per-class restriction of the
MMKP (3.12). Since the MMKP utilizes binary decision variables, the chromosome
needs to be transformed accordingly when evaluating a solution obtained by a GA.
Let chr denote an integer array representing the chromosome. A binary solution
vector can then be constructed with the following mapping:
xij =
#
1 if j = chr[i]
0 else
(3.22)
Figure 3.9 shows an example of transforming a chromosome into a binary
solution for the sample process and the service alternatives presented in Table 3.2.
Regarding the fitness function, there is no single definition used in the scope of
this thesis. The reason is that for solving the optimization problems considered
in this work, different GAs have been employed which were proposed in the
literature. Each of these GAs however defines its own fitness function. The
employed GAs and the corresponding fitness functions are being presented in
Chapter 7.
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Ñ x11 = 0, x12 = 1, x13 = 0
Ñ x21 = 0, x22 = 0, x23 = 1, x24 = 0
Ñ x31 = 1, x32 = 0
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1
Figure 3.9: Transforming a chromosome into a binary solution vector
3.3 Security in Service Composition
Security in the context of service composition is a vast field of research. It has
been considered from different perspectives such as QoS models and formal
process calculi. Respective works can be roughly classified into QoS-based, policy-
driven and model-driven approaches (cf. Figure 3.10). Some approaches however
conceptually belong to multiple classes. In particular, policy- and model-driven
methodologies are combined in the literature. The following subsections discuss
the different classes with respect to the consideration of interdependence effects.
Security-Aware
Web Service
Composition
QoS-Based Policy-Driven Model-Driven
Figure 3.10: Classification of approaches for security-aware service composition
QoS-Based Approaches
QoS-based approaches consider security properties to be non-functional require-
ments which are codified in QoS models and verified and/or negotiated based
on an SLA. QoS models for web services have been addressed by numerous
publications (e. g. [SCD+97; OEH02; LJL+03; JRM04; CDE+05; CP09]). Regarding
security, two groups can be identified. The first group treats security as a single
QoS attribute [OEH02; LJL+03] whereas the second group partly decomposes
security into multiple security attributes [SCD+97; JRM04; CDE+05; CP09]. While
the approaches of the second group usually consider security objectives to be in-
dependent, SABATA et al. take into account interdependence between availability
on the one hand and fault tolerance as well as resource management on the other
hand. The consequence for their proposed QoS taxonomy is that availability is
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not treated as security objective but as a criterion for service level [SCD+97]. In
general however, interdependence between security objectives is not covered by
QoS-based approaches.
Policy-Driven Approaches
The common denominator of these approaches is that they state what is allowed
and what is not based on (formally) defined policies. These policies are subse-
quently used to verify if service compositions comply with the specified policies.
Some approaches also go a step further and propose policy enforcing mechanisms.
NARAYANAN and MCILRAITH employ Petri nets to formalize service composi-
tions. Policies are expressed by means of flow conditions which are verified for
reachability, liveness and the existence of deadlocks [NM02]. BARTOLETTI et al.
propose utilizing the λ-calculus to formalize security policies. Security-critic code
is wrapped into safety framings which enforce the given security policy at the time
of executing the wrapped code. Service orchestration is performed with respect
to the security policies of the orchestrator and the clients (i. e. services) [BDF06].
Similar formal approaches have been proposed in [RM09; MDC11]. ROSSI and
MACEDONIO define a typed process algebra for specifying security requirements
in service compositions. The work explores under which conditions single services
may be replaced without deteriorating the security of the composition [RM09].
MARTÍNEZ et al. use a formal language to specify contracts between partners in
a composition in terms of obligations, permissions and prohibitions. Contract
compliance is verified using timed automata [MDC11].
PACI et al. focused on access control policies in service choreographies, espe-
cially on the question if a choreography can be implemented based on the access
control policies of each service and the credentials each service is willing to dis-
close. Choreographies are modeled as transition system and credential disclosure
policies as directed graphs [POM08]. The work of SUN et al. focuses on verifying
security requirements of service compositions using finite state automata. From a
user perspective, security requirements are expressed using terminology such as
“low encryption” which is internally mapped to concrete security measures such
as encryption algorithms and key sizes [SBH+10].
Conceptually related is the work of LAVARACK and COETZEE which addresses
trade-offs in policy intersections. Originally introduced in the scope of the standard
WS-Policy [W3C06], policy intersection aimed at identifying compatible policy
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alternatives (i. e. collections of policy assertions) in case of two or more policies53.
The result was thus again a policy called intersection which consisted of assertions
that are compatible with all policies. However, the original model did not allow
for any other reasoning except of policy compatibility. In this context the authors
propose to determine the pros and cons of intersections with methods from fuzzy
logic. For this purpose the authors identified a total of six aspects such as trust
and authentication which have an influence on the security level of a system.
With these aspects, for each intersection a Fuzzy Cognitive Map is generated
which describes the mutual relations and influences of these aspects expressed by
weights. These maps are then evaluated with fuzzy interference which enables to
order intersections according to the security level they offer [LC11].
Model-Driven Approaches
Approaches of this class employ meta-information such as semantic enrichment
of process models in the course of selecting and/or configuring web services with
respect to security requirements.
A lot of research has been conducted in order to align security features such
as access control with the web service paradigm, either standards-based or on
a conceptual basis [BBG05; SIM+07; WMS+09]. BHATTI et al. address trust and
context issues in service selection and propose an extended XML-based Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) framework incorporating these aspects. The authors also
describe an implementation architecture for the proposal [BBG05]. SRIVATSA
et al. propose an approach for specifying and enforcing access control policies
on service compositions. Policies are specified via a declarative language using
pure-past linear temporal logic. Access control policies are being enforced using a
dedicated service that verifies actions with deployed policies [SIM+07]. WOLTER et
al. propose a model-driven approach which closely follows the MDA methodology
(cf. [OMG03]). The foundation of the framework is a collaboratively designed
business process model using a graphical notation such as BPMN which forms the
Computational Independent Model (CIM). The subsequent step is the definition
of security features by a security expert. The result is a security annotated business
process model which forms the Platform Independent Model (PIM). Finally, the
Platform Specific Model (PSM) is obtained by transforming the PIM with XSLT
into target models. In particular, these are a BPEL process as well as WS-Security
and XACML files. The latter two are intended to be deployed in a policy decision
53 In the scope of service composition, the respective policies are defined by the service consumer
and the service providers.
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and enforcement component in order to enforce specified security constraints at
runtime [WMS+09].
Another line of research aims at providing frameworks from modeling security
constraints over security-aware service selection to composition [NTI+05; CFH06;
JF09]. NAKAMURA et al. consider static service compositions which are modeled
using UML. Security requirements are being attached to UML models by means of
annotations. The annotated UML diagrams are subsequently being transformed to
service-oriented applications according to the MDA approach. Both the application
and the security requirements are intended to be performed by the same person,
i. e. the application designer [NTI+05]. A similar but conceptually closer work
to service composition was proposed by JENSEN and FEJA who propose custom
security modeling elements for e. g. end-to-end encryption and access control.
The modeling notation of choice are EPCs. Enriched process models are being
transformed to BPEL afterwards [JF09]. CARMINATI et al. propose a framework
for secure service composition which is build around what the authors call a secure
WS-broker. Common security vocabulary is established between all parties using
the OWL ontology. Security capabilities of web services are expressed using SAML
assertions. Assigning web services to tasks is performed using a component called
security matchmaker. This component builds a graph-structure representing all
possible compositions with regards to compatibility of security capabilities of web
services on the one hand as well as security requirements of the process model on
the other hand. From among the composition alternatives, the best with regards
to QoS criteria is selected and transformed into BPEL [CFH06].
Summary
Security-aware service composition has been studied from very different perspec-
tives. Despite the great deal of conducted research however, interdependent secu-
rity has gained only little attention. Except of the work of SABATA et al. [SCD+97],
the author is not aware of any other approach considering interdependence effects
in this context.
3.4 Compliance in Service Composition
In Section 2.4 it was identified, that out of the five compliance aspects differentiated
in the literature, the aspects Data, Location and Time Limits need to be considered
in the context of service selection. Hence in this section it will be at first analyzed
to what extent these compliance aspects have an influence on service composition
3.4. COMPLIANCE IN SERVICE COMPOSITION 115
in general and service selection in particular.
• Data: As stated in Section 2.4, this aspect covers the life cycle of data objects
as well as data management. Since the life cycle of data objects (i. e. all
activities from creation to deletion in a process model) is a modeling issue, it
does not need to be considered in service selection. Depending on the type
of processed data however, services might be required to fulfill a minimum
of security measures such as a certain encryption strength. This leads to
the necessity to consider these requirements as local constraints during ser-
vice selection. In the following, respective constraints will be considered as
required minimum encryption strength in terms of key length for a certain al-
gorithm. Comparisons of encryption strengths between different algorithms
will not be covered for the sake of simplicity.
• Location: Also depending on the type of data processed, tasks might be
restricted to certain countries and/or regions. This usually applies to single
tasks and thus needs to be considered as local constraint in service selection.
Although some regulations require actions to take place in a region such
as the EU, only exact locations in terms of countries will be considered in
this thesis for the sake of simplicity. Since the decision if a location con-
straint is fulfilled or not is binary for either regions or single countries, this
simplification does not lead to any loss of generality.
• Time Limits: It has already been discussed that single activities or sub-
processes might be subject to legal time constraints. However, processes
might be composed of non-human as well as human tasks. For human tasks,
process designers usually allot a certain amount of time for completion. Thus,
service selection for sub-processes which are subject to a time limit not only
needs to consider this time limit in terms of an upper bound but also allotted
times for human tasks.
From a modeling perspective, the compliance aspects which are relevant for
service selection can be represented as follows. Data and Location aspects can be
captured in BPMN by using text annotations on single activities. A text annotation
(represented as an open rectangle) is linked to an activity using an association
(depicted as a dotted line) [OMG11]. Figure 3.11 illustrates this.
For modeling Time Limits, BPMN offers a Timer Intermediate Event (repre-
sented as a clock marker) which may be attached to the boundary of an activity.
In case that this activity is not finished within a certain period of time, process
execution leaves the normal flow and is redirected to an exception flow. This
subsequently leads to triggering an alternate activity to handle the exception. To
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Some
Activity
Data: RSA-1024
(a) Data
Some
Activity
Location: Germany
(b) Location
Figure 3.11: Modeling Data and Location constraints in BPMN
indicate that an activity is performed by a human, BPMN offers a user task which
is an activity containing a human figure in the upper left corner [OMG11]. Figure
3.12 shows a corresponding sample process. The activities “Non-human Activity”,
“Human Task” and “Exception Handling” are enclosed in a sub process which is
also an activity itself in BPMN. Hence this allows to define time limits at different
conceptual levels as stated above.
Non-human
Activity
Humasn
Task
Exception
Handling
Time limit
violated
. . . . . .
. . .
45 minutes
60 minutes
Figure 3.12: Modeling Time Limit constraints in BPMN
Transforming compliance requirements into optimization constraints is pretty
straight forward. Let qenc, qloc and qrt denote the QoS dimensions for encryption,
location and response time respectively. Furthermore, let cenc and cloc denote local
constraints regarding encryption and location. Then a local constraint on task t
(which corresponds with service class St) can be expressed as follows:
qenctj ¥ cenc (j = 1, . . . , |St|)
qloctj = cloc (j = 1, . . . , |St|)
Modeling scope-based constraints requires at first hand to capture the tasks it
consists of. Let T denote the set of task identifiers of the considered scope. A scope
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based constraint on time limit (denoted crt) can then be expressed as follows:
¸
tPT
qrttj ¤ crt (j = 1, . . . , |St|)
3.5 Alternative Composition Approaches
Besides of service selection, two other groups of approaches for service compo-
sition exist, namely service planning and service mashups. In the following these
composition approaches will be briefly presented.
Service Planning
Approaches for service planning (e. g. [SPW+04; KG06; Zho07; LKS08; ZVB13]) do
not require a process model but start with a description of the goals of a service
composition in terms of tasks, similar to the introductory example in Section 2.1.1.
Often this description is specified formally, e. g. in some calculus. This description
forms the input for an Artificial Intelligence (AI) planner such as SHOP2 [SPW+04]
or XPlan [KG06] which determines from available web services a composition
fulfilling these required tasks. Although current mechanisms differ in terms of
employed technologies and complexity, the basic mechanism is as follows54. For a
given list of tasks, web services are step-wise assigned such that the capabilities
of the service cover the current task. Planning is finished as soon as all tasks
are iterated. Web service capabilities are mapped to tasks employing semantic
facilities such as OWL-S ontologies and the DAML-S language. Depending on the
capabilities of single web services, resulting plans can be fundamentally different.
Again the sample process is utilized to derive the following goals (corresponding
tasks are denoted ti):
1. Check e-mail address (t1)
2. Check either bank account number (t2) or credit card number (t3), depending
on payment method
In correspondence to the introductory sample process, it is specified that t1 has
to be performed before t2 and t3. Furthermore, let the service repository contain a
total of four services (cf. Table 3.7). Except of s4, each service provides exactly one
capability matching a task. That is, s1 provides e-mail address checking, s2 bank
54 A thorough presentation can be found in e. g. [Zho07].
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account number checking and s3 credit card number checking. Service s4 provides
checking capabilities for both, bank accounts and credit card numbers.
Table 3.7: Service repository for service planning example
Service Capabilities
s1 t1
s2 t2
s3 t3
s4 t2, t3
Given these goals and services, two different plans are possible. The first
possibility is to invoke s1 and afterwards either s2 or s3 depending on the concrete
payment method. The second possible composition is to invoke s1 and afterwards
s4. Figure 3.13 illustrates these possibilities as DAG where s0 denotes the start and
s8 the end node respectively. Either plan can be subsequently transformed into a
BPEL process.
s0 s1
s2
s3
s8
(a) Plan 1
s0 s1 s4 s8
(b) Plan 2
Figure 3.13: Possible plans for composite service
Service planning mechanisms have the advantages that no process model is
required and that multiple service capabilities can be taken into consideration
during service composition. BPEL processes can be generated (semi-)automatically
from a high-level specification which makes service planning very flexible.
The major drawback of current approaches is however that service planning
mechanisms are not able to handle complex process structures such as choices. Fur-
thermore, planning is computationally very expensive and usually does not lead
to optimal solutions from a QoS perspective [LAP06]. Finally, compliance aspects
such as the sequence of tasks need to be considered explicitly when defining the
goals. The definition of complex processes can thus easily become unmanageable.
Some approaches such as XPlan [KG06] and QBroker [YZL07] therefore use service
planning to generate an initial plan which is further optimized utilizing service
selection.
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Service Mashups
Similar to service planning and selection, service mashups are a development
methodology for web applications. In contrast however, mashups have a much
stronger focus on content publishing and visualization. Generally speaking, ser-
vice mashups aim at combining web services with Web 2.0 technologies such as
tags and microformats. From a conceptual perspective, the focus is not limited to
implementing business processes. Hence, the utilization of service mashups in
business settings is just one of several application areas [BDS08].
Originally, there were a lot of development tools for service mashups developed
and maintained by companies such as IBM, MICROSOFT, GOOGLE and YAHOO.
As of 2014 however, the only major tool remaining to create service mashups
is YAHOO PIPES55. The other major vendors have discontinued their respective
products since 2009. Service mashups are however still being actively developed.
ProgrammableWeb lists a total of 7379 mashups as of March 8th 2014. An example
for a service mashup is the project Flightradar2456 which is a service for tracking
flights. Based upon GoogleMaps, real-time information is provided regarding
thousands of flights worldwide. The necessary data is gathered from different
sources which are aggregated and used to populate the map with information
regarding flights (including type information about planes in use) as well as
airports. Figure 3.14 gives an impression.
3.6 Summary
This chapter introduced and discussed service composition from diverse per-
spectives such as composition topologies and modeling approaches. It lay the
foundation for the approaches proposed in this thesis by discussing possibilities
on how to consider security and compliance in service composition. Furthermore,
essential assumptions have been introduced on which our contributions are built
on. Finally, the mathematical model has been introduced and discussed which is
used by the proposed approaches for service selection.
55 http://pipes.yahoo.com/pipes/
56 www.flightradar24.com
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Figure 3.14: Screenshot of Flightradar24
Part II
Design & Implementation

Chapter 4
Requirements Analysis
and State of the Art
“A goal without a plan is just a dream.”
– ANONYMOUS PROVERB
A FTER HAVING DISCUSSED fundamental topics in the previous chapters, it isnow possible to define the requirements of an approach for service com-
position which considers interdependent security as well as compliance (Section
4.1). The identified requirements are then being compared against state of the art
approaches in service composition in order to identify research gaps (Section 4.2).
A brief summary of the findings finishes this chapter (Section 4.3).
4.1 Requirements Analysis
An approach for service composition with consideration of interdependent security
objectives and compliance is subject to several requirements. In the following
these will be explicated and discussed based on the previous chapters.
Requirement 1 [COMPLETENESS]. The approach must support all relevant composition
patterns.
This requirement may sound obvious, but as has been discussed in Section 3.2.4,
the problem formulation affects which composition patterns can be captured and
thus has an impact on the completeness of the approach. In some cases the assump-
tion may be justified that not all composition patterns are important. Particularly
this is the case for semi-structured processes which are not based on a defined
process model. For instance, in case of travel planning the assumption is justified
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that processes are sequential in general. A corresponding sample process may be
comprised of tasks for booking a hotel, a flight and on-site transportation (in any
sequential order). The utilization of BPMN however is usually the consequence
of structured processes which also include non-sequential structures. In this case,
assuming that certain composition patterns cannot occur is unjustified. Hence the
selection of the right problem formulation is not trivial.
Requirement 2 [CONSIDERATION OF MULTIPLE QOS]. The approach must be able
to cope with multiple general as well as domain-specific QoS attributes when evaluating
service compositions, along with their individual semantics for all supported composition
patterns.
Similar to the first requirement, assuming that certain QoS dimensions are more
important than others or that some QoS attributes are not important at all is unjus-
tified. Hence the approach must be able to cope with all kinds of QoS attributes
when evaluating service compositions, either general or domain-specific. Further-
more, the approach is required to handle every QoS attribute for all supported
composition patterns in terms of aggregation schemes. Particularly, this means
that the approach needs to be extensible in terms of aggregation functions for
individual QoS attributes.
Requirement 3 [THOROUGH SEARCH SPACE EXPLORATION]. The approach must
not restrict the search space unjustified in terms of QoS importance.
By default, the search space must be explored as thorough as possible by means of
a MOO problem. Restrictions to the search space may only be applied in justified
cases, for instance if the user explicitly states that some QoS attributes are more
important than others. Hence the approach must be flexible enough to support
possible user preferences in order to reformulate the selection problem from a
MOO problem to a SOO problem and vice versa. Other search space restrictions
which might bias the results are not permitted.
Requirement 4 [EFFICIENCY]. The approach must be able to deal with process models
of real-world size efficiently.
If the approach is to be used in real-world scenarios, it has to be able to generate
results for large process models in acceptable time. What is considered as “accept-
able time” is generally any time span for generating a composition such that the
(monetary) benefits of the composition outweigh cost of idleness before enacting it.
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This is particularly important since change requests for IT systems (and eventually
for processes which they support) are required in ever shorter time frames (cf.
Section 2.2.2). Hence brute force approaches such as full enumeration are not
acceptable to deal with process models of real-world size. Efficient approaches
which exactly solve the service selection problem are usually modeling service
selection as SOO problem which however restricts the search space as discussed in
Section 3.2.4.3. Therefore, (meta-)heuristics which deliver near-optimal solutions
in polynomial time and which thoroughly explore the search space by modeling
service selection as a MOO problem are preferred.
Requirement 5 [CONSIDERATION OF INTERDEPENDENT SECURITY OBJEC-
TIVES]. The approach must select services with respect to multiple interdependent security
objectives.
Since security objectives are subject to interdependence (cf. Section 2.3), the
approach needs to consider these interdependence effects and has to be able to
determine if a composition suffices defined security requirements. However, as
already stated, there is no formal model for interdependent security to the best of
the author’s knowledge. Hence this requirement does not demand for formally
provable security for service compositions, but for a security assessment.
Requirement 6 [COMPLIANCE-AWARENESS]. The approach must suffice compliance
requirements when selecting services.
As has been explained in Section 3.4, compliance requirements are mandatory
and thus have to be respected when selecting services in order to generate a
composition. This requirement is especially crucial since compliance violations
may lead to monetary as well as non-monetary losses such as customer and
employee trust if they ever become publicly known.
4.2 State of the Art
QoS-aware service selection is a very active field of research since the end of the
1990s. Hence over time a plethora of approaches have been proposed. Works
on alternative composition approaches, i. e. service (re-)planning and service
mashups are not considered here as this would otherwise exceed the scope of this
work. The literature review will be performed based on the previously defined
requirements. That is, for each requirement it will be analyzed if they are covered
by related works and to which extent.
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4.2.1 Completeness
Regarding the completeness of approaches, two major groups can be differentiated,
namely graph-based and combinatorial approaches (cf. Section 3.2.4).
Among the graph-based approaches, the works presented in [ZBD+03; YL04;
ZBN+04; YZL07; HL13] utilize a classic DAG and thus can only handle sequences.
Loops can be handled by unrolling them to sequences. However, YU et al. further
propose to utilize an annotated DAG which empowers their approach to addition-
ally consider splits and joins for AND and XOR patterns. OR patterns as well as
discriminators are not supported [YZL07]. This model has also been utilized in
[WCS+08; KIH11]. A slightly more comprehensive set of annotations has been
proposed by MENASCÉ which is additionally able to cover OR patterns, but no
discriminators [Men04].
The approaches presented in [CCG+06; CCG+07; AM10; YCY12; LRM+12]
utilize customized DAGs to model service selection. In particular, CARDELLINI
et al. utilize nodes to model service classes containing a set of concrete services.
Similar to classic DAG-based approaches, only sequences are supported and loops
are unrolled to sequences [CCG+06]. The same approach has also been employed
in [AM10]. In a later work however, CARDELLINI et al. propose a more expressive
custom DAG which additionally supports XOR and AND patterns as well as pick
activities from BPEL (cf. [OAS07]). However, it still does not cover all relevant
composition patterns [CCG+07]. Similarly, the approaches presented in [LRM+12;
YCY12] are restricted to sequences, loops and parallelisms.
Another alternative graph presentation are directed graphs [AZA+05; GJ05;
KIH12]. ARPINAR et al. use a directed graph in a similar way as DAG-based
approaches. From a modeling point of view their approach has the advantage
that loops do not need to be unrolled. However, as in DAG-based approaches,
sequences and loops are the only composition patterns supported [AZA+05].
GRØNMO and JAEGER internally use a customized directed graph for QoS-aware
service selection before transforming a solution to BPEL. The approach supports
all composition patterns [GJ05]. KLEIN et al. use a customized directed graph
where nodes can be either tasks or control flow elements. Although not explicitly
stated, it is certain that the approach cannot represent discriminators. This is
because the authors propose a tree structure for QoS aggregation which is derived
from the graph representation. The tree structure however only considers the split
but not the join. Hence it is obvious that the approach assumes that each split is
closed by a join of the same type [KIH12].
Undirected graphs are employed in [XB05; WKI+12] but are similarly restricted
as DAGs. While the approach presented in [XB05] is only able to represent se-
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quences and unrolled loops, the modified graph model in [WKI+12] is additionally
able to represent AND and XOR patterns.
The majority of combinatorial approaches formalize service selection as ILP
problem [Lee03; AVM+04; CDE+05; CAH05; AP06; BSR+06; CDE+08; SPG+11].
As has been discussed in Section 3.2.4, this enables to consider all composition
patterns, since the problem formulation is orthogonal to QoS aggregation and thus
allows to consider any aggregation scheme for any QoS attribute. Alternative com-
binatorial problem formulations with similar expressiveness have been proposed
in [JM07; LWL09; YZB11]. JAEGER and MÜHL propose a problem formulation
incorporating aggregation functions which can be freely defined [JM07]. LIANG et
al. formalize service selection as an assignment problem [LWL09]. YE et al. finally
propose a problem formulation considering a hierarchy of services, i. e. application
and utility services where services of the latter group provide the infrastructure
for services of the former group to run on [YZB11].
Other approaches have been proposed which however do not support all com-
position patterns. WANG et al. proposed a semantic approach for selecting single
services which does not support composition patterns at all [WLH07]. ALRIFAI
et al. utilize a MIP problem to decompose global QoS constraints into local con-
straints. Instead of composition patterns, the approach considers the aggregation
functions summation, multiplication and min which do not cover all composition
patterns presented in Section 3.2.2 [AR09; ARN12]. MABROUK et al. use a decision
tree approach which does not support discriminators [MBK+09]. MENASCÉ et
al. use a non-linear problem formulation which supports composition patterns
by means of BPEL constructs. However, not all composition patterns introduced
in Section 3.2.2 are supported [MCD10]. LÉCUÉ and MEHANDJIEV formulate the
problem as Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) which only considers sequences,
AND and OR patterns [LM11].
4.2.2 Consideration of Multiple QoS
From the perspective of supporting multiple QoS attributes, current approaches
can be divided into several classes.
The by far biggest group employs a utility function to compute a score for
service compositions based on the normalized and aggregated QoS of a solution
(cf. Section 3.2.4.3). The respective approaches [ZBD+03; YL04; ZBN+04; GJ05;
AP06; CCG+06; CCG+07; JM07; YZL07; AR09; LWL09; MBK+09; AM10; KIH11;
YZB11; ARN12; YCY12; HL13] consider by default a certain set of QoS attributes
which can be easily extended for new attributes along with individual aggregation
schemes. Hence these approaches are considered as fully supporting multiple
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QoS in the meaning of Requirement 2. The utility functions employed by these
approaches have already been reviewed in Section 3.2.4.3.
Similar to utility functions, some approaches which employ GAs for solving the
service selection problem, utilize the fitness function in a similar manner [CDE+05;
CDE+08; WCS+08; LM11]. Multiple QoS attributes are weighted which results in
a fitness score which, like an utility score, is used to determine the desirability of
an individual solution (cf. Section 2.5.6). Analogously to approaches employing a
utility function, the approaches of this group can also be easily extended for new
QoS attributes along with their aggregation schemes.
A group of approaches model QoS attributes mutually independent, i. e. with-
out computing an abstract utility value from different QoS attribute values. In
particular, these approaches consider each aggregated QoS attribute either as
decision criterion [Men04; MCD10] or as objective function on its own [CAH05;
WKI+12]. What these approaches have in common is that they can be easily
extended for new QoS attributes as well.
Semantic approaches for service selection [Lee03; AZA+05; WLH07; LRM+12]
form a group on their own which differ significantly in terms of extensibility. The
approach of LEE considers multiple QoS dimensions as mutually independent
objectives, but not in the sense of a MOO problem. Instead, the approach allows
for optimizing problem instances for different QoS objectives by means of a MCKP
problem (cf. Section 3.2.4.2). This approach is extendable for new QoS attributes
which however requires defining an individual objective function and capacity
constraint for each additional QoS attribute [Lee03]. ARPINAR et al. propose a
trade-off formula for weighting multiple quality criteria against semantic similarity
of service interfaces which yields conceptual similarities to a utility function and is
thus considered as fully expandable for new QoS attributes [AZA+05]. A similar
approach has been proposed by WANG et al. But since the authors only consider
single service selection, no QoS aggregation is supported [WLH07]. LAMA et al.
proposed a semantic approach for cost-oriented service selection. Consequently,
the only aggregation scheme supported is for cost while other QoS attributes and
their respective aggregation schemes are not supported [LRM+12].
Some approaches [AVM+04; XB05; BSR+06; SPG+11; KIH12] propose a custom
methodology for considering multiple QoS attributes. Except of the approach
presented in [BSR+06], all proposals fulfill Requirement 2. AGGARWAL et al.
propose an ontology-based approach to describe QoS attributes along with their
metrics and aggregation schemes. This information is used by the LINDO solver
for service selection [AVM+04]. For the graph-based modeling approach presented
by XIAO and BOUTABA, the authors propose a custom shortest path algorithm
which incorporates a fixed set of QoS attributes. Providing support for further
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QoS attributes would thus require modifying this search algorithm which seems to
be possible judged on the provided pseudo-code [XB05]. BERBNER et al. propose
an approach which supports a set of arbitrary QoS attributes which are used
to compute a score using the weighted sum method. However, only additive,
multiplicative and min aggregation schemes are supported which do not cover
all semantics of QoS attributes [BSR+06]. SCHULLER et al. optimize for cost only
and take other QoS attributes into consideration in terms of constraints [SPG+11].
KLEIN et al. propose service selection with respect to network locations of services
aiming at minimizing network latency. Orthogonal to this network QoS, multiple
service QoS attributes and their individual aggregation schemes are supported
[KIH12].
4.2.3 Thorough Search Space Exploration
As has been stated previously, thorough search space exploration means modeling
service selection as MOO problem if no user preferences have been explicated
regarding QoS attributes, and otherwise as SOO problem with consideration of
user preferences by means of weightings, etc. Related works can be classified into
approaches which model service selection as SOO problem and those which model
it as MOO problem. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no current approach
supports both model worlds.
All approaches which employ either utility [ZBD+03; YL04; ZBN+04; GJ05;
AP06; BSR+06; CCG+06; CCG+07; JM07; YZL07; AR09; LWL09; MBK+09; AM10;
KIH11; YZB11; ARN12; YCY12; HL13] or fitness functions [CDE+05; CDE+08;
WCS+08; LM11] for selecting and ranking solutions model service selection as SOO
problem. As has been discussed in Section 3.2.4.3, this allows for considering user
preferences and reduces mathematical complexity but restricts the search space
since some Pareto optimal solutions are usually missed. Hence these approaches
are considered as partly fulfilling Requirement 3.
A number of approaches supports multiple mutually independent QoS at-
tributs in service selection. Some approaches consider QoS attributes in terms
of objective functions [Lee03; CAH05; WKI+12]. In a similar fashion, WANG
et al. consider multiple QoS attributes by means of a matching degree which
is determined employing fuzzy interference [WLH07]. Another major group of
approaches have been proposed considering multiple aggregated QoS attributes
without any further weighting or prioritization during the selection process. Par-
ticularly, this holds for the approaches presented in [AVM+04; Men04; AZA+05;
XB05; MCD10; KIH12; LRM+12]. However, ARPINAR et al. also propose a version
of their selection approach with human interaction. In contrast to automatic selec-
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tion, this version provides a user with a list of the highest ranked services for a
task. The user can then select the service which best fits his/her needs [AZA+05].
The work of LAMA et al. only considers price during service selection [LRM+12].
As these approaches do not support prioritizing certain QoS attributes, these are
also considered as partly fulfilling Requirement 3.
SCHULLER et al. model service selection as ILP and optimize for price only.
Other QoS constraints are taken into account by means of restrictions [SPG+11].
Since no other QoS attributes than price are considered in the objective function,
this approach is not considered to thoroughly exploring the search space by means
of Requirement 3.
4.2.4 Efficiency
Proposed service selection approaches utilize a vast array of techniques for solving
the problem. In general however they can be categorized into brute force, exact
and (meta-)heuristic approaches.
The most general brute force approach, namely full enumeration is employed
in [Men04; GJ05]. Since this quickly leads to exorbitant runtimes with increasing
problem size, these approaches cannot be considered efficient.
Exact solving approaches for service selection can be classified into two groups.
The first group utilizes solvers such as IBM OSL [Lee03; ZBD+03; ZBN+04],
LINDO [AVM+04], CPLEX [AP06; SPG+11] and MATLAB with the SNOPT
package [CCG+06; CCG+07]. The second group utilizes either general or custom
algorithms for tackling the selection problem. YU et al. model service selection as
combinatorial problem and use PISINGER’s algorithm [Pis95] to tackle it [YL04].
In a later work, the authors model service selection as a graph-based problem as
well as ILP problem. For the graph-based problem, the authors propose a custom
shortest path algorithm which considers multiple constraints named MCSP for
sequential and MCSP_General for general flow structures. The MCSP algorithm is
also used by HEINRICH and LEWERENZ [HL13]. For the combinatorial model, the
BBLP algorithm [Kha98] as well as the WS_IP algorithm are employed [YZL07].
MENASCÉ et al. formulate the problem as non-linear optimization problem which
is solved using a custom algorithm called JOSes [MCD10]. YAN et al. propose a
custom approach based on DIJKSTRA’s algorithm [Dij59] to solve their graph-based
approach [YCY12]. These approaches have in common that they are well-suited to
exactly solve small to medium-size problem instances. However, solving problem
instances of real-world size is usually infeasible. Hence these approaches are only
considered as partly efficient in accordance to Requirement 4.
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Among the (meta-)heuristic approaches, two major groups can be identified.
The first group employs GAs for determining near-optimal solution sets for the
service selection problem. The approaches presented in [CDE+05; JM07; CDE+08;
WCS+08; LM11; YZB11; KIH12; WKI+12] employ custom GAs while CLARO et al.
employ NSGA-II [DPA+02] which is known to be a fast metaheuristic delivering
good results (cf. Section 7.2) [CAH05]. The second major group of approaches
utilizes custom heuristics which leverage certain properties of the problem for-
mulation in order to determine near-optimal solutions. This particularly holds
for the approaches presented in [XB05; BSR+06; YZL07; LWL09; MBK+09; AM10;
MCD10; KIH11; LRM+12]. Some heuristic approaches however need some further
explanation due to their specific solution approach. The semantic approach of
ARPINAR et al. aims at finding service selections which on the one hand fulfill
QoS requirements and on the other hand provide sufficient semantic similarity in
terms of the interfaces of selected services. That is, outputs of preceding services
in a composition must provide a certain semantic similarity with the inputs of the
directly following services. Hence the proposed Interface Matching Algorithm
(IMA) aims at finding solutions providing a good tradeoff between these two prop-
erties [AZA+05]. WANG et al. determine QoS fulfillment via fuzzy logic. Solutions
are generated using a custom GA before being evaluated using fuzzy inference
[WLH07]. ALRIFAI et al. propose to globally decompose QoS requirements into
local upper/lower bounds constraints. This is modeled as MIP and solved using
the LPSolve solver. Since the decomposition is not exact, the approach leads to
near-optimal solutions [AR09; ARN12]. All these approaches have in common
that they deliver near-optimal solutions in polynomial time. Therefore they are
considered as efficient in the sense of Requirement 4.
4.2.5 Consideration of Interdependent Security Objectives
From a security perspective, approaches for service composition can be divided
into two groups. The first group of approaches does not consider any security
aspects at all. In particular this holds for the works presented in [Lee03; ZBD+03;
AVM+04; Men04; YL04; ZBN+04; AZA+05; CDE+05; CAH05; GJ05; XB05; AP06;
BSR+06; CCG+06; CCG+07; JM07; WLH07; YZL07; CDE+08; WCS+08; AR09;
LWL09; MBK+09; AM10; MCD10; KIH11; LM11; SPG+11; YZB11; ARN12; KIH12;
LRM+12; WKI+12; YCY12; HL13].
The second group are approaches which formally consider a certain set of
security objectives in the context of service composition. Since they do not consider
any QoS requirements (cf. Section 3.3), they will not be further discussed here.
As has been previously stated, interdependence effects have not been consid-
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ered yet in the context of service composition to the best of the author’s knowledge.
4.2.6 Compliance-awareness
As already mentioned in Section 2.4, compliance issues have not been considered
yet in the scope of service selection. However, as discussed in Section 3.4, compli-
ance requirements are constraints either on single services or on a set of services
which can be mathematically modeled. Hence the comparison presented here will
focus on the potential of approaches to support compliance issues. More precisely,
it will be analyzed if respective approaches support constraints on single as well
as sets of services.
In general, all proposed approaches might be upgraded for the possibility for
supporting local as well as scope-based constraints. In fact however only the
approaches presented in [ZBN+04; AP06; AR09; ARN12] support expressing local
constraints. Consideration of scope-based constraints is not supported by any
of the approaches discussed here. Hence in their current form only the works
presented in [ZBN+04; AP06; AR09; ARN12] are able to partly model compliance
requirements.
4.2.7 Conclusion
Table 4.1 summarizes the fulfillment of the gathered requirements by state of the art
approaches for service composition. As can be seen, especially the requirements
3, 5 and 6 are not completely fulfilled by any available approach so far. Since
the reviewed works cover a large spectrum of problem modeling and solving
approaches, their properties are being compared in greater detail in Table A.1. Due
to its size however, the Table has been relocated to Appendix A.2.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, a number of requirements has been established for an approach for
service composition with consideration of interdependent security and compli-
ance. A comparison of these requirements against state of the art approaches in
service composition revealed that no approach completely fulfills them. Hence
research gaps have been identified especially with respect to thorough search space
exploration as well as consideration of interdependent security and compliance in
service composition.
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Table 4.1: Fulfillment of requirements by related approaches
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ARPINAR et al. (2005) G#  G#  # #
CANFORA et al. (2005)   G#  # #
CLARO et al. (2005)   G#  # #
GRØNMO and JAEGER (2005)   G# # # #
XIAO and BOUTABA (2005) G#  G#  # #
ARDAGNA and PERNICI (2006)   G# G# # G#
BERBNER et al. (2006)  G# G#  # #
CARDELLINI et al. (2006) G#  G# G# # #
CARDELLINI et al. (2007) G#  G# G# # #
JAEGER and MÜHL (2007)   G#  # #
WANG et al. (2007) # G# G#  # #
YU et al. (2007) G#  G#  # #
CANFORA et al. (2008)   G#  # #
WADA et al. (2008) G#  G#  # #
ALRIFAI and RISSE (2009) G#  G#  # G#
LIANG et al. (2009)   G#  # #
MABROUK et al. (2009) G#  G#  # #
ARDAGNA and MIRANDOLA (2010) G#  G#  # #
MENASCÉ et al. (2010) G#  G#  # #
KLEIN et al. (2011) G#  G#  # #
LÉCUÉ and MEHANDJIEV (2011) G#  G#  # #
SCHULLER et al. (2011)  G# # G# # #
YE et al. (2011)   G#  # #
ALRIFAI et al. (2012) G#  G#  # G#
KLEIN et al. (2012) G#  G#  # #
LAMA et al. (2012) G# # G#  # #
WAGNER et al. (2012) G#  G#  # #
YAN et al. (2012) G#  G# G# # #
HEINRICH and LEWERENZ (2013) G#  G# G# # #
Note:  = fulfilled, G#= partly fulfilled, #= not fulfilled
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Chapter 5
Approach
“I’m proud of my invention, but I’m sad that it is
used by terrorists.”
– MIKHAIL KALASHNIKOV
T HIS CHAPTER presents an approach to address the requirements identifiedin Chapter 4. First, an overview is given of how each requirement is being
addressed in order to draw the big picture (Section 5.1). Subsequently, separate
approaches for addressing interdependent security (Section 5.2) as well as compli-
ance (Section 5.3) in service selection are being presented. Finally, the key points
of these approaches are being summarized (Section 5.4).
5.1 Overview
In order to fulfill the requirements identified in Section 4.1, the proposed solution
approach employs the following measures:
R1 (Completeness):
To avoid limitation with regards to composition patterns, a combinatorial problem
formulation has been selected. More precisely, the MMKP has been chosen since
this formulation is the most accurate problem definition for service selection. It
does not suffer from any limitations regarding composition patterns or specific
properties of the problem at hand such as different QoS dimensions (cf. Section
3.2.4.2).
R2 (Consideration of Multiple QoS):
A generic approach is proposed to define models for an arbitrary set of QoS
attributes. Hence there is no limitation in this regard. The respective approach
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will be presented in Section 5.2.1.
R3 (Thorough Search Space Exploration):
Depending on user preferences, the presented approach supports reformulating
the optimization goal. In case that no preferences are given, the problem is defined
as MOO problem. Otherwise, the problem is reformulated into a SOO problem
using either the weighted sum method or lexicographic ordering of objectives (cf.
Section 2.5.4). The respective approach is an integral part of the implemented
proof of concept tool and hence will be presented in Section 6.2.2
R4 (Efficiency):
As has been previously stated in Section 3.2.4.2, there is to the best of the author’s
knowledge no efficient approach for solving the MMKP as MOO problem exactly.
Hence the optimization problem is tackled with GAs (cf. Section 2.5.6) in order
to deliver near optimal solutions to problem instances of real-world size in a
reasonable amount of time.
R5 (Consideration of Interdependent Security Objectives):
A custom approach is proposed to assess the security of service compositions con-
sidering interdependence of an arbitrary set of security objectives. The approach
is based on the notion of structural decomposition. In the presented approach,
the assessment has the form of multiple objective functions so it can be seam-
lessly aligned with the service selection problem. Furthermore, SANDHU’s notion
of “good enough security” [San03] is respected by means of constraints in the
optimization model. More precisely, a user defines her security requirements in
terms of minimum function values which a protection function has to yield. The
approach is being presented in Section 5.2.
R6 (Compliance-awareness):
A custom drop-in solution for considering compliance requirements is proposed.
This enables existing GAs to consider compliance aspects and thus become com-
pliance-aware. The respective approach will be presented in Section 5.3.
Utilizing these proposed measures, it is possible to construct a method for service
composition with respect to interdependent security and compliance. Figure 5.1
shows the outline of this method. The first step is to define a process model for
a business process in a notation such as BPMN as has been laid out in Section
2.1.1. For this given process model, the user needs to define security as well as
QoS requirements in the second step. The third step is the selection of appropriate
services to implement the process and is divided into two sub-steps. In sub-step
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1. Definition of Process
Model (e. g., BPMN)
2. Definition of Security-
And QoS-requirements
3. Service Selection
3.1 Problem formulation
of multi-objective MMKP
3.2 Problem solving with
compliance-aware GA
4. Transformation to exe-
cutable process (e. g., BPEL)
Figure 5.1: Outline of proposed service composition method
3.1 the selection problem is formulated as MMKP with multiple objective functions
capturing the interdependencies of considered security objectives. Sub-step 3.2 is
to solve the resulting multi-objective MMKP with a compliance-aware GA and to
obtain a set of (Pareto optimal) solutions. Among these solutions the user needs to
pick an alternative which best suits her preferences. The fourth and final step is to
transform the selected solution to an executable form such as BPEL.
5.2 Assessing Interdependent Security of Service
Compositions
This section presents a framework for assessing interdependent security. It intro-
duces approaches for building QoS and domain models. QoS and domain model
together will be called security assessment model in the remainder of this thesis.
5.2.1 Building QoS Models
As stated in Section 3.2.2, QoS attributes need to be aggregated in service composi-
tion according to the control flow of a process model and the attribute’s semantics.
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The first aspect has already been covered in Section 3.2.2 by means of aggregation
schemes for three QoS attributes, namely Price, Availability and Response time.
Here, the focus will be on the semantics of QoS attributes. The semantics of a QoS
attribute depends on two essential features: attribute type and measurement scale.
Measurement theory traditionally distinguished between the attribute types binary,
continuous and discrete as well as the measurement scales57 nominal, ordinal, interval
and ratio [Ste46; JD88]. As both aspects are necessary in order to aggregate QoS
attribute values correctly along process models, the author proposes to merge both
worlds by describing QoS attributes in a generic way as 4-tuple qa= (T ,M,V ,A)
consisting of the following elements:
• T : Attribute type
• M: Measurement scale
• V : Set of valid values
• A: Set of Aggregation schemes
The set of all QoS attributes qa, i. e. the QoS model, is denoted by QA. Follow-
ing is a discussion of the components a QoS attribute qa is comprised of.
Valid values for T are Binary, Continuous and Discrete which mathematically
correspond to the sets B, R+ andN respectively.
M can have one of the following values: Nominal, Ordinal ascending, Ordinal de-
scending, Interval ascending, Interval descending, Ratio ascending and Ratio descending.
The basics of these measurement scales have already been introduced in Section
3.2.3. Here, some additional aspects regarding nominal scales for QoS attributes
will be discussed. As has been stated, nominal scales are employed if no natural
order relation exists for the elements in V , i. e. if each element defines a category
of items which is independent from the remaining categories. A typical example
for a QoS attribute employing a nominal scale is encryption algorithm. There is
no natural ordering of cryptographic algorithms by means of security. However,
it is possible to construct an order, e. g. based on a set of hypotheses. Respec-
tive approaches have been proposed in e. g. [LV00; LV01; Len06; OH04; BBB+12;
Sma12; Bun13b; Bun13a; NSA13]58. However this is a subjective matter and as
57 The author is aware that this typology, especially in case of nominal and ordinal scales, is
subject to controversy (cf. e. g. [VW93]). However, as these critics mostly relate to issues about
statistical interpretation of data and as this typology is still widely in use, it is adopted here.
58 A web-based tool for cryptographic key length recommendation based on these approaches is
available at: www.keylength.com
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Table 5.1: Allowed spaces for V with respect to variable type and measurement scale
PPPPPPPPPScale
Type Binary Continuous Discrete
Any – min - max min - maxascending
Any – |min| - |min| -descending |max| |max|
Nominal Single value/ – –Enumeration
such it seems appropriate to associate a utility value with each category in order to
allow users to express their preferences regarding each category. Effectively, this
means transforming a nominal scale into an ordinal scale. Applied to the example
with the QoS attribute encryption algorithm, this means assigning a utility value
for each combination of encryption algorithm and key sizes. These utility values
might be for instance derived from the approaches mentioned above. The set of
these assignments then forms the content of V (cf. below).
The space of V depends on the attribute type as well as the measurement scale.
Table 5.1 shows how V is specified for each combination. Some combinations are
forbidden (denoted “–”) as they yield no additional expressiveness but introduce
additional overhead for handling. In case of either an ordinal, interval or ratio
scale, the content of V is defined by determining minimum and maximum values.
If the order relation is descending, minimum and maximum values are expressed
as absolute values. In case of a nominal scale, V consists of either a single value or
an enumeration of utility values where the sum must not exceed 1. As the only
valid attribute type for nominal scales is binary, it may sound contradictory to
provide more than one utility value. One needs however to differentiate between
different categories (which are each associated with an utility value) and the binary
decision if a certain category is supported by a service alternative or not. The latter
is what attribute type refers to. Equation (5.1) shows parts of a utility function
with two nominal properties Encryption and SecurityProtocols, each containing
more than one value.
. . . +
AES128hkkkikkkj
0.01bi+1 +
AES192hkkkikkkj
0.03bi+2 +
RSA512hkkkikkkj
0.06bi+3looooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooon
Encryption
+
HTTPShkkkikkkj
0.02bi+4 +
TLShkkkikkkj
0.05bi+5looooooooooomooooooooooon+ . . .
SecurityProtocols (5.1)
Each category is associated with an utility value and a binary decision variable
b. The utility values given here express the importance of each category with
respect to the others in the same group as well as its overall importance with
respect to the utility function. Mixing these two aspects in one value might lead to
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an increased complexity in determining sound utility values. This aspect will be
discussed more thoroughly now and it will be especially shown that the proposed
reformulation for providing an enumeration
a) can be sensibly rendered into a single value measurement,
b) is in no contradiction to the “traditional” view without associating a utility
value with each category in V and
c) eases the definition of security assessment models (cf. Section 5.2.2).
Technically speaking, the proposed approach clusters similar items in V (e. g.,
different encryption algorithms) which enables to
a) determine the impact of a group as a whole on some utility function and
b) rank categories within a group by means of different utility values.
This goes beyond the pure binary decision if a service supports a particular
feature but implicitly defines a (partial) ordering of similar categories at the same
time. Given a nominal attribute with V containing p elements and a linear utility
function, the proposed approach replaces (in mathematical terms)
. . . + w1b1 + w2b2 + . . . + wpbp + . . . (5.2)
with
. . . + w(u1b1 + u2b2 + . . . + upbp) + . . . , (5.3)
where wi is a weighting factor (cf. Section 5.2.2), bi a binary decision variable and
ui P R an utility value (which is contained in V). The utility values in (5.3) can be
obtained from the weightings in (5.2) by the following computation:
ui =
wi
p°
j=1
wj
(5.4)
where
p°
j=1
wj  0. Thus, the proposed approach re-formulates a sequence of
binary decision and utility variables into a single measurement value. Moreover, a
formulation as in (5.3) enables domain experts to separate the question of what
impact a certain group of categories has from the question of how to order these
categories. This is especially advantageous in case that the weighting of a single
group needs to be modified or if a single group changes in terms of number and
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importance of categories. While the traditional approach requires in either case
modifications on all utility values in the utility function, the proposed approach
requires that either the group weightings or the single utility values in a group
need to be adjusted. The author believes that this vastly reduces the complexity of
building security assessment models. Equation (5.5) shows the result of applying
the proposed method on the sample in Equation (5.1).
. . . + wi(0.1bi,1 + 0.3bi,2 + 0.6bi,3) + wi+1(0.29bi+1,1 + 0.71bi+1,2) + . . . (5.5)
This reformulation yields similarities with a metric interpretation of nominal
properties. However, it should be noted that the proposed interpretation takes
place on a meta-level (i. e. utility values associated with each category). Hence,
the homomorphic properties of the nominal scale are being preserved.
Finally, A is a set of 2-tuples (Composition Pattern, Aggregation Scheme). As has
been shown in Section 3.2.2, aggregation schemes of attributes vary depending
on the composition pattern of the process model. Therefore it is necessary to list
which aggregation scheme to use for each composition pattern. As this is a matter
of semantics and as such usually different for each QoS attribute, this task cannot
be fully automatized.
5.2.2 Building Domain Models
A domain model describes a set of security goals and their interrelationships.
It consists of protection functions which capture these structures by means of
interdependent utility functions.
5.2.2.1 Defining Protection Functions
The basic idea behind a protection function is to assess the utility of service com-
positions towards fulfilling a certain security objective. In this regard, the utilized
definition is analogous to the idea of a utility function as typically employed in
service composition (cf. Section 3.2.4.3). A protection function semantically serves
several purposes, namely to
• describe the influence of single QoS attributes, which are realized by technical
facilities, on achieving a certain protection level,
• weight the influence of different QoS attributes in case of non-uniformity
and
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• consider the varying effectiveness of different technical implementations for
the same service property. Here, effectiveness is understood as “the degree
to which something is successful in producing a desired result.”59
At this, the proposed approach is based on the notion of structural decomposi-
tion which aims at identifying measurable components for high-level requirements
[WW97; HHA04; SA09]. Since requirements engineering is out of the scope of this
thesis, it is assumed in the remainder that the respective steps have already been
taken beforehand. In particular, it is assumed that necessary security objectives
have already been identified and clearly differentiated against each other. For a
given set of security objectives, structural decomposition consists of three steps
[WW97; SA09]:
1. For each security objective, identify components that contribute to the success
of the goal. Arrange the components as subordinate nodes in a tree structure.
2. Examine the leafs if further decomposition is needed. If this is the case, apply
the first step on the respective components as well.
3. Terminate decomposition if no leaf can be further decomposed. At termi-
nation, the leafs of the tree should be mutually independent measurable
components.
Figure 5.2 shows an example from [SA09] for decomposing authentication into
more fine-grained components. This decomposition has been performed in the
scope of the GENOM project which aims at providing a secure message oriented
middleware. As can be seen the decomposition identified two major components
contributing to the security objective authentication. The first is the identity itself
and its impact is determined by the question what properties it has in terms of
uniqueness, structure and integrity. The second major component is the employed
mechanism to authenticate entities (e. g. username-password and certificates) and
the impact of this component is determined by its reliability and integrity.
Given such a decomposition with n identified components, the security of
different configurations can be assessed as a function as follows [WW97]:
fobjective =
n¸
i=1
wiui (5.6)
where wi and ui denote the impact to a security objective and the utility of a
component respectively. This formulation assumes that each component has an
59 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/effectiveness
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Authentication
Identity Mechanism
Effectiveness Integrity Reliability Integrity
Uniqueness Structure
Figure 5.2: Example for structural decomposition (cf. [SA09])
impact on its own on a certain security objective and that the security level of
a system is determined by the collective impacts of all components. Applying
this scheme to the example depicted in Figure 5.2 thus would yield a function
with five components. An important question in this regard is how to determine
appropriate weightings and utility values. WANG and WULF suggested to employ
decision support tools such as the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [Saa90]. Due
to its extent, AHP cannot be discussed here. To validate obtained weightings and
utility values, WANG and WULF suggested to utilize either empirical relations or
formal experiments. A concrete method is however not defined [WW97].
A research gap that remains and which is addressed with the proposed ap-
proach is the consideration of different degrees of effectivity for different technical
implementations of the same feature. In the context of service selection this needs
to be addressed at the level of single services during selection. In order to align
the concept of effectivity seamlessly with service selection, the approach proposed
here considers it during QoS aggregation. Before presenting this approach in
Section 5.2.2.2, it is first discussed how to align structural decomposition with
service selection.
In the following it is assumed that measurable components for each security
objective have been identified and included in the QoS model and that the impor-
tance of each component for each security objective has been determined utilizing
e. g. AHP. Then each security objective can be expressed as a protection function
which receives as input the aggregated and normalized QoS vector Q1 of a service
composition and returns a utility value which represents an assessment on the
fulfillment of a security objective. The importance of each measurable component
for a protection function can then be expressed as an attribute weighting in the
interval [1, 1] where a negative value indicates a negative impact, 0 no impact
and a positive value a positive impact respectively.
Let D denote a domain model, i. e. a set of n protection functions p fi. A
144 CHAPTER 5. APPROACH
protection function p fi, i P t1, . . . , nu, is defined as follows:
p fi(Q1) =
m¸
j=1
wijQ1j (5.7)
where
Q1 = (Q11, . . . ,Q1m) : Aggregated and normalized global QoS vector and
m¸
j=1
|wij| = 1, wij P [1, 1] : Attribute weightings for protection function i.
Analogously to the approach presented in [WW97], it is assumed that each
QoS attribute of a component has an impact on its own on a security objective.
The security level of a system regarding security objective i is then determined
as the sum of all impacts. From a semantic point of view, protection functions
are equivalent to the assessment functions employed in [WW97; HHA04; SA09].
Protection functions form the basic elements that will be used in the following
sections for modeling interdependence and assessing service compositions.
5.2.2.2 Normalization of QoS Attributes
In previous sections the necessity for aggregating (cf. Section 3.2.2) as well as
normalizing (cf. Section 3.2.3) QoS attributes has been explained in detail. The
usual order in which this happens is aggregation before normalization (cf., e. g.,
[ZBD+03; YCY12]). However, as already stated, the proposed approach aims at
considering different degrees of effectivity for the QoS attributes of each selected
service in a normalized range [0, 1]. Hence it is necessary to perform these actions
in reverse order, i. e. normalization before aggregation.
Normalization of ascending or descending QoS attributes employing either
ordinal, interval or ratio measurement scales is performed with the method pro-
posed by ZENG et al. which has been presented in Section 3.2.3. The reason for
this decision is that this normalization method is the most widely used.
In case of nominal measurement scales, normalization is performed based
on the utility values associated with each category. The normalized QoS value is
simply the sum of all utility values associated with the features which are provided
by a service alternative:
q1αij =
f¸
i=1
uibi, (5.8)
where
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f : The number of features defined in V ,
ui : the utility value associated with feature i and
bi P t0, 1u : a binary decision variable indicating if feature i is supported
by a service alternative or not.
Analogously to the definition of protection functions (cf. Section 5.2.2.1), it
is assumed that each feature has an impact on its own on the security level of a
component and that they mutually complement each other. In the remainder of
this thesis, the following notation will be utilized to represent normalized sets of
features: t name1 = u1, name2 = u2, . . ., name f = u f u. In this notation, namei
is a textual representation of the feature name (e. g. RSA and AES in case of
encryption algorithms) while ui represents the utility value which is associated
with the feature and interpreted in the course of assessment.
Effectivity of a service alternative sij is expressed by means of an effectivity
vector eij. This vector contains one effectivity value eαijP [0, 1] per quality attribute
qαij. Given a normalized quality vector q
1
ij and an effectivity vector eij, aggregation
schemes are applied on the product of qαij and eij. For instance, the multiplicative
aggregation scheme
Qα =
k¹
i=1
qαij
thus becomes
Q1α =
k¹
i=1
q1αij e
α
ij
An important question which should be addressed here is how to determine
effectivity values. As stated above, an effectivity value indicates how well a do-
main expert assesses the technical implementation of a facility. As the assessment
method can be expected to be generally different for different types of organiza-
tions, employed standards, legal requirements and so on, there is no simple answer
to this question. However, in general it appears that constructing an assessment
framework is inevitable. Such a framework needs to address the question of what
factors have which impact on the assessment. This shall be illustrated employing
the example of the QoS attribute encryption again.
In case of a certified state-of-the-art implementation of a cryptographic algo-
rithm, a domain expert would assign a high effectivity value. If the implementation
is known to be outdated and buggy, a medium value would be assigned and finally
a low (or even minimum) value if the provider does not disclose any information
146 CHAPTER 5. APPROACH
regarding the utilized implementation. Thus the first essential task for domain ex-
perts in this context is the question of how to determine essential influence factors
on effectivity for each quality attribute. Secondly, the impact of each identified
factor on the effectivity of a QoS attribute needs to be determined. But since such
frameworks quickly tend to become very complex, this topic will not be discussed
in more detail here. In fact, the work required to be done by domain experts here is
very similar to defining protection functions and utility values for binary attribute
values. Hence it is to be expected that the construction of a consolidated evaluation
framework would be more feasible than developing three separate frameworks.
5.2.2.3 Modeling Interdependence between Protection Functions
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, WOLF and PFITZMANN determined that interde-
pendence between two security objectives might be strengthening, weakening or
implicating. This section shows how to express these kinds of interdependence
with protection functions.
Strengthening and weakening effects of a protection function p fA on another
protection function p fB can be modeled by means of a interference factor λ P R.
Let an update of protection function p fB into p f
1
B be defined as follows:
p f 1B = p fB + λA p fA (5.9)
Depending on the sign of λA, the interference relation is interpreted as either
strengthening or weakening. In case that either λA, p fA or p fB is 0, the particular
strengthening/weakening relationship between p fA and p fB has no effect on
assessment results.
Modeling implication relationships between two protection functions p fA and
p fB (denoted p fA Ñ p fB) requires some more effort. It is insufficient to simply
compare the order of the results of p fA and p fB, because the primary requirement
is that a service has a positive protection value to be considered true. As such,
at first it needs to be defined what “true” and “false” mean in the context of
protection functions. In the following, let a function value p fk ¡ 0 be defined
as “true” or in words: “Security goal achievable with the given quality attribute
values.” Accordingly, a function value p fk ¤ 0 is interpreted as “false” or in words:
“Security goal not achievable with the given quality attribute values.” With these
rules, the implication relation between p fA and p fB can be formulated in the usual
boolean way as given in Table 5.2.
As can be seen, it must be ensured that no situation occurs where p fA ¡
0^ p fb ¤ 0. Otherwise the implication relation between p fA and p fB would not
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Table 5.2: Implication between security functions p fA and p fB
p fA p fB p fA Ñ p fB
¡ 0 ¡ 0 true
¡ 0 ¤ 0 f alse
¤ 0 ¡ 0 true
¤ 0 ¤ 0 true
be true. To verify this property and thus that the implication relation between p fA
and p fB is true, the following two step approach is proposed:
1. Attribute Chaining
2. Pessimistic Attribute Weighting
In the following these steps will be explained in more detail.
1) Attribute Chaining:
Let QAA and QAB denote the sets of quality attributes with a non-zero weighting
in p fA and p fB respectively. Then the following conditions must hold:
1. QAA  QAB
2. The sign of each quality attribute qaA P QAA must be the same as in QAB
If these conditions hold, p fA becomes a sufficient condition for p fB which
means that any quality attribute which effects p fA will effect p fB as well and vice
versa. Following are two short numerical examples to show the necessity of these
two properties. In general, if wij and eij are skipped in the following, they will
be assumed to be (-)1, i. e. without impact on a protection function. Consider the
following two protection functions p fA and p fB (QAA  QAB) defined as follows:
p fA = q11j
p fB = q12j
In case that q11j = 1^ q12j = 0 one receives p fA = 1^ p fB = 0 which invalidates
implication relationship between p fA and p fB. However, the first condition alone
is insufficient. Consider the following modified protection functions p fA and p fB
which violate the second condition:
p fA = q11j  q12j + q13j
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p fB = q11j + q12j + q13j
In case that q11j ¡ 0^ q12j = 0^ q13j = 0 one receives as solution p fA ¡ 0^ p fB  
0 which also invalidates the implication relationship. Hence both conditions are
necessary to guarantee the validity of the implication relationship.
2) Pessimistic attribute weighting:
Given the sufficient condition defined in the first step, the question arises how to
ensure that p fA ¡ 0 holds whenever p fB ¡ 0 holds in terms of factor weightings.
This is achieved by determining the maximum factor weightings which may be
assigned to all quality attributes with a negative sign in p fB. This is what the term
pessimistic attribute weighting refers to. In particular, the proposed approach
ensures that p fB ¡ 0 in the worst case which is defined as follows here:
• The factor with minimum positive weighting has a minimal QoS attribute
value and minimal effectivity,
• all factors with negative weighting have maximum QoS attribute values and
maximum effectivity.
Since the QoS attributes of p fA and p fB are chained, it may happen in this
worst case that p fA ¡ 0 and p fB   0 as has been seen in the last example. This
in turn would break the implication relationship. Hence it is necessary to make
sure that in this worst case p fB ¡ 0 holds which will ensure that the implication
relationship between p fA and p fB remains valid in all other cases as well. The
proposed approach is based on the assumption that for any normalized QoS
attribute it is possible to define practical lower boundaries q1ij,lb and eij,lb which
exhibit the following properties: 0   q1ij,lb ¤ 1 and 0   eij,lb ¤ 1. The interpretation
of q1ij,lb is that by experience a QoS value never falls below this value, even though
the metric has been defined in a broader range. Similarly, eij,lb represents a lower
boundary that by experience is achieved by all providers, no matter how bad their
technical realization is.
With these lower boundaries in mind, let W+ and W be two sets containing
all positive and negative factor weightings in p fB as follows:
W+ = twijq1ij,lbeij,lb | wij ¡ 0u
W = twij | wij   0u
The reason that q1ij and eij are not included in W is that these are assumed to
be 1 in the worst case. Hence they can be omitted without any loss in generality.
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Let further ΣW be the absolute sum of all factor weightings wk P W:
ΣW =
|W|¸
k=1
|wk P W| (5.10)
Then, ΣW can be utilized to determine the maximum weighting that negative
factors are allowed to have such that p fA ¡ 0 whenever p fB ¡ 0 utilizing the
following expression:
ΣW   min(W+) (5.11)
If this criterion does not hold, it cannot be guaranteed that the implication
relationship will hold in all cases. Particularly, if ΣW ¥ 1, implication cannot
be guaranteed for p fA and p fB in their current form since no single attribute
with weighting wk P W+ will be able to overcompensate all attributes with overall
weightings ΣW in the worst case. Hence a reformulation of the underlying domain
model is required. Following is a numerical example to clarify this. Consider the
following two protection functions:
p fA = q11j
p fB = 0.5q11j  0.7q12j + 0.6q13j + 0.6q14j
Obviously both attribute chaining criteria hold for these functions. However in
case that q11j = 1^ q12j = 1^ q13j = 0^ q14j = 0 the results are p fA = 1^ p fB = 0.2
which invalidates the implication relationship. Hence in the following the method
of pessimistic attribute weighting will be applied in order to determine the factor
weighting such that q12j will no longer invalidate the implication relationship
between p fA and p fB. At first, let the lower boundaries for q11j, q
1
2j, q
1
3j, e1j, e2j, e3j
be defined as follows:
q11j,lb = 0.8, e1j,lb = 0.8
q12j,lb = 0.8, e2j,lb = 0.8
q13j,lb = 0.8, e3j,lb = 0.8
The sets W+ and W then contain the following elements:
W+ = t0.32, 0.384, 0.384u
W = t0.7u
Based on W one can compute that ΣW = 0.7. As can be seen, the established
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validity criterion ΣW   min(W+) is not fulfilled. One alternative formulation of
p fB which respects this criterion is the following:
p fB = 0.5q11j  0.3q12j + 0.4q13j + 0.4q14j
Recomputing the case given above yields a function value of p fB = 0.532
which results in a valid implication relationship between p fA and p fB.
5.2.2.4 Known Limitations
The proposed approach for modeling interdependence relations currently only
works under two conditions:
1. There must not be cyclic dependencies between protection functions60
2. In case of implication relationships A Ñ B, A must not have a predecessor.
In order to check these properties, the security assessment model is transformed
into a directed graph at first. For validating condition one, TARJAN’s algorithm
[Tar71] is employed in order to check if the graph contains any strongly connected
components. Checking the second condition is trivial. The developed support tool
(cf. Chapter 6) checks at design time if these conditions hold and shows an error
message if this is not the case.
5.2.3 Discussion
The proposed method for security assessment does not guarantee security of
service compositions, but gives domain experts a tool to evaluate different compo-
sition alternatives with respect to certain security goals. Following is a discussion
about the merits of the proposed approach compared to classical formal approaches
as well as its general limitations.
As has been stated in Section 2.3.2, deciding if a program yields a certain
nontrivial property is undecideable. The consequence of this observation from a
methodical perspective is that formally verifying security of a composition would
at first require to manually verify the security of each service in a composition.
Several frameworks exist for this task with the Common Criteria61 being a prominent
60 Such as between confidentiality and anonymity in the security model of WOLF and PFITZMANN
(cf. Section 2.3.3).
61 https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
5.2. ASSESSING INTERDEPENDENT SECURITY OF SERVICE COMPOSITIONS 151
example. This is however time and cost intensive and hence only few products
have been formally verified62. After this initial step, the composition as a whole
would require to be verified as well. The reason is that “even secure components
can be assembled in ways that make them insecure” [PC10, p. 50]. As an example
consider interactions of cryptographic protocols. Even protocols which are secure
when utilized in isolation can be combined in ways such that the interaction opens
up new security holes [KSW98]. This example underlines a general rule in security
which is that “security does not necessarily compose” [KSW98, p. 103]. One
possibility to avoid such dangers is to again formally verify that the composition
is secure as well. A particular method for cryptographic protocols is the universal
composability paradigm [Can01]. However, even multiple formal verifications (i. e.
at the service and the composition level) are no guarantee that a system is secure
since there can still be design errors or software bugs. Especially the absence of
bugs can never be proved [Dij72].
In this context, the proposed method is to be seen as a tool which can be
employed to assess security of distributed systems. Since assessment is performed
at runtime, results are delivered immediately without requiring any manual steps.
Besides of the procedure described in the previous sections which completely
relies on domain experts’ opinion, it is also possible to define protection functions
by means of security metrics. In this case, each protection function models a single
security metric and thus assesses a composition with regards to this certain metric.
This leads to an assessment of compositions which is much less subjective and
hence much easier to be agreed upon. In general, this variant of the proposed
approach can be applied in two different ways by either employing
1. general-purpose metrics or
2. organizational security metrics.
In either case, modeling protection functions is straight-forward and is per-
formed as described in Section 5.2.2.1. The only difference is however, that each
protection function consists of a single property with a weighting of 1. As an
example consider applying the modified approach to define a protection function
for availability based on a single QoS property uptime probability as follows:
p fAvailability = 1.0Q11 (5.12)
62 A formal verification with Common Criteria corresponds to a EAL 7 certification, the highest
level defined in the framework. This level is however rarely achieved by any product. Out
of 1955 officially certified products only six have have been certified at this level (https:
//www.commoncriteriaportal.org/products/stats/).
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Table 5.3: Sample data for comparing the results of the modified approach and average availability
Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Service Uptime Prob. Service Uptime Prob.
A 90 A 85
B 99 B 80
C 95 C 90
Modified approach 2.32 Modified approach 0.82
Average avail. 94.67 Average avail. 85
Assuming that appropriate aggregation schemes were chosen (e. g. addition
for sequences), the results obtained by the proposed method and computing the
average availability will be trivially identical in terms of preferable composition
alternative. The sample data presented in Table 5.3 illustrates this.
Similarly, organization-specific metrics can be employed with the proposed
approach as well. In this case however, the data is usually not publicly available
but needs to be provided by either the organization itself or by a some trusted
authority. Typical security-related metrics include:
• number of SLA violations
• number of reported data breaches
• average time-to-react in case of security incidents
In other words, monitoring data is being utilized to assess compositions. A
hybrid approach employing general-purpose and organization-specific metrics
is also possible. From the author’s point of view, latter metrics are also suited
to assess compositions with organization-specific risk control methods. Hence,
the proposed method would enable not only to assess QoS and interdependent
security, but would also allow to evaluate possible financial risks of different
composition alternatives.
5.3 Compliance-Aware Service Selection
In this section an approach is presented for aligning compliance checking with ser-
vice selection. First an outline of the proposed approach is given. Subsequently the
single steps of the proposed approach are discussed which consist of a feasibility
check, a detection method for compliance violations and a repair operation.
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5.3.1 Outline of Approach
Since GAs are commonly used for service selection (cf. Section 3.2.4.4), the pro-
posed approach is a drop-in solution. This enables to extend existing GAs for
consideration of compliance aspects even if they are already used in productive
systems. As a proof-of-concept, NSGA-II [DPA+02] has been extended to consider
compliance aspects since evaluations proved it to be the fastest metaheuristic63.
The resulting algorithm was called Compliance-Aware Genetic Algorithm (COM-
PAGA). Figure 5.3 gives a conceptual overview of the proposed approach. The
modified GA works as follows:
NSGA-II COMPAGA
Generate Initial Population
Selection
Crossover
Mutation
Feasibility Check
Generate Initial Population
Selection
Crossover
Mutation
Determine Compliance Violations
COMPRepair
Figure 5.3: Extending NSGA-II to COMPAGA
1. Perform an initial feasibility check. If no compliant solution exists for the
given problem instance, abort.
2. Generate an initial population.
3. Apply GA operators selection, crossover and mutation as usual on the popu-
lation.
4. Check each individual solution for compliance violations.
5. If an individual solution violates compliance, apply the custom GA operator
COMPRepair at a probability of prep64.
63 An overview of the employed metaheuristics is provided in Section 7.2.
64 The question of how to determine a “good” probability prep is covered in Section 7.1.
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6. While the convergence criterion is not met, go to step 3.
Algorithm 5.1 provides a simplifying view on COMPAGA as pseudo-code. In
particular, all parts which are specific to NSGA-II have been either simplified or
completely omitted in order to focus on the extensions introduced by COMPAGA.
These extensions will be explained in detail in the following sections.
Algorithm 5.1: COMPAGA
1 P := Process Model;
2 SA := Set of all service alternatives;
3 if feasibilityCheck(P, SA) = false then returnH;
4 pop := generateInitialPopulation();
5 gen := 0; cond := false;
6 while cond = f alse do
7 selection(pop);
8 crossover(pop);
9 mutation(pop);
10 foreach solution P pop do
11 SC := convertToComposition(solution);
12 V := detectComplianceViolations(P, SC);
13 rand := random[1..100];
14 if V.length ¡ 0 and rand ¡ prep then
15 SC := COMPRepair(P, SC, V);
16 solution := update(SC);
17 end
18 end
19 gen := gen + 1;
20 if convergence criterion met then cond := true;
21 end
22 return pop;
5.3.2 Feasibility Check
The initial feasibility check is the first step of COMPAGA and is performed only
once. The goal of this step is to determine for a given process model and service
alternatives if there is at least one compliant solution without considering user
requirements. If this is not the case, it is infeasible to optimize since no solution
is possible for the given problem instance, i. e. no solution will be able to meet
all compliance and user requirements simultaneously. In case that at least one
compliant solution exists, there is a chance that a solution fulfills both compliance
and user requirements. Hence, the existence of a compliant solution is still no
guarantee that for the considered problem instance at least one valid solution
exists.
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15 seconds
S1: Check
e-mail address
S2: Check
bank account
S3: Check
credit card
Send timeout
message
Location: Germany;
Data: RSA-2048
Location: Germany;
Data: RSA-2048
Figure 5.4: Sample process with compliance requirements
Table 5.4: Service alternatives for sample process with compliance requirements
Service Service Location Data ResponseClass Candidate Encryption Time
S1
s11 Germany RSA-1024 7
s12 Ireland RSA-1024 4
s13 Austria RSA-2048 5
S2
s21 Belgium RSA-4096 3
s22 Germany RSA-3072 2
s23 France RSA-3072 4
s24 Germany RSA-1024 5
S3
s31 Germany RSA-2048 4
s32 Austria RSA-4096 4
The approach for checking feasibility will be illustrated with an example. Figure
5.4 shows the sample process with compliance requirements as explained in
Section 3.4. Service classes S2 and S3 are each subject to two local constraints, i. e.
the location must be Germany and the provided data encryption must be RSA
with a key length of at least 2048 bit. The subprocess is subject to a time limit of
15 seconds. In case that this time limit is not respected, a timeout message is sent
to the user (the corresponding message event is omitted here) and the process
ends. Table 5.4 shows the service alternatives which were introduced in Section
3.2.1. Here, the QoS properties price and availability have been omitted. Instead,
for each service alternative information is given regarding the location where the
service is hosted and the encryption strength provided.
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Given such a process model and a set of service alternatives, the proposed
feasibility checking method works as follows:
1. Iterate all service classes and delete all service alternatives which do not
fulfill local compliance constraints.
2. If any service class is empty, no compliant solution exists; abort!
3. Iterate all scopes subject to a time limit and select from each service class in
the scope the service alternative with minimum response time. Aggregate
the runtimes.
4. If any time limit constraint is violated, no compliant solution exists; abort!
Algorithm 5.2 shows the pseudocode for this operation. Applying the first step
to the service alternatives in Table 5.4 yields the reduced sets of service alternatives
as shown in Table 5.5. Since none of the service classes is empty, step 3 is applied.
Algorithm 5.2: Feasibility Check(P, SA)
1 foreach Si P SA do
2 C := data and location constraints for Si in P;
3 foreach sij P Si do
4 if sij does not meet C then remove sij from Si;
5 end
6 if |Si| = 0 then return f alse;
7 end
8 foreach scope P timeScopes do
9 comp := Partial composition for scope consisting of services with minimal
response time;
10 if comp.responseTime ¡ scope.timeLimit then return f alse;
11 end
12 return true;
As only one time limit including all service classes needs to be considered,
the aggregation expression for response time which was determined in Section
Table 5.5: Reduced service classes
Service Service Location Data ResponseClass Candidate Encryption Time
S1
s11 Germany RSA-1024 7
s12 Ireland RSA-1024 4
s13 Austria RSA-2048 5
S2 s22 Germany RSA-3072 2
S3 s31 Germany RSA-2028 4
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3.2.2 can be reused, i. e. Qα = qα1j + max(qα2j, qα3j). From each service class, the
service alternative with minimum response time is selected. This yields the so-
lution ts12, s22, s31uwhich has an aggregated response time of 8 sec. Since this is
lower than the time limit defined for the subprocess, this solution is compliant and
hence optimization is feasible. In particular, it can be concluded that a solution
might exist fulfilling both compliance and user requirements. However, the opti-
mal solution with respect to user requirements determined in Section 3.2.1 was
ts12, s24, s32u. Since this was also the only solution fulfilling the user requirements,
this shows that for the problem instance at hand, no solution exists which fulfills
compliance and user requirements at the same time. In general this illustrates that
the existence of a compliant solution does not guarantee the existence of a solution
fulfilling compliance and user requirements simultaneously. Hence a successful
feasibility check does not spare performing optimization.
5.3.3 Detecting Compliance Violations
This step of COMPAGA is performed firstly on the initial population and after-
wards on each new population of the current iteration. In order to measure the
degree of compliance of single service compositions, the notion of compliance
distance is utilized which was first introduced by SADIQ et al. [SGN07]. Compli-
ance distance is a quantitative measure and in its most basic form simply counts
the number of compliance violations in a process instance. Here it is adapted for
service compositions and employed to count how many assigned services in a
composition violate compliance requirements. Of course this is a very basic view
on compliance which is based on the assumption that each violation is equally
bad. As was already discussed by SADIQ et al., a more sophisticated approach
would be to associate a cost with each violation [SGN07]. Compliance distance
would then be the sum of all violation costs of a service composition. However,
for the sake of simplicity and without any loss in generality, the basic measure will
be used in the following.
Determining Data and Location violations can be performed locally. Time
scopes however can be nested and may be composed of human as well as non-
human tasks (cf. Section 3.4). Therefore let timeScopes be a data structure which
contains one list scope per time scope in a process model as well as its time limit.
Given a process model P and a service composition SC, the compliance distance
of SC can then be determined with a two step approach. First, all tasks in P are
iterated and it is checked if the services in SC fulfill data and location requirements.
If this is not the case, the indices of these tasks are stored in a list V. In case
that a task p P P is part of one or several nested time scopes, the index of p is
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stored in all corresponding lists scope P timeScopes. In a second step, all lists
scope P timeScopes are iterated and all times allotted to human tasks as well as all
response times of services in SC assigned to non-human tasks are summed up. If
the sum of these times is greater than the time limit assigned to scope, all elements
of p P scope . p R V ^ p.isHumanTask are added to V. The compliance distance
of SC can then be obtained by counting the elements in V. Algorithm 5.3 shows
the pseudo-code for this operation.
Algorithm 5.3: Detect Compliance Violations(P, SC)
1 V := empty list;
2 timeScopes := data structure with one list per time scope and its time limit;
3 foreach p P P do
4 C := p.getConstraints;
5 foreach c P C do
6 if c.isDataAnnotation_ c.isLocationAnnotation then
7 Check if SC[p] meets compliance requirement c;
8 if SC[p] does not meet c then add p to V;
9 else if c.isTimeConstraint then
10 Add p to all corresponding lists in timeScopes;
11 end
12 end
13 end
14 foreach scope P timeScopes do
15 if Σ human processing times + Σ response times ¡ scope.timeLimit then
16 foreach p P scope . p R V ^ p.isHumanTask do
17 Add p to V;
18 end
19 end
20 end
21 return V;
5.3.4 Recovering Compliance
This step is performed in each iteration of COMPAGA at a probability of prep for
each population member which has a compliance distance ¡ 0. In order to replace
services in case of violations efficiently with suiting services, at first a clustering
is performed on the set of service alternatives with a total of three levels. On the
first level, services are clustered according to their service class Si. On the second
level, services are clustered according to their data class. Finally, on the third level
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services are clustered according to their location (cf. Figure 5.5)65. This clustering
allows to find suiting service alternatives in logarithmic time.
S1
S2
Sn
Secret
Top Secret
Brazil
Germany
s15
s12
Root
...
  
  
...
...
Figure 5.5: Service clustering
Given such a clustering, a process model P, a list of violations V as produced
by algorithm 5.3 and a non-compliant service composition SC, the repair operation
works as follows. The list V is iterated and for each violation v P V at first
the service class Sv of v is determined as well as the set C of data and location
constraints which are defined in P. Then the set of clustered services is searched
for a service candidate svj P Sv, which has
1. at least the data class as defined in P,
2. the same location as defined in P and
3. minimum response time.
If such a candidate exists, the service of class Sv in SC is replaced with it. Algo-
rithm 5.4 shows the pseudo code for this operation. It should be noted that the
clustering is performed right after a positive feasibility check and has been placed
in algorithm 5.4 only for the sake of clarity.
Obviously, the success of this operation depends on the question if suiting
service alternatives are available. Therefore it cannot be guaranteed that a non-
compliant SC will become compliant after performing this repair operation. An-
other noteworthy aspect is that time limit constraints are not explicitly addressed,
but implicitly by picking services with minimum response time. The reason for this
decision was that checking time limits would again require a two step approach
as in algorithm 5.3. However, analysis revealed that the proposed technique will
result in a compliant service composition in terms of time limits if suiting service
65 The second and the third level are interchangeable, i. e. one could also cluster services for
location before data class.
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Algorithm 5.4: Repair operation(P, SC, V)
1 Clustering := Three-level clustering of service alternatives;
2 foreach v P V do
3 Sv := service class of v;
4 C := data and location constraints for Sv in P;
5 cand := Clustering.pick(s P Sv . s.data ¥ C.data^ s.location = C.location
6 ^ s.responeTime = min);
7 if cand  H then
8 SC[Sv] := cand;
9 end
10 end
11 return SC;
alternatives exist. If this is not the case, time limit constraints cannot be met with-
out violating another local constraint. Therefore a more sophisticated approach is
not necessary. Since COMPAGA is a GA, it can find at most a number of elements
in PF equal to the population size (cf. Section 2.5.6).
5.4 Summary
This chapter presented the two main contributions of this thesis. The first one is
a method to assess the security of service compositions based on the notion of
structural decomposition. Extensions to the basic model have been presented in
order to consider interdependence effects between security objectives. However,
the method is limited as not all structures can be captured in case of implication
relationships. The second contribution is a drop-in solution for considering com-
pliance aspects in service selection with GAs. An approach was presented which
builds on top of compliance distance in order to detect and repair compliance
violations in service compositions.
Chapter 6
Proof of Concept
“The programmer, like the poet, works only
slightly removed from pure thought-stuff. He
builds his castles in the air, from air, creating
by exertion of the imagination. Few media of
creation are so flexible, so easy to polish and
rework, so readily capable of realizing grand
conceptual structures.”
– FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR. [BRO95, P. 7]
I N THIS CHAPTER the Service Selection Workbench (SSW) is presented. Thistool aims at illustrating the approach presented in Chapter 5. First an overview
is provided of the tool’s functionality (Section 6.1). Next a round-trip is given
in using the tool from workspace creation to performing simulations (Section
6.2). This round-trip is followed by a discussion of the implemented features with
respect to the requirements identified in Section 4.1 (Section 6.3). A summary of
the main results concludes this chapter (Section 6.4).
6.1 Overview
SSW is a tool which has been developed in order to support users in building
security assessment models according to the approach presented in Section 5.2.
Furthermore, a simulation environment has been integrated to analyze resulting
MOO problems with different GAs (including COMPAGA presented in Section
5.3) and different simulation settings. SSW basically consists of three components:
• QoS model editor
• Domain model editor
• Simulation environment
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SSW has been developed on WINDOWS using Java. It uses Swing for all tasks
related to the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and the jMetal framework [DN11]
for simulations. The philosophy behind SSW is that it shall at first hand illustrate
the approach presented in Chapter 5 by means of a real system for users with a
variety of backgrounds. The way users interact with SSW, especially the models
they build, tells more about the practicability of the approach than any theoretical
analysis could. Another aspect is that SSW might be used as a building block
to develop a plugin or a completely new system for process modeling using
the approaches presented in Chapter 5. The following subsections give a brief
overview of each component.
6.1.1 QoS Model Editor
This component allows users to define QoS models of any complexity (cf. Figure
6.1). It allows to add, delete and edit existing QoS attributes. For each QoS attribute
the user needs to specify
• a name
• its variable type
• its measurement scale
• min and max values
• an optional unit
• its aggregation scheme66
These properties have been already explained in Sections 3.2.4 and 5.2.1 respec-
tively. What should be additionally explained here is the implemented approach
for defining nominal attribute values. As can be seen in Figure 6.1, the menu
for defining new QoS attributes contains a button labeled “Define Nominal Val-
ues”. In case of QoS attributes with a nominal scale, this button opens up a new
dialog which enables users to specify attribute values (e. g. different encryption
algorithms) and to assign a utility value to each entry (cf. Figure 6.2).
66 For the sake of simplicity the prototype is restricted to sequential workflows. Since however a
combinatorial approach is employed for problem modeling, this does not cause any loss of
generality (cf. Section 3.2.4).
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Figure 6.1: QoS model editor
Figure 6.2: Defining utility values for nominal QoS attributes
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6.1.2 Domain Model Editor
The domain model editor (cf. Figure 6.3) allows to define protection functions as
well as their interdependencies as explained in Section 5.2.2.3. For each protection
function users can specify a name and select QoS attributes which have an impact
on that particular protection function. The corresponding list only shows QoS
attributes which have already been defined. For each chosen QoS attribute users
are allowed to define weightings and to specify if this attribute is a negative
factor. Furthermore, the editor allows to add existing protection functions as either
strengthening, weakening or implicating objectives. Implication relationships are
validated according to the method presented in Section 5.2.2.3. In case that the
given model does not suffice the required conditions (i. e. attribute chaining and
pessimistic factor weighting), an error screen shows up to inform the user.
Figure 6.3: Domain model editor
6.1.3 Simulation Environment
The simulation environment consists of two tabs which allow for defining algo-
rithm as well as simulation settings (cf. Figure 6.4). The tab “Algorithm settings”
allows users to specify not only the algorithm to be used but also GA-related
options such as selecting GA operators as well as their application probability,
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population size, etc. An exhaustive enumeration of all options is beyond the
scope of this thesis. It should be noted however that depending on the GA em-
ployed, some settings might stay without effect if the respective algorithm does
not support them. For instance, the random approach (cf. Section 7.2) does not
employ any kind of crossover, mutation or repair operator. As such changing the
types of these operators as well as their probabilities will stay without any effect67.
This is particularly the case for the repair operation COMPRepair which is only
supported by COMPAGA. Another noteworthy fact is that the layout of the tab
“algorithm settings” has been strongly influenced by a support GUI for the jMetal
library presented in [DN11]. Simulations are performed according to the “ideal
multi-objective optimization procedure” proposed by DEB (cf. Section 2.5.4), i. e.
not the complete Pareto front is determined but at most a predefined maximum of
Pareto optimal solutions (cf. below).
(a) Algorithm settings (b) Simulation parameters
Figure 6.4: Simulation environment
The tab “Simulation parameters” is employed to prepare simulations such as
the ones reported in Chapter 7. It allows for defining
• workflow length
• maximum number of solutions to be determined
• the maximum constraint threshold to be accepted
• the number of simulation runs to be performed
67 For details about the respective GAs the interested reader is referred to Section 7.2 as well as to
the source code of jMetal which can be obtained at: http://jmetal.sourceforge.net/
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• the probability at which single tasks in the generated workflow are decorated
with random compliance requirements
Furthermore, the user can decide to either generate a completely new workflow
model at each simulation run or to reuse a previously generated one. This option
allows to compare simulation results against each other and has been extensively
used when preparing the simulation results reported in Chapter 7.
Finally, the user can either turn on or off compliance checking of workflow
models. This approach is necessary because checking compliance in terms of
location, data and time limit requirements necessitates the QoS model to contain
certain attributes. Since SSW does not claim to be a mature, feature-rich product,
the required QoS attributes have been hard-coded for the sake of simplicity. If
these attributes are not present in the QoS model, compliance checking cannot
be performed. Hence the state of this flag is used internally to determine if the
QoS model shall be checked for these attributes or not. In case that compliance
checking is turned on and the model does not support the required attributes, the
user is prevented from performing any simulations with an error message.
In particular, performing compliance checks requires the employed QoS model
to contain the following three attributes:
1. Encryption with variable type binary and measurement scale nominal con-
taining the following nominal values: { RSA = 1.0, AES = 0.9, 3DES = 0.8,
None = 0.0 },
2. Hosting location with variable type binary and measurement scale nominal
containing the following nominal values: { Europe = 1.0, Asia = 0.9, USA =
0.8 },
3. Response Time with variable type discrete and measurement scale ordinal
descending.
If all settings are plausible, simulations start after clicking the “Execute” button.
Results of simulation runs are written to several files (cf. Figure 6.5). The central
file for each simulation run is _SIMULATION.LOG which is a log generated by the
Java class Logger68. This file documents all steps taken and results generated
during simulations along with timestamps and can thus be used to e. g. reconstruct
all experiments in detail as well as to detect and pinpoint abnormal program
68 Cf. the Java documentation for details: http://docs.oracle.com/javase/6/docs/
api/java/util/logging/Logger.html
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behavior. In order to ease numerical evaluations, all generated results are again
written to individual files which can be separately imported to tools such as SPSS,
MICROSOFT EXCEL and OPENOFFICE CALC. Some of the abbreviations used
in Figure 6.5 refer to auxiliary metrics employed for the numerical evaluations
performed in the scope of this thesis and are covered in Section 7.3.
_SIMULATION.LOG Main log file of each simulation run
General simulation results
_ADF.TXT Fulfillment of user requirements
_HV.TXT Hypervolume of generated solutions
_NORM_L2.TXT Euclidian or L2 norm of function values
_NORM_RMS.TXT RMS norm of function values
_PRICE.TXT Price of generated solutions
_RUNTIME.TXT Runtime of employed algorithm
Results for comparing COMPAGA with other GAs
_CD.TXT Compliance distance of solutions
_ENCRYPTION.TXT Average encryption strength of solutions
_RESPONSETIME.TXT Aggregated response time of solutions
Figure 6.5: Files generated by SSW during simulations
6.2 Application Example
This section briefly describes some typical use cases of SSW. Particularly, the aim
is to give the reader a glimpse on the possibilities offered by SSW although its still
an early step towards a mature product.
6.2.1 Workspace Creation
A workspace in SSW is a container for security assessment models as well as test
data for simulations. Creating a workspace is performed over a self describing
menu entry. After creation, users can provide optional meta information about the
model which solely serves for description purposes (cf. Figure 6.6). As soon as
the workspace is created, users can build QoS and domain models as described in
Section 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 respectively.
In order to perform simulations however, it is necessary to generate test data,
i. e. service alternatives. For this task, SSW provides a separate dialog. After
providing the service class and the maximum price per service, the required
number of service alternatives are generated (cf. Figure 6.7). QoS attribute values
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Figure 6.6: Providing optional meta information for workspaces
of each alternative are chosen randomly from the given range for QoS attributes
employing either ordinal, interval or ratio scales. Similarly, price is randomly
picked from 0 to maximum price which is 5.00 by default. In case of nominal QoS
attributes, one of the defined elements is randomly picked. Effectivity vectors
are also generated randomly for each service alternative. The generated service
alternatives can be viewed and edited afterwards in a separate dialog (cf. Figure
6.8).
Figure 6.7: Generating random service alternatives for simulations
6.2.2 Expressing Requirements and Performing Simulations
SSW supports expressing user requirements at the level of single protection func-
tions and QoS attributes via a separate dialog (cf. Figure 6.9). Requirements
can be specified either manually or generated randomly. These requirements are
subsequently considered during service selection by means of constraints.
When performing simulations, users can choose between two different modes.
The simulation environment presented in Section 6.1.3 considers service selection
as MOO problem without taking any preferences into account with regards to
security objectives. Furthermore, SSW provides users with a different mode which
allows to express preferences regarding single protection functions in order to
reduce the MOO problem to a SOO problem (cf. Section 2.5.4). By default, no pref-
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Figure 6.8: Editing generated service alternatives
Figure 6.9: Dialog for defining user requirements
erences for any objective are given (cf. Figure 6.10). Two icons in the upper right
corner symbolize that in this case the search space is being thoroughly explored
at the cost of exactness. The other supported modes are objective weighting (cf.
Figure 6.11(a)) and lexicographic ordering of objectives (cf. Figure 6.11(b)). In
case of objective weighting, the user needs to define weights for each objective
such that the sum must be 1. In case of lexicographic ordering, the user has to
arrange the objectives with small arrow buttons at the right of each objective. Each
objective is represented with a different coloring. The order in which objectives are
evaluated goes from green to red, i. e. the green objective is evaluated first and the
red objective last. In both cases again two little icons in the upper right corner in-
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form the user that the problem can be solved exactly at the cost of restricted search
space exploration. The sliders which can be seen next to each security objective
allow for expressing requirements with regards to that particular objective. Upper
and lower boundaries of each protection function are determined by inserting
maximum and minimum values respectively for each eij and q1ij.
Figure 6.10: Service selection with no preferences regarding objectives
(a) Objective Weighting (b) Lexicographic Ordering
Figure 6.11: Different methods for expressing preferences regarding objectives
6.3 Discussion
As can be seen, SSW implements the approaches developed in Chapter 5 and hence
fulfills its purpose of being a prototypical implementation for the requirements
discussed in Chapter 4. In order to become a fully featured BPMS however,
SSW would require facilities for the phases design, process enactment as well as
diagnosis of the BPM lifecycle (cf. Section 2.1.1). These steps remain as open tasks
for future version of SSW.
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Two remarks shall be added here regarding the requirements formulated in
Chapter 4. The first remark is about requirement R1 (Completeness). Since SSW
does not yet either support importing process models or modeling processes, all
process models are assumed to be sequential. A methodical consequence is that
currently only one aggregation scheme per QoS attribute is supported. Extending
SSW to support multiple aggregation schemes per QoS attribute is a minor task
from the author’s point of view. The amount of time however which would be
necessary to develop a modeling component or a feature for importing process
models was considered too much for the given timeframe. Hence this feature has
been skipped since without proper process models it would not yield any added
value.
The other remark is about the fulfillment of requirement R3 (Thorough Search
Space Exploration). In its current state, SSW does not implement solving SOO
problems since this is a common feature which does not yield any added value in
the scope of this thesis. However, several Java libraries are available for this task
such as APACHE COMMONS MATH69 and CPLEX OPTIMIZER by IBM70 which
provide implementations for ILP solving algorithms such as Simplex. From the
authors point of view, integrating SSW with these libraries is a straightforward
but nevertheless time consuming task and hence has been skipped in the scope of
this thesis.
6.4 Summary
This chapter presented SSW, a proof of concept implementation for the approaches
introduced and discussed in Chapter 5. It was shown that SSW prototypically
fulfills the requirements identified in Section 4.1. Currently, SSW has two minor
limitations. Firstly, it supports only sequential workflows and hence only one
aggregation scheme per QoS attribute due to a lack of support for real process
models. The other limitation is that in its current state SSW only supports de-
termining Pareto optimal solutions for MOO problems employing GAs up to a
user defined maximum (cf. Section 6.1.3). Solving SOO problems and completely
determining the Pareto front have been skipped in order to focus on features that
yield added value in the scope of this thesis. Since the source code of SSW is
however freely available71, it is to be hoped that these missing features might be
69 http://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-math/
70 http://www.ibm.com/support/entry/portal/product/websphere/ibm_ilog_
cplex_optimization_studio?productContext=-568455760
71 http://www.fatih-karatas.com/projects
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added in the future.
Part III
Evaluation

Chapter 7
Numerical Results
“If you can not measure it, you can not
improve it.”
– LORD KELVIN
T HIS CHAPTER PROVIDES an overview of the simulations conducted in orderto study the performance of COMPAGA. At first an overview is given about
the experimental setup (Section 7.1), employed reference algorithms (Section 7.2)
and some auxiliary metrics utilized in the simulations (Section 7.3). Afterwards
the question of how to choose a meaningful prep is addressed (Section 7.4) before
reporting simulation results (Section 7.5). The chapter is concluded by a brief
summary (Section 7.6).
7.1 Experimental Setup
All experiments reported in this chapter were performed on a machine with a
2.67 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU, 2 GB RAM and running WINDOWS 7 (32 Bit). The
simulation environment is written in Java 1.6 and utilizes the jMetal 4.0 framework
[DN11]. The reference algorithms selected for comparisons (cf. Section 7.2) are
shipping with the framework and were not modified in any way.
Each algorithm was tested with identical simulation settings. The population
size for each algorithm was always 100. Workflow length has been varied from
10 to 50 with a stepping of 10 and for each task a total of 20 service alternatives
were generated. Each test case was evaluated 100 times and each algorithm was
allowed to perform at most 25,000 evaluations. For each test case a workflow
model and service alternatives were generated randomly. Workflow models were
randomly decorated with compliance requirements. For the sake of simplicity,
generated workflows are always sequential and contain at most one time limit
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constraint. Since a combinatorial model has been employed (cf. Section 3.2.4)
this does not lead to any loss of generality. Each task is decorated with a data or
location constraint at a uniform probability which is 33.3% by default (cf. Section
6.1.3).
For all simulations the same QoS model has been utilized containing a total
of eight attributes (cf. Table 7.1). As explained in Section 6.2.1, each service
alternative was generated with a random value in the given interval for each QoS
attribute an with a random price in the interval [0.00, 5.00]. Based on this QoS
model, a total of three domain models were generated with 2, 4 and 6 protection
functions respectively. It should be noted that the QoS model as well as the domain
models are not based on any inquiries but use to some extent arbitrary values and
interdependencies in order to study the properties of COMPAGA unbiased and in
a general fashion.
In order to determine confidence intervals, sample variance s has been em-
ployed since the actual variance σ is unknown. The sample variance is defined as
follows:
s2 =
1
n 1
n¸
i=1
(xi  x¯)2 (7.1)
where n  1 is the sample size, xi the i-th sample value and x¯ the sample’s mean.
A sample’s confidence interval is then given by:[
x¯ t(1 α2 ;n1)
s?
n
; x¯ + t(1 α2 ;n1)
s?
n
]
(7.2)
where n  0 is the sample size, t(1 α2 ;n1) the (1 
α
2 ) quantile of Student’s t-
distribution with n 1 degrees of freedom. A confidence level of 0.95 was consid-
ered as sufficient. Considering 99 degrees of freedom (since every experiment was
repeated 100 times), this leads to a quantile of 1.9842.
With this setup, a total of 15 test cases (5 different workflow lengths and 3
domain models) have been simulated for COMPAGA as well as the reference
algorithms (cf. Section 7.2).
7.2 Reference Algorithms
A number of state-of-the-art MOO algorithms were selected which provide overall
good results for most optimization problems. Besides that, a random approach
was utilized to obtain an approximate baseline for the experiments. Since each
algorithm operates on a certain population of solution candidates, the maximum
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number of elements in PF which can be discovered by any algorithm is de-
termined by the population size (cf. Section 2.5.6). Hence no algorithm gives
a general guarantee to determine PF completely. As already stated, all these
algorithms ship with the jMetal framework and remained unmodified. In the
following a brief overview is given about each algorithm.
Random Approach
This algorithm randomly assigns services to each task. As no evaluation of solu-
tions or improvements are performed, the results of this algorithm form an ap-
proximate baseline which any sophisticated algorithm should outperform. Since
this algorithm does not necessarily deliver feasible solutions, it is not a reference
algorithm in a strict sense. Its only purpose is to give an impression of the limits
of pure random service selection and of the benefits of sophisticated approaches.
IBEA
ZITZLER and KÜNZLI introduced the Indicator-Based Evolutionary Algorithm
(IBEA) which employs a binary quality indicator to compare two potential solution
sets. The fitness of individual solutions is determined by comparing them against
the population employing this indicator [ZK04]. This effectively extends the
dominance relation introduced in Section 2.5.4.
NSGA-II
DEB et al. presented the Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II (NSGA-II)
which employs a fast sorting algorithm to assign individuals to a front. These
fronts are ranked such that a solution in a front dominates all solutions in a front
with a lower rank and is only dominated by solutions in a front with a higher rank.
As soon as all fronts are determined, NSGA-II employs a crowded comparison
approach in order to preserve diversity among the population [DPA+02].
SPEA2
ZITZLER et al. introduced the Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm 2 (SPEA2)
which determines individual fitness based on the number of individuals it dom-
inates as well as the number of individuals by which it is dominated. In order
to preserve diversity in the population, nearest neighbor estimation is utilized.
Furthermore, SPEA2 uses an archive to preserve obtained boundary solutions
[ZLT02].
7.3. AUXILIARY METRICS 179
7.3 Auxiliary Metrics
Some auxiliary metrics have been utilized in the experiments in order to compare
results. Following is an overview and a brief explanation of each metric.
Hypervolume Ratio
In Section 2.5.6 theHV was introduced as an indicator for measuring the quality
of a population of solutions generated by a GA. In order to compare the results of
different GAs for a given MOO problem, it would be however desirable to quantify
the quality of obtained solutions in a normalized interval [0, 1]. This would on
the one hand allow to rank algorithms in terms of efficiency for different MOO
problems. On the other hand, it gives an idea of how well different GAs are able to
explore the search space of a certain MOO problem. Therefore, an auxiliary metric
is constructed as follows. First, the HVs of all employed algorithms for a MOO
problem are merged into a maximumHV which is denotedHVmax. The quality
of a single algorithm β can then be computed by means of the hypervolume ratio
HR as follows [CLV07]:
HRβ =
HV β
HVmax (7.3)
where HVmax  0 such that °HRβ = 1. In other words, HRβ expresses for a
set of algorithms the ratio at which each algorithm explored the search space. In
conjunction with actual solutions this metric allows for a limited reasoning about
the quality of each algorithm in comparison to each other, i. e. if a algorithm was
able to explore more feasible areas than others.
Degree of Fulfillment
In order to determine the quality of obtained solutions with respect to user re-
quirements, a simple measure is constructed. The measure is called Degree of
Fulfillment (DF) and is defined as follows:
DF =
°n
i=1
p fi(Q1)
p fi,req
n
(7.4)
where n  0. Here, p fi,req denotes a user’s requirements regarding p fi. The mea-
sure can compensate underfulfillment of a protection function with overfulfillment
of another and vice versa.
This metric is employed in order to compare the solutions found by different
algorithms against each other. Hence only the ratio of DF as obtained by different
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algorithms is of interest, but not if the actual degree is high or low. For instance, low
values can occur for multiple reasons, e. g. unrealistic requirements, unsuitable
service alternatives or a combination of both. Since in the conducted experiments
all parameters (including user requirements and service alternatives) are generated
randomly, such a situation is very probable.
7.4 Configuring COMPAGA
An important question in the context of COMPAGA was which GA to extend.
The author decided to choose the GA which runs fastest for varying numbers
of protection functions and workflow lengths. Since the repair function will
inevitably increase the runtime of the algorithm, hope was that this would keep
the runtime of the extended GA still comparable to the other reference algorithms.
Hence some initial evaluations were performed in order to study the runtime of
the reference algorithms with respect to different numbers of protection goals and
workflow lengths without considering compliance72. The respective numerical
data can be found in Appendix A.4. As can be seen in Figures 7.1(a) and 7.1(b),
NSGA-II had a runtime which was approximately half the runtime of the other
GAs and slightly higher than the runtime of the random approach. Thus NSGA-II
was chosen as the base algorithm to extend.
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Figure 7.1: Runtime evaluation
In the context of COMPAGA, a question remaining is how to choose prep? As
COMPRepair (cf. Section 5.3.4) affects algorithm runtime, compliance distance
as well asHV , this is not a trivial question. Since COMPAGA is an extension of
72 The results of these initial evaluations have been previously published in [KK13a] and [KFK15].
Here, confidence intervals were added which however cannot be seen due to their narrowness.
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NSGA-II, latter algorithm will be used as reference for measuring these effects. Let
∆Runtime, ∆CD and ∆HV denote the effects of COMPRepair on algorithm runtime,
compliance distance andHV respectively. Normalizing these variables utilizing
the method of ZENG et al. (cf. Section 3.2.3) yields ∆
1
Runtime, ∆
1
CD and ∆
1
HV . Here,
∆Runtime has been considered as ordinal descending and ∆CD and ∆HV as ordinal
ascending. A “good” prep can then be determined by measuring the impact of
these three variables for different probabilities on different workflow lengths and
choosing the “best” value. For this task, the Euclidean distance is calculated for
each case (denoted ηrep) as follows:
ηrep =
b(
∆1Runtime
)2
+
(
∆1CD
)2
+
(
∆1HV
)2 (7.5)
This has been performed for different probabilities prep from 5 to 100 with a
stepping of 5. All other settings were as outlined above. The best value in this case
means max ηrep. Table 7.2 shows the results of these experiments (intermediary
results regarding ∆
1
Runtime, ∆
1
CD and ∆
1
HV can be found in Appendix A.3).
Table 7.2: Simulation results for different probabilities prep
Workflow length
prep 10 20 30 40 50
5% 1.0248 1.0684 1.0809 1.1258 1.1912
10% 1.0116 1.0745 1.0432 0.9817 1.1949
15% 0.9941 1.0107 0.9680 1.0650 1.1687
20% 0.9712 0.9730 1.0033 1.0251 1.1301
25% 0.9535 1.0140 0.9711 0.9950 1.1049
30% 0.9550 1.0064 0.9579 0.9675 1.1223
35% 0.9255 0.9829 0.8895 0.9608 1.0649
40% 0.9236 0.9645 0.7664 0.9244 1.0834
45% 0.9125 0.8883 0.8504 0.9077 1.1474
50% 0.8960 0.9271 0.8424 0.9189 1.1170
55% 0.8846 0.8818 0.8070 0.9180 1.1668
60% 0.8685 0.8751 0.7795 0.9036 1.1913
65% 0.8586 0.8613 0.7260 0.9187 1.2155
70% 0.8484 0.8469 0.7370 0.9569 1.2744
75% 0.8243 0.8202 0.6609 0.9755 1.2895
80% 0.8367 0.8133 0.7460 0.9860 1.3138
85% 0.8107 0.7948 0.7687 0.9899 1.3369
90% 0.8035 0.8070 0.7919 1.0076 1.3636
95% 0.8010 0.8269 0.8196 1.0310 1.3846
100% 0.7981 0.9017 0.9082 1.0529 1.4143
Two trends can be seen:
1. ηrep increases with workflow size and
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2. ηrep generally decreases for increasing prep. However, for workflow lengths
¥ 20 there is a turning point at which ηrep constantly increases for increasing
prep. For workflow lengths 20, 30, 40 and 50 the turning point is at prep =
85%, 75%, 60% and 50% respectively.
The maximum of ηrep = 1.4143 is reached at prep = 100 for a workflow length
of 50 which caught the author by surprise. Rudimentary experiments performed
initially had led to the assumption that ηrep must have a nucleus at about prep = 75.
This was actually the reason for calling COMPRepair probabilistically. However,
this assumption has been disproved by these detailed experiments. Hence, in all
subsequent experiments COMPRepair is called at a probability of prep = 100%.
7.5 Results
A total of five experiments have been conducted over the course of the conducted
numerical evaluations. In the following the main results will be presented by
means of plots. It should be noted that in each plot confidence intervals have also
been charted. Due to their insignificance however, they are not visible in most
cases. The numerical data for all plots can be found in Appendix A.4.
For the sake of readability, the following transformation has been performed
on all simulation results reported in this section. Results for a certain workflow
length are the average over all different numbers of protection goals. Analogously,
results for a different number of protection goals are the average over all different
workflow lengths.
7.5.1 QoS of Service Compositions
The first experiment aimed at investigating how well COMPAGA and state-of-the-
art GAs can handle problem instances in terms of QoS of service compositions.
For this purpose a subset of three QoS attributes was chosen from the model intro-
duced in Section 7.1, namely price, response time (ms) and encryption strength. As
has been stated, each algorithm performed a total of 100 runs per problem instance
(i. e. different workflow length and different number of protection goals). At each
run, the average QoS for all obtained solutions has been determined. For the
numerical analysis finally, the average of all runs for a problem instance has been
calculated. This leads to a total of 15 results per algorithm for different workflow
lengths as well as a different number of protection functions.
Following are the results for QoS of compositions which have been averaged
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over different numbers of protection goals (cf. Figures 7.2(a), 7.3(a) and 7.4(a)) as
well as workflow lengths (cf. Figures 7.2(b), 7.3(b) and 7.4(b)).
 71
 72
 73
 74
 75
 76
 77
 78
 79
 80
2 4 6
Av
er
ag
e 
Pr
ice
Number of Protection Goals
Random
IBEA
NSGA-II
SPEA2
COMPAGA
(a) Price vs. number of protection goals
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
10 20 30 40 50
Av
er
ag
e 
Pr
ice
Workflow Length
Random
IBEA
NSGA-II
SPEA2
COMPAGA
(b) Price vs. workflow length
Figure 7.2: Experimental results: Price
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Figure 7.3: Experimental results: Response time
The results show that the random approach generally delivered the worst
results as expected. A distinct exemption is however price for a low number of
protection goals as well as workflow lengths ¥ 40. In these cases, the random
approach delivered the best results. NSGA-II and SPEA2 often performed very
similar with a major exemption for encryption. For a high number of protection
goals and a workflow length of 10, respective results clearly diverted. IBEA and
COMPAGA fought a neck-and-neck race and generally delivered the best results.
However, there were also some distinct exemptions with regards to a varying
number of protection goals. For instance IBEA performed significantly worse than
COMPAGA with regards to price and a low number of protection goals while
performing significantly better for a high number of protection goals. The same
could be observed for response time at six and for encryption at four protection
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Figure 7.4: Experimental results: Encryption
goals where the results delivered by COMPAGA were significantly better than
those delivered by IBEA.
7.5.2 Compliance Distance
The goal of the second experiment was to study the behavior of the employed
algorithms with regards to compliance distance. That is, the goal was to see the
benefit of COMPAGA compared to the other algorithms. Again, the data has been
averaged for different numbers of protection goals (cf. Figure 7.5(a)) and workflow
lengths (cf. Figure 7.5(b)).
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Figure 7.5: Experimental results: CD
The results were similar to those of the first experiment. The random approach
again delivered the worst results. NSGA-II and SPEA2 again performed very
similar and mediocre with a significant exemption at workflow length 30. At
this length, NSGA-II performed significantly better than SPEA2. From among
the reference algorithms, IBEA performed best but was in every case clearly
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outperformed by COMPAGA which generally delivered the best results. This
proves that the proposed repair operation COMPRepair (cf. Section 5.3.4) works
as expected.
7.5.3 Fulfillment of User Requirements
For this experiment the average DF achieved by the employed algorithms was
compared for different numbers of protection goals (cf. Figure 7.6(a)) and workflow
lengths (cf. Figure 7.6(b)). The goal was to study how well each algorithm was
able to respect user requirements while optimizing a given problem instance. To
support understanding of the results, the numerical data has also been plotted as
histograms presenting the average DF ratio per algorithm (cf. Figures 7.7(a) and
7.7(b)).
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Figure 7.6: Experimental results: ADF
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
2 4 6
AD
F 
R
at
io
Number of Protection Goals
Random
IBEA
NSGA-II
SPEA2
COMPAGA
(a) ADF Ratio vs. number of protection goals
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
10 20 30 40 50
AD
F 
R
at
io
Workflow length
Random
IBEA
NSGA-II
SPEA2
COMPAGA
(b) ADF Ratio vs. workflow length
Figure 7.7: Histograms of ADF Ratios
The results of IBEA were found to be superior to the results of the other algo-
rithms, especially in case of more than 2 protection goals and for workflow lengths
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¥ 20. While the superiority was observed to increase with an increasing number
of protection goals, it was found to stay roughly equal for increasing workflow
lengths. COMPAGA, NSGA-II and SPEA2 performed similarly mediocre. Again
at workflow lengths 30 a sudden increase in the quality of results obtained by
NSGA-II can be observed. To the best of the author’s knowledge however, no
convincing explanation could be found for this strange behavior. The same holds
for a sudden decrease of the performance of COMPAGA at workflow length 40.
As expected, the random approach generally performed worst and was clearly
outperformed by all other algorithms.
The numerical results have been compared to the L2 or Euclidean norm as
well as the Root Mean Square (RMS) norm of the function values obtained in the
simulations. As can be seen in the Figures 7.8 and 7.9, the results are similar to the
numerical data obtained by computing the average DF, however with different
value ranges. Hence the trend which has been indicated by the average DF is
being confirmed by both the L2 and the RMS norm.
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Figure 7.8: Experimental results: L2 norm
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Figure 7.9: Experimental results: RMS norm
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7.5.4 Exploration and Exploitation of Objective Space
In this experiment, at first the HV was calculated for each solution obtained by
the algorithms. The obtained HV has been averaged for different numbers of
protection goals and workflow lengths (cf. Appendix A.4 for the numerical data).
Based on this data,HR was calculated, again for different numbers of protection
goals (cf. Figure 7.10(a)) and workflow lengths (cf. Figure 7.10(b)). It should be
noted that the actual numerical results themselves have little meaning for the
conducted experiment, i. e. if they are high or low. What is important however is
their ratio towards each other since this tells how well each algorithm was able to
explore the search space.
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Figure 7.10: Experimental results: HR
The HR measure reveals that in case of more than 2 protection goals, IBEA
clearly outperforms all algorithms. COMPAGA, NSGA-II and SPEA2 performed
approximately equally well while the random approach delivered the worst results.
Although NSGA-II experiences a sudden increase in performance at six protection
goals, this does not change observed trends. The behavior of the algorithms for
different workflow lengths however draws a slightly different picture. In this case,
IBEA and SPEA2 fight a neck-and-neck race while NSGA-II sometimes comes
close to them. The performance of COMPAGA was mediocre and subject to great
fluctuations which can be seen very clearly using theHRmeasure. The random
approach again performed worst.
7.5.5 Runtime
The fifth and final experiment was a classical runtime analysis measured in mil-
liseconds (ms). Each algorithm was studied with regards to different numbers of
protection goals (cf. Figure 7.11(a)) and workflow lengths (cf. Figure 7.11(b)).
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Figure 7.11: Experimental results: Runtime
Results for the different perspectives, i. e. numbers of protection goals and
workflow length, were quite similar for the reference algorithms and different for
COMPAGA. Generally, the random approach was among the fastest. NSGA-II
lived up its reputation of being very fast as its runtime was always close to the
runtime of the random approach. SPEA2 was among the slowest algorithms while
IBEA usually performed a bit faster. Results for COMPAGA were quite different.
The average performance for a varying number of protection goals put COMPAGA
among the slowest with a sudden decrease of runtime at 6 protection goals which
made it one of the fastest in this case. It seems that on average there were only few
compliant and feasible solutions for problem instances with 6 protection functions,
independently from the workflow length. Hence, the repair operation could not
find any suiting services for replacement which caused the runtime of COMPAGA
to drop to the level of NSGA-II. This theory is being supported by data for HR
(cf. Section 7.5.4) as well as CD (cf. Section 7.5.2) which are the lowest from all
GAs in this case. However, CD is not 0 which means that COMPAGA was not
able to find suiting service alternatives to further reduce it. On the contrary, the
average performance of COMPAGA for different workflow lengths generally put
it among the fastest algorithms with a sudden and dramatic increase of runtime
at workflow length 50. Contrary to the former extreme, there seemed to be much
more compliant solutions on average in this case. Taking a look again atHR and
CD, this position can be supported. HR is among the highest from all GAs while
CD is 0 for workflow length 50 and ¡ 0 for workflow lengths 30 and 40.
7.5.6 Summary of Results
Compared to the reference algorithms, COMPAGA delivers solutions with slightly
better QoS properties, especially with regards to response time. Latter is not
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surprising since response time is explicitly minimized by COMPRepair when
selecting alternative services during repair operations. The compliance distance
of the solutions delivered by COMPAGA was the lowest from all algorithms and
always close to 0, even for a high number of protection goals and for big workflow
models. On the contrary, consideration of user requirements was only below
average. Due to the strong alignment of COMPAGA to compliance, search space
exploration and exploitation was also below average. With respect to runtime
it could be observed that COMPAGA is able to quickly find solutions, but also
that the runtime can increase disproportionately in some cases. It was found that
the number of protection goals generally had an impact on the QoS of obtained
solutions with COMPAGA. Average DF was subject to fluctuations in the face of
varying workflow length. Similarly, runtime was also subject to several fluctua-
tions for both different numbers of protection goals as well as different workflow
lengths which seems to be caused by sudden changes in the necessary effort to
repair a solution.
7.6 Summary
This chapter gave an overview of the simulations performed in order to evaluate
COMPAGA. It introduced the experimental setup, the reference algorithms against
which COMPAGA was compared and defined some auxiliary metrics which were
used for evaluation purposes. Furthermore, the question of choosing an appropri-
ate prep has been addressed. To the author’s surprise and in contradiction to earlier
preliminary studies, a probability of prep = 100% proved to be the best solution.
Hence COMPAGA was configured with this value for the subsequent simulations.
The results proved that COMPAGA indeed solves the task it was primarily de-
signed for, namely reducing compliance distance of service compositions much
better than other GAs. However it was also revealed that, although the current
state is very promising, it also leaves room for several improvements, namely
more thorough objective space exploration and exploitation, better consideration
of user requirements and a more constant algorithm runtime.
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Chapter 8
Case Study
“In theory, theory and practice are the same.
In practice, they are not”
– ALBERT EINSTEIN
T HE CASE STUDY presented in this chapter originates from the EU FP7 projectdi.me73. It represents a special case with regards to the approach presented
in Section 5.2 since only a single service is selected instead of multiple. Com-
pliance aspects were not considered. Hence this case study is cited in order to
demonstrate how a security assessment model can be defined by experts using
the methods presented in Chapter 5. Any numerical analyses have been omitted.
In the following, at first a brief overview is given of the di.me project (Section 8.1).
Afterwards the QoS (Section 8.2) and domain model (Section 8.3) for di.me are
being presented before shortly presenting the modified service selection algorithm
(Section 8.4). A summary concludes this chapter (Section 8.5).
8.1 Background
The di.me project aims for integrating personal data in a personal information
sphere, providing a single, user-controlled point of access. This user-controlled
server, the so called Personal Service (PS), is integrating information from several
existing online social networks and implements intelligent features like seman-
tic reasoning and privacy advisory in order to support users in managing their
personal information (cf. Figure 8.1) [SGH+11; TBG+12].
Besides the integration of existing networks and services, di.me provides its
73 http://www.dime-project.eu/
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Figure 8.1: The big picture of di.me
own Online Social Network (OSN) functionalities not covered by any known
alternative (e. g. multiple online identities, or network anonymity). Targeted are
several user groups:
1. Business event visitors
2. CRM users and
3. Private individuals
For each user group a dedicated scenario was defined74. Important for each
scenario is the ease of deployment of di.me servers for lay as well as experienced
users. The case study reported in this chapter was especially motivated by the use
cases deploying a new PS and moving to a new PS (e. g. migration).
8.2 QoS Model
In order to chose a fitting service provider for deploying a single-user server or
to find an existing multi-tenant server meeting the users’ security requirements,
several different QoS properties need to be considered. These properties were
identified following the AFFINE methodology [BBH+10] which enforces the earlier
74 Detailed scenario descriptions can be found on the project website: http://www.dime-
project.eu
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consideration of multilateral security requirements along with other nonfunctional
requirements (i. e. usability) during the design and development process. In the
following, the identified QoS properties are presented in detail and it is discussed
why they are of special relevance for the di.me setting.
Response Time
Response time refers to the total time passing between a request sent to the server
and the arrival of the response. This value is influenced by several factors (e. g.
distance to communication partners, complexity of internal processes, connection
capabilities, dedicated RAM, CPU power, etc.). This time is of different importance
for different di.me use cases. For instance, it is very important for processes where a
user is actively involved, but otherwise of minor relevance when doing automated
background processes or asynchronous communication (e. g. a delay of 3-5 sec for
sending an E-Mail could be tolerated, but not in the case of a user browsing data
with his client).
Storage Strategy
Different hosting facilities use different storage technologies (e. g. RAID), which
has influence on the (physical) security of data but also on response time as well
as integrity.
Downtime
Downtime is referring to the average time a server is not available per year. Since
di.me is a strongly decentralized environment, downtime of a few servers would
not harm the whole network, but only single users. A server being offline would
mean in the best case (for a single-user deployment) the absence of the data of a
single user. In case of multi-tenant deployments this would harm more users, but
still less than in a centralized environment.
Single-User-Deployment
A single-user-deployment is a special kind of deployment, where a user has
his/her own server. It requires of course a little more administrative work, but
also offers complete control over the server and stored personal data. Besides the
single-user deployment, there is also the option to use an existing multi-tenant
deployment (offered by companies or expert users) to store personal information.
Network Anonymity
Since di.me supports multiple digital identities, which could be pseudonyms
intended to be unlinkable, supporting anonymity on the network level is an
important requirement [BHW+12]. Depending on the hosting facility, it may
194 CHAPTER 8. CASE STUDY
not be possible to use Tor75 or proxied connections and to create Tor hidden
services. Therefore this requirement is very important in order to support all di.me
functionalities.
Hosting Country
Legal obligations of the country the server is located in is an important factor
to be considered. For example, the USA PATRIOT ACT (U.S. H.R. 3162) of the
U.S. government enforces hosting facilities and service providers located on U.S.
ground to give access to the authorities. This is contradicting to some national
data protection laws, e. g. as employed by the member states of the European
Union76. Another legal obligation of interest is the Russian Bill on Child Protection
Law77, which came into effect on November 1st, 2012 and puts heavy penalties,
including blocking Internet access and heavy fines, on Internet users who use
anonymizer and filter-bypass tools (e. g., proxies, VPN). In order to keep private
data stored on such servers confidential, additional encryption mechanisms need
to be used. Besides legal issues, of course also the physical distance to the server
may have minor consequences for the response time.
Number of Users
The number of users located on the same server is only of relevance for a multi-
tenant deployment. It can have two different consequences: on the one hand, a
large number of users can be of benefit for a single user’s anonymity as the IP is no
longer a reliable identifier. On the other hand, a PS with a large number of users
providing a low downtime might be an indicator for a general stable system and
good (administrative) support.
Antivirus
The existence of facilities for detecting viruses is important for user content (up-
loaded and shared data) and also at the level of the operating system where the
di.me server is deployed.
Data Backup Interval
A small backup interval results in a higher availability (and restorability) of data.
But it also has to be considered, that it is duplicating all personal files somewhere,
maybe causing an information leak. So the backup strategy needs to be considered,
75 https://www.torproject.org
76 Cf. the EU Directive for Data Protection 2012 (DRAFT)
77 Cf. Amendment to the Child Protection Act, passed on July 16th, 2012 and amended on
September 21st, 2012 (Bill No. 89417-6).
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too.
Data Storage Encryption
Complete encryption of stored data can be a requirement for some users, especially
when using a (Cloud-) provider not located in the EU (cf. also Hosting Country).
Strong encryption mechanisms may also influence the performance, e. g. in terms
of response time.
Based on evaluations performed by experts from the di.me team, for each of these
QoS properties the type, range and utility scores for nominal properties have been
identified. The result was a QoS model following the method presented in Section
5.2.1 (cf. Table 8.1).
Table 8.1: QoS properties for hosting a di.me Private Service
QoS property Type Range of Values Utility Score
Response Time discrete 1-5000(ms) -
Storage Strategy
nominal, RAID 0 1
enumeration RAID 1 1
RAID 5 2
Downtime discrete 0-525600 -(minutes/year)
Single-User Deployment binary 0 01 1
Network anonymity
nominal, none 0
enumeration proxy 1
Tor 2
Hosting Country nominal, EU-Country 3
(legal issues) enumeration Germany 4
US 1
Russia 1
China 1
Number of users discrete 1-1000 -
Antivirus for uploaded files binary 0 01 1
Antivirus for system files binary 0 01 1
Data backup interval
nominal, no backup 0
enumeration once a day 3
once a week 2
once a month 1
Data Storage Encryption binary 0 01 1
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8.3 Domain Model
In the course of intense discussions, the experts from the di.me team decided
to consider the classical CIA triangle of security objectives, i. e. Confidentiality,
Availability and Integrity. The influence of the single QoS attributes on these secu-
rity objectives has been determined based on discussions with Table 8.2 showing
the results. Each entry represents a weighting factor and in accordance with the
method presented in Section 5.2.2.1, the sum of the weightings in each column
must be 1. The corresponding protection functions can be seen in (8.1)-(8.3).
Table 8.2: Influence of QoS attributes on security objectives in di.me
QoS property Confidentiality Integrity Availability(Weight)
Response Time (w1) 0.0 0.0 0.3
Storage Strategy (w2) 0.0 0.4 0.3
Downtime (w3) 0.0 0.1 0.4
Single-User-Deployment (w4) 0.1 0.0 0.0
Network Anonymity (w5) 0.3 0.0 0.0
Hosting Country (w6) 0.2 0.0 0.0
Number of Users (w7) 0.1 0.0 0.0
Antivirus (w8) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Data Backup Interval (w9) 0.0 0.3 0.0
Data Storage Encryption (w10) 0.3 0.2 0.0
p fC = 0.3Q14 + 0.3Q15 + 0.2Q16 + 0.1Q17 + 0.3Q110 (8.1)
p f I = 0.4Q12 + 0.1Q13 + 0.3Q19 + 0.2Q110 (8.2)
p fA = 0.3Q11 + 0.3Q12 + 0.4Q13 (8.3)
In order to define interdependencies between protection functions, another
round of discussions has been performed based on the protection functions de-
fined in the first round. As a result of these discussions, the expert group came to
the conclusion that confidentiality measures have a weakening impact on avail-
ability whereas integrity measures have a slightly strengthening effect. In case of
integrity, the experts came to the conclusion that confidentiality measures have
a much stronger strengthening effect than integrity on availability. The defined
interdependencies between the protection functions along with the strengthening
and weakening factors were as follows:
p fA1 = p fA  0.5  p fC + 0.1  p f I (8.4)
p f I1 = p f I + 0, 8  p fC (8.5)
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8.4 Selecting the Best Deployment Option
To measure how well a deployment option fulfills user requirements, again the
DF measure has been employed (cf. Section 7.3). Selection is performed with a
simple algorithm (cf. Algorithm 8.1) which compares all available alternatives
against the user requirements in terms of DF in linear time. The algorithm returns
the index of the deployment option with maximum DF which is subsequently
proposed to the user.
Algorithm 8.1: getBestDeploymentOption( req, options )
1 index := –1;
2 maxDF := –8;
3 for j := 0 to length( options ) do
4 currentDF := computeDF( req, optionsj );
5 if currentDF ¡ maxDF then
6 maxDF := currentDF;
7 index := j;
8 end
9 end
10 return index;
8.5 Summary
This chapter presented a real world example from the di.me project in which the
proposed approach has been adapted. It was shown how the approach has been
used to construct a security assessment model by a group of experts. Since the
di.me project does not need to evaluate service compositions but different deploy-
ment options for the di.me userware, modifications to the proposed approach
had to be performed with regards to the selection algorithm. In this case a full
enumeration is performed utilizing the DF measure introduced in Section 7.3 to
assess different deployment options. Afterwards the deployment option with the
highest DF is picked and proposed to the user.
198 CHAPTER 8. CASE STUDY
Part IV
Finale

Chapter 9
Conclusion & Outlook
“Every new beginning comes from some other
beginning’s end.”
– Attributed to SENECA
T HE FINAL CHAPTER at first summarizes the major contributions of this thesis(Section 9.1) before addressing some open questions which arose during the
research (Section 9.2). Next an overview is given about complementary research
which might use the work at hand as starting point (Section 9.3). Finally, the thesis
closes with some general considerations on the current state and the future of
service composition (Section 9.4).
9.1 Contributions
In the following the contributions of this work are being summarized with regards
to the research questions as defined in Section 1.2.
Research Question 1 What are the requirements for a method for service
composition with respect to interdependent security and compliance?
A total of six requirements have been identified in the course of this work, based
on a literature review as well as considerations on pros and cons of different
approaches to composition. It was identified that such a method at first needs
to be complete, i. e. it needs to support all relevant composition patterns in the
context of business process modeling. Furthermore, the approach should be able
to consider multiple QoS attributes, either general or domain-specific. With
regards to service selection, the search space should be explored thoroughly by
default without prioritizing any QoS attributes over others, except if the decision
201
202 CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK
maker decides otherwise. Mathematically this means formulating service selection
as MOO problem by default and transforming it to a SOO problem in case the
decision maker is able to formulate preferences. In order to be useful for real-
world scenarios, the approach has to be efficient. For service selection as a MOO
problem this means utilizing (meta-)heuristics such as GAs in order to obtain
near-optimal solutions in polynomial time. Finally, such as method obviously
must consider interdependent security objectives and be compliance-aware. A
literature survey in the field of service composition revealed that interdependent
security has not been covered yet. Compliance-awareness per se was also found
to be a research gap. However, some approaches were found to have the potential
to partly cover compliance aspects in service selection, particularly with regards
to time limits. All reviewed approaches for service selection were found to only
partly cover thorough search space exploration. Particularly, approaches either
consider SOO or MOO problems, but do not consider transforming the problem
from one representation to the other. Less than half of the approaches surveyed
were found to be complete in terms of composition patterns while most works
support multiple QoS attributes and employ efficient selection mechanisms.
Research Question 2 How can interdependent security objectives be
assessed in service composition?
An approach has been presented which utilizes the concept of structural decom-
position introduced by WANG and WULF for assessing security of systems. The
assessment is based on the influence of single QoS properties on a security goal as
determined by domain experts using decision making tools such as AHP [WW97].
Such a utility function assessing the fulfillment of a single security goal is called a
protection function here. This basic model has been extended in order to cover
the structures of interdependent security (namely strengthening, weakening and
implicating relationships) which have been first described by WOLF and PFITZ-
MANN [WP00]. In case of strengthening and weakening relationships between
security goals, the proposed method relies on estimations by domain experts. For
implicating relationships, a plausibility check is performed in order to guarantee
the validity of modeled implication. In its current form however, the proposed
method does not allow for cyclic dependencies between protection functions. Fur-
thermore, in case of implicating relationships, protection functions must not have
a predecessor. The result of the proposed modeling approach is a MOO problem
which can be tackled with standard tools for optimization such as GAs. Since
GAs are frequently used in service selection, the proposed approach is compatible
to the greatest possible extent with established methods for QoS-aware service
selection and hence can be used to retrofit existing systems for service composition.
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The possibility to formulate constraints on protection functions corresponds to the
notion of “good enough security” proposed by SANDHU [San03].
Research Question 3 How can compliance be verified in service composi-
tion?
Based on the notion of compliance distance which was first introduced by SADIQ
et al. [SGN07], a method has been developed to track and record services in a
composition that violate compliance requirements. Furthermore, a custom repair
method has been presented and discussed that utilizes this information in order
to exchange these services in an attempt to make the composition compliant again.
Since GAs are frequently used for service selection, it has been shown how to
extend existing algorithms with these methods in a drop-in fashion to make them
compliance-aware. This approach has been demonstrated with NSGA-II which
led to a new algorithm called COMPAGA. This algorithm further performs an
initial feasibility check to see if there exists at least one compliant solution without
considering user requirements. If this is not the case, COMPAGA aborts. However,
a positive feasibility check is no guarantee that a solution exists which satisfies
compliance as well as user requirements.
Research Question 4 What are the impacts of considering interdependent
security and compliance on service composition?
Initial studies of problem instances on interdependent security with reference
algorithms showed that NSGA-II delivers results the fastest. Based on these
results, NSGA-II has been extended to COMPAGA and subsequently simulations
have been performed on problem instances considering compliance. The results
showed that COMPAGA is able to clearly reduce the compliance distance of service
compositions. However, objective space exploration and exploitation are not as
good as for the reference algorithms. The same holds for consideration of user
requirements. The runtime of COMPAGA proved to be subject to disproportional
fluctuations. Different numbers of protection goals were found to have an impact
on QoS of obtained solutions as well as on algorithm runtime. On the other
hand, different workflow lengths led to fluctuations in terms of average DF and
algorithm runtime. Hence, the results show that with respect to considering
interdependent security and compliance, COMPAGA is a viable first step which
however yields room for improvement.
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9.2 Open Questions
Open questions can be categorized into two distinct groups, namely regarding
the proposed approach for assessing interdependent security (cf. Section 5.2) and
for compliance-aware service selection with COMPAGA (cf. Section 5.3). In the
following these questions and their implications on the work at hand will be
discussed.
Assessing Interdependent Security of Service Compositions
Currently assessment is being performed on a global scope, i. e. for a service
composition as a whole. The question of how this global view can be combined
with a local view remains open. Such a local view would enable decision makers
to either replace single services in a composition which do not provide a certain
minimum of security or to remodel the underlying business process if no suiting
service alternatives exist at all.
Another question remains regarding the basic model employed for assessing
interdependent security. Since it relies on protection functions which need to be
modeled by domain experts, there always exists the danger that these functions
do not adequately reflect reality. Hence an open question remains how such
protection functions can be validated with formal methods. Since to the best of
the author’s knowledge there exists no formal security model which considers
interdependence effects in a general fashion, this question is considered a major
challenge.
Compliance-Aware Service Selection with COMPAGA
As has been demonstrated in Section 5.3.2, the proposed feasibility check can
guarantee that either none or at least one compliant solution exists for a given pro-
cess model and service alternatives. However if a compliant solution also fulfills
user requirements, is another question. In case of a few compliant solutions, this
question can be answered by checking them against the requirements using e. g.
full enumeration. However in case of “big” search spaces with maybe hundreds
of compliant solutions, this decision becomes an optimization problem on its own.
Hence the question arises how this problem can be modeled and efficiently be
solved and what the adjective “big” exactly means in this context.
Another question with regards to COMPAGA is what might be the impact of
using custom genetic operators for selection, crossover and mutation instead of
general-purpose implementations? Due to the No Free Lunch Theorems of WOLPERT
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and MACREADY it is justified to assume that custom operators will have a positive
impact on the performance of COMPAGA [WM97].
In this thesis it was assumed that compliance requirements on single tasks are
binary, i. e. they either apply or do not. Often however, compliance requirements
are more complex and offer a certain degree of freedom. In simple cases, this
freedom consists of a choice between multiple alternatives. More complex com-
pliance requirements allow certain actions only if a certain set of prerequisites is
fulfilled. Modeling such complex requirements needs a more expressive language
and subsequently raises the need to consider them during service selection. Hence
it remains open
a) how such complex requirements might be modeled,
b) how these requirements can be transformed into a problem formulation and
c) how the resulting optimization problem can be solved efficiently.
Finally, it remains open how compliance-aware service selection can be ex-
tended to cover the full business process lifecycle. As has been discussed in Section
2.4, considering all compliance aspects requires service selection to be flanked
with modeling and monitoring techniques. The author expects such a holistic view
to yield synergy effects which might be utilized by sophisticated approaches for
BPM. Hence the question is how such a holistic approach needs to be designed in
order to reap maximum benefits.
9.3 Complementary Research
In this work several assumptions have been made regarding service composition
for the sake of simplification (cf. Section 3.2.1). In particular, it was assumed that
all services within a service class have uniform interfaces, i. e. that types, naming
and ordering of input and output parameters are equal. However, in real settings
this is rarely the case. Hence additional research is required to appropriately model
heterogeneous service interfaces. For the selection process this effectively means
that the search space can be restricted to those combinations which are functionally
valid in terms of interfaces. For some business processes this might even mean that
no concrete sequence of services exists which can implement the process. Similarly,
consideration of heterogeneous data is a direction which requires more research.
In the literature about business process compliance (including this thesis),
the notion of location is solely being used in a geographic sense. Due to the
globalization of the economy however, such a view is not adequate. As an example
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consider multi-national corporations such as GOOGLE and AMAZON. Although
their services are hosted in multiple countries, they are primarily subject to US
law. Hence, although their service offerings are also being hosted in the EU, the
services do not always comply with EU law. Hence further research is necessary
to answer the question, how the notion of location needs to be extended in this
context in order to cover these aspect of multi-national service providers.
Currently, the influence of single QoS attributes on protection functions in
terms of factor weightings is being determined by domain experts employing
decision support tools such as AHP. Major corporations however usually employ
risk models for assessing the security of their IT infrastructure. In Germany, the
risk analysis method of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) is being commonly used [BSI08]. Hence an interesting and important research
direction would be to bridge the gap between the model proposed in this thesis
and risk models. Particularly, the aim of this research would be to deduct factor
weightings from risk models already established by corporations. This might not
only strengthen the basis of the proposed approach, but also foster its adoption by
real world corporations.
As previously stated in Chapter 6, SSW is not intended to be a mature product
but a proof of concept. However, in order to enable a broad adoption of tools for
service composition which implement the approaches presented in this thesis, it is
necessary to perform further research. This research needs to focus on how service
composition can be best supported by tools. Ideally such tool support should span
the whole BPM lifecycle in order to benefit from synergy effects. An interesting
question in this context is how such tools might foster the utilization of progressive
optimization methods for service selection. Optimization methods such as STEM
and SEMOPS usually require several steps of interaction with the decision maker
but generally lead to “better” results from a user’s perspective [CLV07]. Up to
now however, there is to the best of the author’s knowledge a lack of tool support
for service composition with progressive optimization methods. Hence a study
on the impact of progressive optimization methods on the quality of obtained
solutions in service composition is necessary to develop an understanding about
the utility of such methods for this field of study.
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9.4 Final Remarks
“One more special message to go,
and then I’m done and I can go home.”
– NIRVANA
This work proposed initial approaches to bridge the gap between service com-
position on the one hand and interdependent security as well as compliance on
the other hand. Since an increasing number of apparently monolithic services are
actually composed of more fine-grained components, considering these aspects
becomes crucial for organizations. The trend towards business processes which
one day shall (partly) configure themselves autonomously based on a (formal)
description from a set of single single services, further increases the importance of
these topics. It shall not be concealed here that it is still a long way to go until this
goal is achieved, especially since today business processes are still being imple-
mented “traditionally” (i. e. manually). Hence a paradigm shift in society seems to
be inevitable to prepare the ground for a broad adoption of service composition by
organizations. Even though it may still be a long time from now until this change
takes place, several approaches addressing topics related to service composition
have already been proposed for the time after. This thesis contains two of them.
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Appendices

Appendix A
Support Materials
The materials presented here provide further details to topics that would have
otherwise exceeded the scope of this thesis. They are intended to support the
argumentation of sections referencing them.
A.1 Mapping of Composition Patterns from BPMN
to BPEL
In the following it will be presented how to express the CPs presented in Section
3.2.2 as BPEL 2.0 statements. This is particularly important for model-driven
transformations of BPMN process models to executable BPEL code. Due to the
scope of the language however, all details cannot be covered here. Instead the
interested reader is referred to the corresponding specification (cf. [OAS07]). With
the available language constructs of BPEL 2.0 however, discriminators (CPs 5 and
7) cannot be expressed.
Sequence (CP 1)
For representing sequences, BPEL offers the sequence element. All activities
within this element are performed in the order of their appearance (cf. Listing
A.1).
Listing A.1: Sequence in BPEL
1 <sequence>
2 ...
3 </sequence>
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Loop (CP 2)
BPEL offers two alternatives for expressing loops. The first alternative is the
while element which first evaluates a termination condition before executing the
loop (cf. Listing A.2). The second alternative is the repeatUntil element which
works in reverse order, i. e. execution before evaluation (cf. Listing A.3) and thus
corresponds to a do-while loop known from languages such as C++ and Java.
Listing A.2: Loop in BPEL: Alternative 1
1 <while>
2 <condition>...</condition>
3 ...
4 </while>
Listing A.3: Loop in BPEL: Alternative 2
1 <repeatUntil>
2 ...
3 <condition>...</condition>
4 </repeatUntil>
XOR-Split followed by XOR-join (CP 3)
This pattern can be expressed in BPEL using the if, elseif and else elements
which represent conditional branching as known from plenty of programming
languages (cf. Listing A.4)
Listing A.4: Representing XOR-split and join in BPEL
1 <if>
2 <condition>...</condition>
3 ...
4 <elseif>
5 <condition>...</condition>
6 ...
7 </elseif>
8 <else>
9 ...
10 </else>
11 </if>
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AND-split followed by AND-join (CP 4)
BPEL defines the flow element which allows to group several activities. It com-
pletes only after all enclosed activities have been completed (cf. Listing A.5).
Listing A.5: Representing AND-split and join in BPEL
1 <flow>
2 ...
3 </flow>
OR-split followed by OR-join (CP 6)
This pattern is not directly supported by means of a dedicated element in BPEL.
However, it can be constructed by nesting one or more link elements in a flow
element. A link element defines one or more conditional transitions between
activities. Depending on the formulation of these conditions, one or more can be
true at any time which corresponds to the OR-pattern (cf. Listing A.6).
Listing A.6: Representing OR-split and join in BPEL
1 <flow>
2 <links>
3 <link name="link-name" />
4 </links>
5 <receive>
6 <sources>
7 <source linkName="link-name">
8 <transitionCondition>
9 ...
10 </transitionCondition>
11 </source>
12 </sources>
13 </receive>
14 <invoke>
15 <targets>
16 <target linkName="link-name" />
17 </targets>
18 </invoke>
19 </flow>
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A.2 Comparison of Related Works on QoS-aware Ser-
vice Selection
Table A.1 gives details about state-of-the-art approaches for QoS-aware service
selection which have been discussed in Chapter 4. The respective works have been
classified with respect to utilized problem modeling and solving approaches.
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A.3 Intermediary Results for Determining prep
This appendix shows all intermediary data which lead to the results presented
in Table 7.2 (cf. Section 7.4). Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4 show the raw results for
∆Runtime, ∆CD and ∆HV while Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7 show normalized data.
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Table A.2: Simulation results: ∆Runtime
Workflow length
prep 10 20 30 40 50
5% 10.1000 25.7500 19.5500 15.1200 24.6700
10% 15.8100 30.3300 42.5700 113.5300 49.0100
15% 25.5000 72.8600 95.3400 68.4200 77.3000
20% 36.2200 94.3800 77.1400 98.9500 126.4200
25% 45.5000 73.5500 96.2400 125.2000 169.3100
30% 44.0100 80.0800 111.5800 149.5100 181.0600
35% 58.0100 92.7500 147.1400 162.9300 244.5000
40% 58.5000 105.7500 233.7300 200.2700 270.1700
45% 65.0000 148.3500 183.4500 223.0800 273.0500
50% 72.4000 127.8700 185.6600 230.4100 326.8600
55% 77.9100 149.5700 211.3500 255.3400 335.1900
60% 84.7000 154.7400 233.0200 296.1000 379.7700
65% 89.4000 164.4600 260.0000 298.1600 371.3800
70% 94.2000 172.6500 265.6200 301.4900 390.3900
75% 106.2200 190.1200 341.2200 315.6100 399.2400
80% 98.7000 200.9100 287.5700 321.5200 410.4300
85% 112.5000 210.2000 285.3000 342.6300 436.9100
90% 115.6000 215.7900 296.3800 354.0300 444.6900
95% 117.0000 224.5900 302.8400 363.7700 508.6100
100% 116.1000 214.3900 298.3800 404.1100 501.3700
Table A.3: Simulation results: ∆CD
Workflow length
prep 10 20 30 40 50
5% 0.0400 0.7273 0.6644 1.3507 5.3227
10% 0.0600 0.8356 0.7580 1.7482 6.3689
15% 0.6600 0.9333 0.9140 2.2569 6.7379
20% 0.1400 0.9472 1.0268 2.4516 7.3571
25% 0.2200 0.9911 1.1766 2.6339 7.8746
30% 0.1900 1.0323 1.1600 2.8486 8.4202
35% 0.3200 1.0623 1.3539 3.1590 8.6091
40% 0.1100 1.2073 1.3785 3.6401 9.2206
45% 0.4700 1.2288 1.5862 3.8887 10.1885
50% 0.7100 1.3032 1.7227 4.2001 10.2516
55% 0.3800 1.3544 1.8094 4.5265 10.9234
60% 0.4900 1.4044 1.9732 4.9149 11.4796
65% 0.6400 1.4867 2.0631 5.1512 11.6275
70% 0.9400 1.6075 2.4701 5.7129 12.2961
75% 0.9300 1.6728 2.7985 5.9181 12.4901
80% 0.9100 1.8007 3.2515 6.0735 12.6541
85% 1.2400 2.0021 3.7553 6.3336 12.9351
90% 1.3000 2.2757 4.3965 6.4709 13.0779
95% 1.4500 2.6310 4.9203 6.5891 13.1803
100% 1.7700 3.0549 5.4107 6.7100 13.2985
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Table A.4: Simulation results: ∆HV
Workflow length
prep 10 20 30 40 50
5% -0.0196 0.0692 0.0705 0.1006 0.1152
10% -0.0234 0.0819 0.0739 0.1133 0.1262
15% -0.0227 0.0910 0.0881 0.1182 0.1302
20% -0.0242 0.0905 0.0906 0.1237 0.1377
25% -0.0236 0.0944 0.0904 0.1296 0.1451
30% -0.0260 0.0970 0.1000 0.1336 0.1512
35% -0.0301 0.0955 0.0921 0.1384 0.1534
40% -0.0314 0.0975 0.0989 0.1419 0.1623
45% -0.0294 0.0934 0.1030 0.1461 0.1741
50% -0.0349 0.0965 0.0991 0.1531 0.1781
55% -0.0339 0.0895 0.1006 0.1636 0.1902
60% -0.0399 0.0904 0.1017 0.1720 0.2009
65% -0.0422 0.0912 0.0919 0.1769 0.2084
70% -0.0470 0.0895 0.0984 0.1885 0.2267
75% -0.0479 0.0896 0.1017 0.2002 0.2313
80% -0.0529 0.0949 0.1093 0.2050 0.2425
85% -0.0559 0.0905 0.1130 0.2099 0.2511
90% -0.0599 0.1006 0.1221 0.2197 0.2629
95% -0.0631 0.1163 0.1315 0.2316 0.2752
100% -0.1087 0.1465 0.1673 0.2491 0.2884
Table A.5: Normalized simulation results: ∆
1
Runtime
Workflow length
prep 10 20 30 40 50
5% 1.0000 0.9686 0.9810 0.9899 0.9708
10% 0.9885 0.9594 0.9349 0.7965 0.9219
15% 0.9691 0.8741 0.8290 0.8830 0.8652
20% 0.9476 0.8309 0.8655 0.8218 0.7667
25% 0.9290 0.8727 0.8272 0.7691 0.6806
30% 0.9320 0.8596 0.7964 0.7203 0.6571
35% 0.9039 0.8342 0.7251 0.6934 0.5298
40% 0.9029 0.8081 0.5514 0.6185 0.4783
45% 0.8899 0.7227 0.6523 0.5728 0.4725
50% 0.8750 0.7638 0.6478 0.5581 0.3646
55% 0.8640 0.7202 0.5963 0.5081 0.3479
60% 0.8504 0.7099 0.5528 0.4263 0.2585
65% 0.8409 0.6904 0.4987 0.4222 0.2753
70% 0.8313 0.6739 0.4874 0.4155 0.2371
75% 0.8072 0.6389 0.3358 0.3872 0.2192
80% 0.8223 0.6172 0.4434 0.3753 0.1969
85% 0.7946 0.5986 0.4480 0.3330 0.1438
90% 0.7884 0.5874 0.4257 0.3101 0.1282
95% 0.7856 0.5697 0.4128 0.2905 0.0000
100% 0.7874 0.5902 0.4217 0.2096 0.0145
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Table A.6: Normalized simulation results: ∆
1
CD
Workflow length
prep 10 20 30 40 50
5% 0.0000 0.0518 0.0471 0.0989 0.3984
10% 0.0015 0.0600 0.0542 0.1288 0.4773
15% 0.0468 0.0674 0.0659 0.1672 0.5052
20% 0.0075 0.0684 0.0744 0.1819 0.5519
25% 0.0136 0.0717 0.0857 0.1956 0.5909
30% 0.0113 0.0748 0.0845 0.2118 0.6321
35% 0.0211 0.0771 0.0991 0.2352 0.6463
40% 0.0053 0.0880 0.1010 0.2715 0.6924
45% 0.0324 0.0897 0.1166 0.2903 0.7654
50% 0.0505 0.0953 0.1269 0.3138 0.7702
55% 0.0256 0.0991 0.1335 0.3384 0.8209
60% 0.0339 0.1029 0.1458 0.3677 0.8628
65% 0.0453 0.1091 0.1526 0.3855 0.8740
70% 0.0679 0.1182 0.1833 0.4279 0.9244
75% 0.0671 0.1232 0.2081 0.4433 0.9390
80% 0.0656 0.1328 0.2422 0.4551 0.9514
85% 0.0905 0.1480 0.2802 0.4747 0.9726
90% 0.0950 0.1686 0.3286 0.4850 0.9834
95% 0.1063 0.1954 0.3681 0.4940 0.9911
100% 0.1305 0.2274 0.4051 0.5031 1.0000
Table A.7: Normalized simulation results: ∆
1
HV
Workflow length
prep 10 20 30 40 50
5% 0.2242 0.4479 0.4513 0.5270 0.5637
10% 0.2148 0.4800 0.4597 0.5591 0.5915
15% 0.2165 0.5028 0.4955 0.5714 0.6016
20% 0.2128 0.5017 0.5019 0.5852 0.6204
25% 0.2142 0.5114 0.5014 0.6001 0.6390
30% 0.2081 0.5179 0.5254 0.6101 0.6544
35% 0.1979 0.5141 0.5057 0.6221 0.6600
40% 0.1945 0.5191 0.5226 0.6311 0.6823
45% 0.1995 0.5088 0.5331 0.6415 0.7122
50% 0.1858 0.5168 0.5233 0.6592 0.7222
55% 0.1884 0.4990 0.5271 0.6856 0.7528
60% 0.1732 0.5013 0.5298 0.7068 0.7797
65% 0.1674 0.5034 0.5051 0.7191 0.7986
70% 0.1552 0.4990 0.5215 0.7484 0.8447
75% 0.1531 0.4993 0.5299 0.7779 0.8561
80% 0.1403 0.5126 0.5488 0.7901 0.8843
85% 0.1328 0.5015 0.5583 0.8023 0.9060
90% 0.1229 0.5271 0.5813 0.8270 0.9359
95% 0.1147 0.5665 0.6049 0.8571 0.9668
100% 0.0000 0.6426 0.6949 0.9009 1.0000
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A.4 Numerical Data of Experiments
This appendix shows the raw data used for generating the plots depicted in
Chapter 7. In order to enhance readability, data has been generally rounded to four
digits after decimal point except for Runtime (Tables A.8 and A.18) and Response
Time (Table A.10). Since in these cases the data has at least four digits, the decimal
portion has no significant impact on the measured values. Each of the following
tables consists of two parts. In the upper part, simulation results have been
averaged over different numbers of protection goals while the data in the lower
part is averaged over different workflow lengths. The symbols CIlower and CIupper
are used to denote the lower and the upper boundary of the confidence interval
respectively. Since HR itself is not the result of simulations but of computation
based onHV , Table A.17 does not include confidence intervals. The sequence of
tables follows the sequence of figures in Chapter 7.
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Table A.8: Initial runtime evaluation results
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2
2
Mean 3079 10063 4638 9395
CIlower 3067 10039 4622 9337
CIupper 3091 10087 4654 9453
4
Mean 5167 13333 6792 14859
CIlower 5150 13307 6774 14800
CIupper 5183 13359 6810 14917
6
Mean 7272 19062 8893 16854
CIlower 7241 19018 8872 16795
CIupper 7303 19106 8914 16912
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2
10
Mean 1821 10845 3546 10703
CIlower 1815 10823 3533 10662
CIupper 1827 10867 3558 10745
20
Mean 3427 12444 5113 12144
CIlower 3411 12420 5097 12087
CIupper 3443 12468 5128 12202
30
Mean 5171 14121 6736 13459
CIlower 5146 14084 6719 13399
CIupper 5196 14158 6754 13519
40
Mean 6890 15889 8482 15200
CIlower 6863 15854 8461 15136
CIupper 6917 15924 8504 15264
50
Mean 8555 17464 9994 17005
CIlower 8530 17426 9968 16937
CIupper 8579 17503 10020 17073
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Table A.9: Simulation results: Price
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
2
Mean 75.1802 78.4729 78.9843 79.3291 76.1187
CIlower 74.8232 78.3090 78.5947 78.9473 75.7027
CIupper 75.5372 78.6368 79.3740 79.7109 76.5346
4
Mean 74.3905 74.3014 74.8320 74.9876 75.5534
CIlower 74.2964 73.9341 74.3014 74.4384 74.8687
CIupper 74.4847 74.6687 75.3626 75.5368 76.2380
6
Mean 74.2829 71.8377 72.7756 73.5394 74.6170
CIlower 74.2177 71.2513 72.2317 72.9559 73.9155
CIupper 74.3480 72.4242 73.3196 74.1229 75.3185
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
10
Mean 24.9717 21.4946 22.9352 22.3979 21.8232
CIlower 24.8664 21.4253 22.8099 22.2897 21.6279
CIupper 25.0770 21.5639 23.0606 22.5061 22.0185
20
Mean 48.9542 45.0496 47.2447 47.4798 45.1252
CIlower 48.7906 44.8806 46.9206 47.1556 44.6791
CIupper 49.1179 45.2185 47.5689 47.8041 45.5713
30
Mean 74.9350 72.9816 74.3998 75.7842 76.9354
CIlower 74.7680 72.6742 73.8850 75.2493 76.2516
CIupper 75.1019 73.2890 74.9145 76.3192 77.6191
40
Mean 99.4842 104.1472 103.8546 104.3191 101.8182
CIlower 99.2988 103.6245 103.1827 103.5980 100.9530
CIupper 99.6696 104.6699 104.5265 105.0402 102.6834
50
Mean 124.7443 130.6804 129.2190 129.7790 131.4464
CIlower 124.5050 129.8860 128.4147 128.9434 130.6332
CIupper 124.9837 131.4748 130.0233 130.6145 132.2595
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Table A.10: Simulation results: Response Time
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
2
Mean 69130 52412 54528 54345 50176
CIlower 68764 52191 54141 53946 49460
CIupper 69497 52634 54915 54744 50893
4
Mean 70308 53503 64842 65157 55290
CIlower 70201 53081 64295 64529 54485
CIupper 70415 53925 65389 65785 56095
6
Mean 71283 65685 69419 69835 58417
CIlower 71214 64867 68694 69183 57672
CIupper 71352 66503 70144 70487 59162
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
10
Mean 22197 21520 20669 20773 18701
CIlower 22072 21458 20539 20611 18296
CIupper 22321 21582 20799 20934 19107
20
Mean 46066 37051 39945 40673 32705
CIlower 45902 36788 39595 40310 32067
CIupper 46230 37314 40296 41036 33342
30
Mean 69896 57979 61695 62302 54564
CIlower 69735 57354 60917 61729 53617
CIupper 70058 58605 62473 62875 55512
40
Mean 94144 75076 85006 84404 73809
CIlower 93930 74450 84310 83601 72875
CIupper 94357 75702 85701 85207 74743
50
Mean 118899 94375 107333 107411 93359
CIlower 118658 93516 106520 106514 92506
CIupper 119140 95234 108145 108308 94212
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Table A.11: Simulation results: Encryption
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
2
Mean 0.8005 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
CIlower 0.8003 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
CIupper 0.8006 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
4
Mean 0.8003 0.8000 0.8003 0.8003 0.8004
CIlower 0.8003 0.8000 0.8002 0.8002 0.8003
CIupper 0.8004 0.8000 0.8004 0.8003 0.8006
6
Mean 0.8005 0.8023 0.8010 0.8016 0.8022
CIlower 0.8004 0.8022 0.8008 0.8014 0.8019
CIupper 0.8005 0.8024 0.8011 0.8017 0.8025
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
10
Mean 0.8021 0.8039 0.8021 0.8030 0.8044
CIlower 0.8017 0.8037 0.8018 0.8027 0.8037
CIupper 0.8025 0.8040 0.8024 0.8034 0.8051
20
Mean 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
CIlower 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
CIupper 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
30
Mean 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
CIlower 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
CIupper 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
40
Mean 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
CIlower 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
CIupper 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
50
Mean 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
CIlower 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
CIupper 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8000
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Table A.12: Simulation results: Compliance Distance
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
2
Mean 6.7257 2.2432 3.4492 3.9953 0.0017
CIlower 6.6175 2.2085 3.3769 3.9324 0.0001
CIupper 6.8339 2.2779 3.5215 4.0581 0.0033
4
Mean 7.4301 1.5050 5.8844 5.5823 0.0035
CIlower 7.3910 1.4743 5.7625 5.5001 0.0017
CIupper 7.4691 1.5357 6.0063 5.6646 0.0053
6
Mean 8.9298 1.9778 5.7118 6.5748 0.6558
CIlower 8.8980 1.9308 5.5993 6.4718 0.6457
CIupper 8.9617 2.0249 5.8242 6.6778 0.6658
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
10
Mean 1.8987 1.3391 1.8702 1.9226 0.0119
CIlower 1.8633 1.3250 1.8490 1.9080 0.0089
CIupper 1.9341 1.3531 1.8914 1.9372 0.0150
20
Mean 4.1042 1.0225 3.2549 3.4442 0.0000
CIlower 4.0560 0.9996 3.1966 3.4045 0.0000
CIupper 4.1524 1.0454 3.3132 3.4839 0.0000
30
Mean 7.7532 2.2358 3.4305 5.6364 0.3359
CIlower 7.6929 2.1901 3.3544 5.5547 0.3339
CIupper 7.8135 2.2814 3.5066 5.7181 0.3379
40
Mean 11.4063 3.5857 8.1800 7.9098 0.6691
CIlower 11.3352 3.5367 8.0155 7.7865 0.6654
CIupper 11.4774 3.6347 8.3446 8.0331 0.6727
50
Mean 13.3136 1.3604 8.3399 8.0076 0.0847
CIlower 13.2300 1.3045 8.1490 7.8535 0.0710
CIupper 13.3971 1.4163 8.5309 8.1618 0.0985
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Table A.13: Simulation results: Average DF
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
2
Mean 0.0090 0.0182 0.0178 0.0185 0.0153
CIlower 0.0088 0.0173 0.0177 0.0184 0.0153
CIupper 0.0091 0.0191 0.0178 0.0185 0.0153
4
Mean 0.0286 0.0987 0.0645 0.0661 0.0591
CIlower 0.0280 0.0975 0.0629 0.0645 0.0562
CIupper 0.0293 0.1000 0.0662 0.0678 0.0621
6
Mean 0.0392 0.1689 0.1135 0.0976 0.0907
CIlower 0.0389 0.1665 0.1116 0.0963 0.0880
CIupper 0.0396 0.1713 0.1154 0.0990 0.0934
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
10
Mean 0.0281 0.0460 0.0362 0.0350 0.0320
CIlower 0.0272 0.0454 0.0351 0.0340 0.0294
CIupper 0.0291 0.0466 0.0372 0.0360 0.0345
20
Mean 0.0355 0.1377 0.0826 0.0868 0.0902
CIlower 0.0350 0.1355 0.0815 0.0858 0.0884
CIupper 0.0359 0.1399 0.0838 0.0879 0.0921
30
Mean 0.0260 0.1261 0.1043 0.0763 0.0674
CIlower 0.0258 0.1241 0.1024 0.0751 0.0645
CIupper 0.0263 0.1282 0.1062 0.0775 0.0704
40
Mean 0.0197 0.0950 0.0561 0.0611 0.0387
CIlower 0.0195 0.0936 0.0551 0.0601 0.0373
CIupper 0.0199 0.0965 0.0571 0.0621 0.0401
50
Mean 0.0187 0.0716 0.0472 0.0445 0.0470
CIlower 0.0185 0.0703 0.0463 0.0436 0.0463
CIupper 0.0189 0.0729 0.0480 0.0453 0.0476
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Table A.14: Simulation results: L2 Norm
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
2
Mean 0.0493 0.1012 0.0989 0.1026 0.0855
CIlower 0.0486 0.1011 0.0988 0.1025 0.0854
CIupper 0.0499 0.1014 0.0991 0.1027 0.0855
4
Mean 0.0931 0.2257 0.1925 0.1995 0.1632
CIlower 0.0924 0.2242 0.1911 0.1980 0.1591
CIupper 0.0939 0.2272 0.1940 0.2010 0.1673
6
Mean 0.1304 0.4041 0.3100 0.2961 0.2411
CIlower 0.1297 0.3997 0.3066 0.2937 0.2359
CIupper 0.1312 0.4084 0.3133 0.2985 0.2463
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
10
Mean 0.1528 0.3117 0.2462 0.2648 0.1999
CIlower 0.1518 0.3103 0.2447 0.2633 0.1946
CIupper 0.1538 0.3131 0.2476 0.2662 0.2052
20
Mean 0.0923 0.2474 0.1982 0.2045 0.1818
CIlower 0.0915 0.2454 0.1967 0.2028 0.1783
CIupper 0.0931 0.2493 0.1998 0.2063 0.1853
30
Mean 0.0692 0.2279 0.2144 0.1792 0.1309
CIlower 0.0686 0.2250 0.2117 0.1778 0.1278
CIupper 0.0697 0.2308 0.2171 0.1806 0.1339
40
Mean 0.0604 0.1991 0.1562 0.1607 0.1188
CIlower 0.0600 0.1970 0.1548 0.1595 0.1162
CIupper 0.0607 0.2012 0.1576 0.1620 0.1213
50
Mean 0.0801 0.2323 0.1874 0.1877 0.1849
CIlower 0.0792 0.2307 0.1862 0.1867 0.1837
CIupper 0.0810 0.2339 0.1885 0.1888 0.1862
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Table A.15: Simulation results: RMS Norm
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
2
Mean 0.0348 0.0716 0.0699 0.0725 0.0605
CIlower 0.0344 0.0715 0.0698 0.0724 0.0604
CIupper 0.0353 0.0717 0.0700 0.0726 0.0605
4
Mean 0.0466 0.1129 0.0963 0.0998 0.0816
CIlower 0.0462 0.1121 0.0955 0.0990 0.0795
CIupper 0.0470 0.1136 0.0970 0.1005 0.0836
6
Mean 0.0533 0.1650 0.1265 0.1209 0.0984
CIlower 0.0529 0.1632 0.1252 0.1199 0.0963
CIupper 0.0536 0.1667 0.1279 0.1219 0.1006
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
10
Mean 0.0686 0.1374 0.1101 0.1180 0.0888
CIlower 0.0681 0.1368 0.1094 0.1173 0.0863
CIupper 0.0691 0.1380 0.1107 0.1186 0.0912
20
Mean 0.0447 0.1156 0.0944 0.0975 0.0868
CIlower 0.0443 0.1147 0.0937 0.0968 0.0853
CIupper 0.0451 0.1165 0.0951 0.0983 0.0883
30
Mean 0.0347 0.1093 0.1021 0.0886 0.0646
CIlower 0.0344 0.1081 0.1009 0.0880 0.0631
CIupper 0.0350 0.1106 0.1033 0.0892 0.0660
40
Mean 0.0314 0.0984 0.0791 0.0819 0.0600
CIlower 0.0312 0.0975 0.0785 0.0813 0.0589
CIupper 0.0316 0.0993 0.0798 0.0825 0.0611
50
Mean 0.0450 0.1216 0.1022 0.1026 0.1006
CIlower 0.0445 0.1209 0.1016 0.1021 0.1001
CIupper 0.0456 0.1223 0.1027 0.1031 0.1012
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Table A.16: Simulation results: HV
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
2
Mean 0.0017 0.0072 0.0069 0.0074 0.0057
CIlower 0.0017 0.0072 0.0069 0.0074 0.0057
CIupper 0.0017 0.0072 0.0070 0.0074 0.0057
4
Mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CIlower 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CIupper 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
6
Mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CIlower 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CIupper 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
10
Mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CIlower 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CIupper 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
20
Mean 0.0003 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007
CIlower 0.0003 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007
CIupper 0.0003 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007
30
Mean 0.0003 0.0016 0.0014 0.0016 0.0006
CIlower 0.0003 0.0016 0.0014 0.0016 0.0006
CIupper 0.0003 0.0016 0.0014 0.0016 0.0006
40
Mean 0.0004 0.0023 0.0020 0.0022 0.0011
CIlower 0.0004 0.0023 0.0020 0.0022 0.0011
CIupper 0.0004 0.0023 0.0020 0.0023 0.0011
50
Mean 0.0018 0.0074 0.0074 0.0076 0.0071
CIlower 0.0018 0.0074 0.0074 0.0076 0.0071
CIupper 0.0019 0.0074 0.0074 0.0076 0.0071
Table A.17: MeanHR of simulation results
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
2 0.0591 0.2490 0.2397 0.2548 0.1974
4 0.0059 0.5749 0.1083 0.1777 0.1332
6 0.0006 0.6393 0.2535 0.0649 0.0417
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
10 0.1041 0.2459 0.2238 0.2333 0.1929
20 0.0781 0.2354 0.2345 0.2405 0.2115
30 0.0574 0.2838 0.2500 0.2954 0.1134
40 0.0516 0.2835 0.2473 0.2813 0.1364
50 0.0590 0.2364 0.2363 0.2423 0.2260
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Table A.18: Simulation results: Runtime
# Prot. Functions Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
2
Mean 28127 33129 29008 34123 34521
CIlower 28085 33086 28940 34075 34109
CIupper 28170 33171 29077 34171 34933
4
Mean 33197 37482 34641 40472 40024
CIlower 33068 37409 34511 40395 39882
CIupper 33326 37554 34772 40550 40166
6
Mean 35339 45883 35673 46405 35582
CIlower 35213 45827 35621 46293 35499
CIupper 35465 45939 35726 46516 35666
Workflow Length Random IBEA NSGA-II SPEA2 COMPAGA
10
Mean 10061 17796 12538 23727 12708
CIlower 10037 17768 12516 23660 12657
CIupper 10085 17825 12560 23794 12759
20
Mean 23092 27991 20781 28658 21457
CIlower 22956 27953 20747 28608 21412
CIupper 23228 28030 20815 28708 21503
30
Mean 31313 38653 35133 38699 31507
CIlower 31236 38565 35071 38586 31440
CIupper 31390 38741 35194 38811 31575
40
Mean 42445 49782 45303 49432 42602
CIlower 42326 49716 45069 49353 42529
CIupper 42563 49848 45536 49510 42675
50
Mean 54194 59932 51784 61151 75271
CIlower 54054 59868 51715 61064 74447
CIupper 54335 59996 51853 61239 76096
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